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Abstract
THE EU banking systems are facing major changes in the form o f increased 
competition, concentration and restructuring. These changes are triggered by a number 
of factors including technological change, financial liberalisation and 
internationalisation. The circulation of the single currency is expected to reinforce 
these trends.
Although the banking industry is in a state of flux, it is possible to discern some overall 
patterns in the actions and strategies of individual banks. The effects of these responses 
are mainly reflected in changes in the structure of bank income and, in particular, in the 
increasing incidence of non-interest income. The analysis of the shift towards non­
interest income provides key information for evaluating the extent to which this 
process could affect banks’ profitability.
Profits have become the driving force in market economies. Many banks are keenly 
interested in earning maximum profits to provide the highest possible return to their 
shareholders and secure additional funds to support long-term growth. As the EU 
banking industry continuously evolves, changes in industry composition and the 
macroeconomic environment have a direct impact on the aggregate performance of the 
industry.
If banks’ profitability becomes more volatile, banking is more risky unless the level of 
profitability raises substantially. So, there is a clear connection between profitability 
volatility and banking stability; a high level of profitability volatility is a source of 
instability in the banking system, augmenting the possibility of bank failures. A move 
to more interest rate sensitive assets like securities and to off-balance sheet 
instruments, along with more prone to default assets, like consumption credit, may 
increase the profitability’s volatility and so the stability and soundness of the banking 
system. The changes in the banks’ income structure and the determinants of 
profitability deriving from developments in the banking business will have clear 
implications on the activity of banking supervision.
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Research Motivation
1.1. Introduction
During the past few decades major changes are transforming the global banking 
industry. The major drivers of change are globalisation and customisation, 
deregulation, information technology (IT), and increased customer sophistication. The 
globalisation of retail markets has resulted, in general, in a greater homogenisation of 
customer tastes and preferences across national boundaries. IT creates new possibilities 
for disintermediation and provides an almost infinite amount of information at very 
low cost to customers who are now more sophisticated than in the past. Although new 
regulations have been introduced into banking, in general, the trend over the past 
twenty years has been towards deregulation that creates opportunities for new entrants 
into bank markets from both financial and non-financial companies, and intensifies 
international competition.
Despite these fundamental factors which are changing the nature o f the financial 
service business, the single currency should function as a catalyst. The introduction of 
the single currency will alter the sources of competitive advantage of European banks. 
The euro circulation will not only make the creation of a single market irreversible, but 
it will, besides the obvious fall in revenue from intra-European currencies trading, 
change fundamentally the nature of several businesses. A more predictable 
environment will facilitate the exploitation of economies of scale and the optimal 
location of processing units. Finally, the transition to a more stable monetary 
environment should bring positive effects to the European Union (EU) banking 
systems (especially to banking systems previously operating in a high inflation 
environment). Price stability has already contributed to financial market stability, 
although the EU has not been by any means fully insulated against the global asset 
price movements.
From the nature of their operations, the credit institutions are at the centre of every 
process that is related to the reformation of the credit and monetary system. Indeed, the 
EU banks found themselves in the centre of the procedure for the financial integration.
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In a more developed stage, nowadays, the banks constitute the cornerstone of the 
monetary integration process. The advent of the single European currency has 
accelerated the need for the industry to restructure. This has clear implications not only 
fo r  the composition o f bank income but also fo r  the sustainability and variability o f the 
profit levels.
1.2. The Performance of Commercial Banks
Banks are financial institutions that accept deposits and make loans. On the 
microeconomic level, they represent the primary source of credit to most small 
businesses and many individuals. In market economies, they serve the key purposes of 
providing financial intermediation1 and transaction services. They raise funds primarily 
by issuing checkable deposits (deposits on which checks can be written), savings 
deposits (deposits that are payable on demand but do not allow their owner to write 
checks), and time deposits (deposits with fixed terms to maturity). They use these 
funds to make commercial, consumer, and mortgage loans and to buy government 
securities and municipal bonds. Transaction services facilitate payments for goods, 
services, and financial investments, and thereby support the medium of exchange.
The banking industry is changing rapidly. An old characterisation pictured bank 
managers as retired from the ‘hustle and bustle’ of the real world (Miller and Noulas, 
1997). They accumulated deposits at low rates and loaned the money out at higher 
fixed rates. The interest rate spread provided a consistent and reliable profit stream. In 
what was traditionally a stable industry in which most banks enjoyed relatively high 
levels of profitability, instability and diverging returns are now the norms. A range of 
factors has created an unstable business environment in which the old rules of 
competition are being eroded. Price and geographic deregulation, advances in 
technology, capitalisation of financial markets, and increased competition from non­
bank institutions (dis-intermediation) have dramatically changed the environment 
within which banks must operate.
1 Intermediation is the process of selling financial claims to savers, and investing the proceeds 
in claims on businesses, households and government. This process can reduce the degree of risk 
and uncertainty in an economic system, thereby lowering the real rate of interest and the cost of 
capital, which in turn leads to higher investment and a better standard o f living.
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Measuring bank performance is a difficult task because of the multidimensional and 
intangible nature of banking products and the lack of explicit prices for some of the 
output. Not so long ago the main objective of banks and most financial institutions was 
growth and, consequently, the size of the balance sheet total. But, modem economies 
are based on production and consumption of increasingly differentiated goods and 
services. In the case of banking, this increased variety leads to the fragmentation and 
changing nature of the banking services. Banks that systematically manage for 
shareholder value stand the best chance of competing successfully in the new 
economy. Optimising risk growth and return trade-offs successfully creates greater 
market confidence, which in turn has the beneficial effect of raising share prices. 
Financial institutions increase their focus on profitability management. Profits have 
become the driving force in market economies. Generally speaking, Dr. Peter Drucker 
and Dr. Milton Friedman, each from his own viewpoint, convincingly argue that it is 
socially irresponsible and economically damaging for business to be concerned with 
anything but results. That is maximising profits.
In 1990 the concept of shareholder value creation was not high on the agenda of most 
bankers. However, the topic is gradually increasing in popularity; for example, the 
1990 Chief Executive’s Report of Lloyds Bank opens with the heading ‘Creating 
Shareholder Value’. Brian Pitman, the CEO, goes on to write: “...our objective is to 
produce for shareholders long-term, superior total returns, comprising progressive 
dividend growth and appreciation in the share price".
Many banks are keenly interested in earning maximum profits in order to provide the 
highest possible returns to their shareholders and secure additional funds to support 
long-term growth. They realise that higher profits may enhance the confidence among 
depositors and investors, making it easier to raise capital in the future. Market 
confidence also enables executives to invest in the technology and product 
development that is required for further business and profit growth. This renewed 
concern over higher profits was especially evident among larger U.S. banks in the late 
1960s and 1970s, when many institutions paid closer attention to daily bank stock price 
movements. These banks saw rising profits, leading to higher stock prices, as an
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avenue permitting them to acquire more bank and non-bank affiliated firms and 
thereby expand into new markets.
Evaluating the banks’ overall performance and monitoring their financial condition is 
important to depositors, owners, potential investors, managers, and regulators. 
Currently, financial ratios are often used to measure the overall financial soundness of 
a bank and the quality of its management. Bank regulators, for example, use financial 
ratios to help evaluate a bank’s performance as part of the CAMEL system2. Many 
financial ratios have been designed to measure various dimensions of bank 
performance. The performance measures employed in the literature are generally based 
on accounting profitability since hundreds of banks lack market data. Commonly, 
comparisons of profitability are made using accounting return on assets (ROA), and 
accounting return on equity (ROE). For profitability comparison between European 
countries, net income, assets, and book value of equity are aggregated to the state level 
by summing across all banks operating in a given country. The profitability variable 
equals the total profits before tax (or net income) of all banks in a country divided by 
the total assets (or total equity) of all banks in that country.
1.3. Sources of Income
Banks generate income in two ways: (i) interest income from loans, securities, and 
other funds sold, and (ii) fees and services charges, called non-interest income, related 
to such products and services as loan originations, loan servicing, deposit-account 
activity, credit card annual fees and other activities.
The difference between a bank’s total interest income and total interest expense is 
called net interest income. For a traditional bank engaged in funding loans with 
deposits, net interest income represents the “bread and butter” of the business (Sinkey, 
1998). It has the major task to covering the bank’s loan-loss provision, net non-interest
2 Many agencies (e.g. the Federal deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)) assess the overall quality of a bank’s condition according 
to the CAMEL system. The letters in CAMEL refer to capital adequacy, asset quality, 
management quality, earnings ability, and liquidity. Regulators assign ratings from 1 (best) to 5 
(worst) for each category and an overall rating for all features combined.
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income, securities losses, taxes, extraordinary items, and dividends. Except for 
dividends, deducting these items leads to a bank’s bottom line, or net income 
(accounting net profits).
Despite its recent decline as a share of total assets, net interest income continues to be 
the most important source of bank income with at least two-thirds o f banks’ gross 
income coming from this source o f income in most countries. Interest on loans and 
investments comprises the bulk of revenue. Interest payments on borrowings similarly 
represent the primary expense. Understanding the trends of net interest income is 
therefore central to monitoring and predicting bank performance.
In recent years as market conditions have become tougher and more competitive, the 
focus of profitability management has tended to shift away from interest earnings 
towards fees and other income. The relative share of non-interest income (as a 
percentage of total operating income) increased in the EU throughout the last decade. 
This evolution was a result of both increasing non-interest income and the ongoing 
reduction in interest income. The composition of non-interest income is rather 
heterogeneous. Fees and commissions are the main components, with the other three 
components being net profit from financial operations, income from securities, and 
other operating income. There are important differences between countries and banks.
Non-interest income as a whole does not seem to be more volatile than net interest 
income. However, it does not help stabilising total income. The latter does not imply 
that non-traditional activities are unprofitable for the bank. It does not contradict the 
fact that loan selling might be desirable for a bank since it moves assets off-balance 
sheet, freeing up bank capital, while the loan purchases might be a way for a bank to 
diversify its portfolio. To the extent that the investment banking market is imperfectly 
competitive, commercial banks may find it profitable to move onto these types of 
activities even if they are not the most efficient producers.
As a result of the increased importance of activities generating non-interest income, 
banks’ operational, reputation and strategic risks seem to be heightened.
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1.4. Profitability Determinants
A chief executive officer (CEO) may not rest, however, once he or she understands 
what is performance and finds ways to measure it. The next challenge is to discover 
what drives performance so that appropriate managerial actions can be taken. This is 
not a simple issue. The drivers of performance are many and are tightly intervened, as 
their relationships can be quite complex.
The rate of return earned by a commercial bank, i.e. its profitability, is affected by 
numerous factors. These factors include elements internal to each financial institution 
and several important external forces shaping earnings performance. Internal 
determinants relate to management control variables, such as the level of risk included 
in bank balance sheets, expense management, the level of capital in the bank, the level 
of liquidity, and ownership characteristics. External determinants of bank profitability 
are those factors that are not influenced by specific bank decisions and policies, but by 
changes in the external economic environment. The most important of them is the 
market growth, the level of market interest rates, the level of inflation, or more 
generally monetary policy shifts. Evidence suggests that macroeconomic instability is 
an important cause of financial instability. In particular, inflation in either or both 
product prices and asset prices reduces the efficiency and endangers the survival of 
financial institutions. Environmental factors are indirectly controlled by the banks - 
through lobbying activities, marketing efforts, research and development- and hence, 
they can also be viewed as major factors in understanding performance. The literature 
review on bank performance studies suggests that bank profitability is determined by 
both kinds of factors.
1.5. Macroeconomic Conditions and Bank Performance
General macroeconomic conditions have substantial impact on the financial sector and 
the pace of financial development. Bank performance, monetary policy 
implementation, and bank examination are interrelated in various ways. Monetary 
policy may itself establish at least some performance criteria. It also determines many 
of the constraints under which banks must operate. Assessing performance and 
implementing monetary policy both require information on bank activities.
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Although the instruments of monetary control are used primarily for stabilisation 
purposes, a monetary aggregate can be fixed with various settings of the instruments, 
and the banking profits are sensitive to the choice among combinations. The effects of 
monetary policy on profits should not be neutralised. Instead, these profit effects ought 
to be used to influence the structure of the banking industry with a view toward 
improving performance.
In recent years, many central banks have placed increased emphasis on price stability. 
Monetary policy, whether expressed in terms of interest rates or growth o f monetary 
aggregates, has been geared increasingly toward the achievement of low and stable 
inflation. It seems reasonable to define this objective as a state o f affairs in which 
inflation and inflation expectations are no longer a significant influence on economic 
decision-making. Inflation is a monetary phenomenon. Professor Lintner (see Jaffe, 
2000), in his American association presidential address, states that “few  matters are o f  
more serious concern to students o f  finance and to members o f  the financial 
community than the impact o f  inflation on our financial institutions and markets and 
its implication for investment policy”. Inflation is a process of continually rising prices, 
implying a continually falling value of money. Inflation is measured by a variety of 
price indexes that track the average price of different representative market baskets of 
goods and services. High and more volatile inflation has a major impact on bank 
earnings. Mainly it deteriorates the asset quality which surfaces as increased loan loss 
provisions and net loan losses. Maintaining loan losses have decreased the average 
profitability of banks while continued declines in loan loss provisions are many times 
the primary catalyst for increases in net interest margins. A reasonable degree of price 
stability is possibly the most critical prerequisite for effective and efficient domestic 
resource mobilisation and allocation through the financial sector.
The conduct of the monetary policy, the management of interest rates and the quantity 
of money, also referred to as the money supply (defined as anything that is generally 
accepted in payment for goods and services or in the repayment of debt), has an 
important impact on financial markets and institutions. The level of interest rates, the 
fluctuations and the unpredictability of future rates, have impinged on financial 
institutions in many ways, both directly and through the effects on their customers.
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Existing levels of interest rates affect both inflows and outflows of the commercial 
banks’ funds. The major source of revenue for such intermediaries is the interest return 
on their loans and investments, and the major expense category is interest payments for 
borrowed funds (including deposits). A rise in interest rates raises the cost of acquiring 
funds for commercial banks and raises the income on assets such as loans. In addition, 
changes in interest rates and interest rate expectations also affect the income and 
expenses of financial institutions. These changes affect the prices o f securities such as 
stocks and bonds that are held by financial institutions. Changes in interest rates thus 
directly affect the profitability and value of commercial banks.
The argument is that rate variability reduces financial market stability, although some 
economist and policymakers argue that efforts to smooth interest rates increase the 
variability of money and income, and, over the long run, the variability of rates as well. 
Also, the degree of uncertainty introduced by financial deregulation was in a growing 
difficulty in forecasting interest rate term structure. For example, unanticipated 
increases in short term interest rates, when the trend for interest rates was downward 
slopping, affected negatively the profitability of banks’ decisions about funding in 
money markets.
1.6. Research Motivation and Potential Contributions
While the efficiency of the financial markets has been studied and debated at length, 
much less has been done in understanding the performance and the income sources of 
the institutions that operate in these markets. Under intense competitive pressures, 
financial institutions are forced to take a careful look into their performance and its 
sustainability. It is my expectation that the better understanding of performance and its 
drivers will lead to managerial practices that improve the performance of this 
significant sector of economic activity.
Many studies of the determinants of bank profitability in several countries have been 
undertaken, including those which have focused on the relationship between 
concentration and profitability and those which have examined the possibility of 
expense preference behavior existing in regulated and concentrated industries such as 
banking. However, it appears to have covered less well the relationship between
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monetary conditions and bank profitability or its income sources i.e. net interest 
income and non-interest income. The identification of the relationship between bank 
performance and changes in the external macroeconomic environment is also useful. It 
will help all the people who are involved in banks’ operations (shareholders, potential 
investors, bank management, depositors, bank staff, regulators, and supervisory 
authorities) in their estimations of the determinants of banks’ profitability.
The motivation of this thesis is based on the fact that in the global banking 
environment is changing rapidly. Especially in Europe, the introduction of the single 
currency is altering the fabric of European banking industry. In what was traditionally 
a stable industry in which most of the banks enjoyed relative high levels of 
profitability, instability and diverging returns are now the norm. In this environment 
the importance, or the direction, of the influence of several determinants on bank 
profitability may have been vulnerable. We will look at the change in banks’ 
performance, not only on its determinants but also on its components (interest versus 
non-interest income). The connection between profitability volatility and banking 
stability bridges micro with macroeconomic issues. A high level of profitability 
volatility is a source of instability in the banking system, augmenting the possibility of 
bank failures. The systematic issue is, without any doubt, in the macro economic field.
Both market participants and supervisors need information about the financial 
performance of a bank. Information about the performance of a bank, in particular 
about its profitability, and the variability of those profits over time, in necessary to 
access potential changes in financial position and future potential to repay deposits and 
liabilities, to make distributions to owners, and to contribute to capital growth. 
Information about profits and losses and their components over recent and earlier 
periods, helps from assessments of future financial performance and cash flows. It also 
helps assess the effectiveness with which a bank has employed its resources.
Initially we monitor and assess developments in European banking by describing the 
structure of the banking industry in Europe. Then, we examine profitability and 
performance of European banks, utilising the databases that are available. After that,
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we concentrate on the sources of income, the net interest income and the non-interest 
income. An econometric analysis is conducted on the determinants of net interest 
income, while the effects of the non-interest income on the stability of bank 
profitability is also presented. Then we examine the several determinants of bank 
profitability, both internal and external, by using accounting data for bank profits. In 
the last part of the thesis we review the main conclusions of the thesis and make policy 
recommendations at European level.
Summarising, we foresee the following possible contributions from this research:
i) Banks’ performance measurement in Europe by using data on a recent period 
(1992-1999). In the provisional absence of harmonised bank statements in the 
EU, the most important sources of bank accounting data are a limited number 
of privately maintained annual account databases, like the Fitch-IBCA 
Bankscope database which is used in the thesis. Combined, they allow 
coverage of the vast majority of European credit institutions. Since bank 
accounting practices and publications customs differ markedly within the EU, 
a considerable effort has been put into the screening and functional regrouping 
of the published statements.
ii) Identify the possible factors that drive the profitability of EU banks (studies 
using international databases are limited) and cast some light on the debate of 
whether the external determinants are responsible for changes in bank 
performance. This study shows that it is possible to conduct a meaningful 
analysis in spite of the substantial differences in accounting practices and legal 
forms between banks in various EU countries.
iii) Use of data which cover both a recent period (1992-1999) [or the period 1994- 
1998 for the econometric analysis] and a wider, compared with previous 
research on these issues, time horizon (seven years).
iv) Examine the effects of interest rates, balance sheet structure and market 
competition on the net interest margins of the banks. Also, while the bulk of 
the literature suggests a tendency for increased concentration across European 
banking markets, there appears to have been no other studies [except these by 
Short (1979) and Bourke (1989) years ago], that attempt to examine the
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relationship of bank size, market concentration, and macroeconomic 
conditions with bank performance in Europe.
v) Introduce modem portfolio theory to identify the effect of non-interest income 
on income variations and examine interest and non-interest income variability.
vi) Compared with a recent report of the European Central Bank (April, 2000) 
which is based on aggregate country data presented on the OECD publication, 
we conduct an empirical search for the correlation between interest and non­
interest income, both expressed as a percentage of the average balance sheet 
total, for individual banks in the period 1994-1998.
vii) Introduce in the analysis of bank performance and income sources not only the 
influence of the levels of interest rates, but also their variability.
viii) As well as analysing the universe of European banks in the traditional 
geographical groupings, we also ‘cut’ the sector by type of bank across 
Europe, in order to provide a better understanding of performance and 
valuation frameworks, and the impact of industry trends on the different 
institutions. Additionally, we segment the bank universe into two size brackets.
The reader must have noticed that while we talk about the performance of financial 
institutions, in general, most of the discussion focuses on banking institutions. By 
focusing on a single class of financial institutions, we have been able, collectively, to 
make substantial progress in understanding their performance and its drivers. While 
not all the findings are applicable to other institutions, commonalities do exist between 
financial service firms. We hope that the body of knowledge presented here can guide 
efforts in understanding the performance of other financial institutions as well.
1.7. Overview of the Thesis
Chapter 2 presents procedures for analysing bank performance. Many financial ratios 
have been designed to measure the various dimensions of bank performance. The 
performance measures employed in the literature are generally based on accounting 
measures of profitability, although recent innovation has led to new performance 
measures.
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In Chapter 3 we describe the structure of the banking industry in Europe, discussing 
the variations in the importance of banks between countries. We also analyse the main 
features of credit institutions and other depository institutions in Europe and where 
there are still significant differences in institutional arrangements between member 
states. Moreover, we examine the various indicators of excess capacity in European 
banking. Finally, we discuss concentration in European banking, both at a national and 
pan-European level.
Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the profitability structure of the European banks by 
using Fitch-IBCA and OECD databases. Some descriptive statistics of the income 
composition and the profitability determination according to income statement and 
balance sheet analysis are presented. Between EU countries and across a short (Fitch- 
IBCA database) and long (OECD database) time period profitability and income 
statements analysis is provided. Fitch-IBCA database is a valuable source of 
information on bank income and costs, containing information on bank performance at 
the level of the individual institution. We use this database both to analyse recent 
trends in bank performance and to obtain further insight into the differences in bank 
performance between countries.
Chapter 5 presents an econometric analysis on the effects of competition, interest rate 
changes (level and variability), and the balance sheet structure on banks’ net interest 
margins. Interest sensitivity or gap management is the popular concept for managing 
banks’ net interest income and exposure to interest rate risk. The sensitivity or gap 
position, defined as the relationship between rate-sensitive assets and rate-sensitive 
liabilities, gauges a bank’s exposure to interest rate risk.
Chapter 6 shows the effect of non-interest income on the stability of the bank profit 
levels. In the face of declining net interest margins, depository institutions have entered 
new product areas over the past two decades, moving from traditional lending to areas 
that generate non-interest revenues. The change is of importance for financial stability. 
The more unstable is a bank’s earnings stream, the more risky the institution is. The 
aim of this chapter is to examine whether the gradual move into fee-earning activities
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has reduced the variability of banking system profits. The conventional wisdom in the 
banking industry is that earnings from fee-based products are more stable than loan- 
based earnings, and that fee-based activities reduce bank risk via diversification. Our 
results, generally, do not support that view.
Chapter 7 provides the literature review on the effect of several internal and external 
determinants on bank profitability. Several authors through their studies have analysed 
the differential effects of endogenous (e.g. staff expenses, capital and liquidity ratios, 
overhead expenses, the composition of loans and deposits etc.) and exogenous 
(concentration ratios, regulation, government ownership, interest rates, inflation, 
market growth) variables on bank profitability. These authors provide a mixture of 
findings on bank performance with samples of various banks’ sizes and over different 
time periods.
Chapter 8 provides the econometric analysis on the effects of internal and external 
factors on bank profitability. We adopt a multiple regression framework to analyse the 
panel and the year-by-year cross-sectional data set that has been constructed. As 
argued above, the type of explanation would determine possible policy implications 
and ought to be taken seriously.
Chapter 9 provides the main conclusions of the thesis, with some policy implications. 
We discuss strategic and policy issues and present recommendations.
Finally, in Part II of the thesis we provide a number of annexes with detailed statistical 
tabulations supporting the arguments in the main text. These cover quantitative 
analysis of banking issues related to performance measures, concentration, capacity, 
and profitability, and additional tables relating to the econometric analysis that has 
been conducted.
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Chapter 2
“Bank Performance”
Abstract
The purpose o f this chapter is to give an overview o f  bank performance 
measurement. Bank performance is a multidimensional phenomenon. Many 
financial ratios have been designed to measure various dimensions o f bank 
performance. Financial ratio analysis makes use o f  the bank’s financial 
statements to gauge the financial health o f the bank. Indeed financial ratios are 
among the most important tools available to commercial bank managers. All 
performance evaluators, regardless o f  their specific objectives, use accounting 
and market data to assess the financial condition o f  an institution at a point in 
time, as well as to determine how well it has been managed over a period o f 
time. Profitability obtains increasing emphasis due to the fact that profits’ level 
is the most important “ line o f defence” both for covering losses and 
strengthening capital adequacy. This chapter presents procedures for analysing 
bank profitability by using periodic balance sheet and income statement data. 
The profitability o f  a commercial bank can be measured in various ways; 
among them are the return on equity (ROE), and the return on assets (ROA).
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Chapter 2: Bank Performance
2.1. Introduction
Clark (1994) states that: a bank's overall performance depends on its ability to get
the fundamentals o f  its business right. These fundamentals... are all about the clarity 
and focus o f  the bank’s business vision and strategy, and the banks' effectiveness 
quality". Measuring bank performance is a difficult task because of the 
multidimensional and intangible nature of banking products and the lack of explicit 
prices for some of the output. The interest rate charged is only one of several elements 
in the price vector which can be adjusted to clear the loan market. Other elements 
include maturity, loan size and collateral. Banks also provide commitments (formal 
and informal) for future funds, business counselling and other services that are a form 
of output but difficult to quantify. Additionally, it is difficult to account for quality in a 
banking service. Thus, evaluating the economic performance of banks is a complicated 
process.
Several people involved in bank’s operations are interested in its performance: 
shareholders, potential investors, bank management, depositors, bank staff, regulators, 
and supervisory authorities3. The performance measurement systems have enabled 
banks to create internal capital markets, measure risks so as to facilitate their proper 
hedging and pricing, and create risk-based performance standards for lines of business. 
Such standards are particularly important in avoiding the misallocation of resources. 
Performance is measured by constructing the conventional standards of performance 
ranking and evaluation. Balance sheet and income statement variables relating to 
lending and investment behaviour, deposit and capital structure, liquidity and reserve 
positions, and revenues and expenses, are used. Figure 1 indicates the different 
stakeholder needs and relevant performance measures.
3 The Basle Committee has identified six broad categories of information, each of which should 
be addressed in clear terms and appropriate detail to help achieve a satisfactory level o f bank 
transparency; among them is financial performance. The other categories are financial position 
(including capital, solvency and liquidity); risk management strategies and practices; risk 
exposures (including credit, market, liquidity, operational, legal and other risks); accounting 
policies; basic business, and corporate government information.
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Figure 1: Bank stakeholders needs and performance measures
Customers Staff
Satisfy customer needs Rewarding bank to work in
- market share - bank salaries vs market
- products per customer - staff turnover rate
- closed accounts - staff attendance rate
Value for money Help staff achieve potential
- bank’s price vs market - training take up
- customer satisfaction index - number of promotions
Efficiency/Services Process efficiency
- queuing time - unit cost per transaction
- transaction processing time - transaction processing time
- complaints - lead time for product lunch
- systems downtime
Financial secure - error rates
- capital adequacy - transaction per teller
- liquidity
Shareholders Regulators.
Financial performance Financial security
- share price vs banking sector - capital adequacy
- earnings per share - liquidity
- bad debts % - profitability
- profitability by
* profit share Internal controls
* product - internal audit reports
* customer ♦overall risk index
♦grading of outcomes
- risk adjusted return - limit expectations
- cost/income ratio - fraud cases
- fee income/total income
* effective tax rates
Business performance Treating customers fairly
- market share - complaints
- customer satisfaction index - compliance exceptions
- business growth
- income per staff head
Source: Clark, M. (1994), Coopers and Lybrand Deloite Digest.
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2.2. Measures of Bank Performance
Many financial ratios have been designed to measure the various dimensions of bank 
performance. Each financial ratio’s numerator and denominator are drawn from either 
a financial institution’s balance sheet or income statement. The denominator of a 
financial ratio often serves as a scale factor to standardise that ratio so that it can be 
compared with the same ratio for another financial institution, or so that comparisons 
can be made over time to capture any trends. Commonly used scale factors are total 
assets, total deposits, total equity capital (net worth), total loans, total revenue 
(operating income), total expenses, and number of employees.
It is convenient to analyse the results of a depository institution’s operations using 
several performance dimensions: liquidity, credit risk exposure, financial leverage, 
efficiency or productivity, profitability etc. Ratios should be categorised according to 
the area o f performance with which they are most closely connected. For each area of 
performance evaluation, many ratio measures are available. Most of the ratios for 
evaluating performance are provided in Annex 1.
Ricketts and Stover (1978) used ratios which were classified into seven major 
categories: liquidity, loan volume, loan quality, capital adequacy, efficiency, 
revenue sources, and profitability. The various performance ratios that are used by 
Curry and Rose (1984) are representing portfolio composition [also Kaufman (1965), 
Fraser and Rose (1971), Mayne (1976)], bank capital e.g. Equity Capital/Total Assets 
[also Mingo (1975), Mayne (1976), Brimmer (1978), Wall (1985), Boyd and Runkle 
(1993)], operating efficiency, prices of bank services [several ratios are being used 
by Kaufman (1965), and Mayne (1976)], and profitability.
Along with increasing emphasis on asset-liability management, Arshadi and Lawrence 
(1987) mention that it becomes more important to embody the interactions between the 
various performance measures. These authors define the performance of a new bank as 
an index of profitability, pricing of bank services (average loans and deposits rates), 
and loan market share in the trade area. While high loan rates (service fees) and low 
deposit rates could contribute to short-term profitability, the critical growth of a new
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bank’s market share in a given trade area could be negatively affected, thereby 
threatening the institution’s survival. Banks could also ‘bundle’ their services by 
adopting pricing strategies which offer low loan rates and low deposit rates or high 
loan rates and high deposit rates with the same impact on profitability. Thus, the 
relationships between rates, market share, and profitability must be considered 
simultaneously.
In Brimmer’s (1978) paper, banks are appraised against three general criteria: the 
capital adequacy as the ratio of capital to risk assets; the asset quality primarily in 
terms of the size of loan losses written off and the volume o f loans that are somewhat 
of less than good quality (or in respect to which repayment is doubtful) compared with 
the bank’s capital; and the bank’s management team in terms of its effective control 
over banking operations as well as its ability to employ the bank’s assets profitably. 
The management quality is assessed in terms of senior officers’ awareness and control 
of a bank’s policies and performance. Finally, the overall evaluation o f the 
performance is the result of weighting each of the three separate criteria. It is 
summarised by assigning to the bank a composite rating, with the first group 
suggesting that the bank is in the top category with respect to each of the standards.
Generally speaking, it is difficult to monitor, evaluate, and reward executive decisions 
since many things must be taken into account e.g. the range of options available to 
executives, the programmability of their behaviour, and the uncertainty surrounding 
outcome. For Haslem (1975) management effects are the results of differences in bank 
management objectives, policies, decisions, and actions reflected in differences in bank 
operating relationships, including profitability.
Boorman (1974) and Haslem (1979) examine the asset quality as the ratios of net loan 
losses/average loans, loan loss provisions/average loans and loan loss reserves/loans. 
Fraser and Rose (1972) used a total of 26 measures of bank performance. Included 
were measures of profitability, revenue, expenses, and the composition of assets, 
liabilities, and loans. For them the two most frequently used measures of performance 
are the effective rate charged on loans and the average rate paid on time deposits.
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Yeats (1974) uses five weighted measures of market performance. Two profitability 
ratios, two price measures [the same ratios as Kaufman (1965)] and finally the 
loans/deposits ratio. The last one was calculated for each market and is interpreted as 
an activity measure or indication of the aggressiveness of competing banks. Kaufman 
(1965) uses as activity measures the ratio of loans to total assets and the ratio of time to 
total deposits. In Elliott’s (1972) paper the sample firms were measured by taking into 
account six financial performance categories; liquidity, growth, owner’s earnings, 
management profit performance, leverage, and capital investment.
Meinster and Elyasiani (1988) used multiple indicators. The sixteen performance 
measures were grouped into four categories; the asset management measures (asset 
structure, measures of liquidity and portfolio risk), the liability and capital 
management measures (three sources of fund management), the pricing measures 
(service charges on deposit accounts, interest paid on deposits, and interest charged on 
loans) and the expense and profitability measures (indicators o f management 
performance: total operating expenses over total assets, return on equity, dividend 
payout ratio, loan losses/total loans). Finally, Miller and Noulas (1997) consider the 
effect on bank performance of a number of financial ratios that measure asset (lending 
and investment) management, liability (funding) management, productivity and 
efficiency, and the quality of assets.
2.3. Profitability Measurement
Financial institutions are organisations focused on the level of profits, and we can 
define performance to mean economic performance as measured by a host of financial 
indicators. The performance measures employed in the literature are generally based 
on accounting costs or profitability. However, many times, market-based measures 
have been used: price-to-earnings ratios, the firm’s stock beta and alpha, and Tobin’s q 
ratios. Lloyd-Williams et.al. (1994) say that some measure of the price of certain 
banking products and services is not a good performance measure. It presents problems 
to the researcher, because banking is a multi-product industry and cross subsidisation 
among products and services often occurs. Prices can only be used if costs are directly 
associated with these prices and are explicitly accounted for as explanatory variables. 
Individual prices of products can be misleading. The use of profit measures should
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eliminate many of these potential problems. Profitability measures, where all product 
profits and losses are consolidated into one figure, are generally viewed as more 
suitable because they by-pass the problem of cross-subsidisation. ‘Profitability can be 
used as a summary index o f  performance’ [Heggestad (1977)]. Adequacy of earnings 
is needed to provide bank shareholders a sufficient return, to generate sufficient cash 
flows in order to cover borrowers demand and to provide for future needs through the 
development of capital. A profitable performance can help banks in gaining and 
maintaining public confidence. At the same time, it is the criterion financiers use in 
order to evaluate an organisation’s present and future trustworthiness and 
creditworthiness. Gilbert (1984) has identified that the only measures of bank 
performance obtained from bank financial accounts that do not have major 
measurement problems are bank profit rates. Others, such as Rhoades (1982,1985) and 
Evanoff and Fortier (1988), provide also support for the use of profitability measures 
to account for the performance of banks. The most usually used profitability measures 
are listed in Annex 2.
A major concern with accounting performance measures is that they are calculated 
using the book values of assets, liabilities and equity. Book values fail to recognise 
changes in the value of assets, liabilities and equity between their initial placement on 
the books of the institution and their removal by sale, repayment, maturity or charge- 
off. In other words, book value is the historic, not market, value of an asset or liability. 
However, many financial institutions provide only accounting and not market data.
To assess the financial performance of a bank, it is essential to have a breakdown of 
income and expenses incurred. This information is necessary to assess the quality of 
earnings, to identify the reasons for changes in a given bank’s profitability from year to 
year, and to compare the financial performance of different banks. The income 
statement usually includes items for interest income and expense, fees and 
commissions, other non-interest income, operating expenses, charge for credit losses, 
any extraordinary items, tax expenses, and net income. Key figures and ratios should 
include the return on average equity, return on average assets, net interest margin, and 
cost-to-income ratio.
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2.4. The Return-on-Equity Model
A basic tool of financial statement analysis is the retum-on-equity (ROE) model. This 
procedure, introduced by Cole (1971), enables an analyst to evaluate the source and 
magnitude of bank profits relative to selected risks taken.
Aggregate bank profitability is typically measured and compared in terms of retum-on- 
equity (ROE) and retum-on-assets (ROA) figures. The ROE model simply relates ROE 
to ROA and financial leverage [equity multiplier (EM)], and then decomposes ROA 
into its contributing elements. The advantage of this model stems from the fact that 
since the ratios ROE, ROA, and profit margin (PM) all have the same numerator by 
different denominators, they provide different prospective on the notion of 
profitability. Four pieces of accounting information are required to start ROE analysis: 
net income, total operating income, average assets and average equity. The first two 
pieces of information are flow variables that come from a bank’s income statement, 
while the last two are stock variables that come from the balance sheets.
2.4.1. Return-on-Equity  (R O E )
Many authors have used this measure of profitability. Among them are Emery (1971), 
Brimmer (1978), Opper (1981), Sinkey (1983), Curry & Rose (1984), Smirlock (1985), 
Clark (1986), Barry (1988), Meinster and Elyasiani (1988), Boyd and Runkle (1993), 
Woosley and Baer (1995), and Berger (1995) [see also Annex 3]. ROE equals net 
income divided by total equity (or average equity) and thus measures the percentage 
return on each pound of stockholders equity. So, by definition,
___  Net Income
ROE ------------------
Total Equity
Usually net income is synonymous with profits before taxes, and covers the sum of 
profits before taxes with net provisions (e.g. gross income less operating expenses)4. 
Pre-tax income rather than after-tax income is used many times because the tax figure 
reported on a firm’s annual statements may include tax credits or cany-forwards that
4 For Bond (1971) the figure of net profits differ from net earnings in that it reflects realised 
capital gains and losses on securities, and such factors as charge-offs and recoveries on loans 
and transfers to and from valuation reserves for loans and securities, etc.
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do not pertain to the current year’s performance. Difficulties of taking into account the 
full complexity of the tax-structure, the lagged nature of tax payments and offsets, and 
the occurrence of large tax changes affecting capital and income from capital, mean 
that tax paid in one year cannot be directly related to income earned on that year, or 
even less to income from a specific investment.
Net income before taxes differs from net operating income in that it reflects the results 
of a number of non-operating transactions and other arbitrary accounting decisions. 
Thus losses and write off (or recoveries) on loans, realised capital losses (or gains) on 
securities, and other losses (or profits) are deducted from (included in) net profit.
ROE is the aggregate return to stockholders before dividends. The higher the return the 
better, as banks can add more to retained earnings and pay more in cash dividends 
when profits are higher. The total equity capital5 is used because of the emphasis on 
shareholders’ return as a short-run proxy for long-run value maximisation.
It has been argued that ROE is more appropriate than alternative measures since this 
corresponds most closely to what owners seek to maximise. The Arthur Andersen 
survey (1993) found that bankers ranked ROE as likely to be the most important 
financial indicator by the year 2000. This measure not only, by definition, informs 
bank management about the amount that has been earned on the book value of 
common shareholders’ investment in the bank, but also reflects revenue generation, 
operational efficiency, financial leverage and tax planning (Hempel et.al. 1994).
Emery (1971) uses capital market theory in order to provide tests for differences in 
performance among a sample of structurally diverse banks. He examines the difference 
between return on equity that would have been expected for the realised level of risk if 
the bank has been on the capital market line and the return actually obtained. Any 
remaining difference is already compensated for in both the risk premium and the price 
of time. What is needed for the derivation of the capital market line is an estimate of
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the pure rate of interest i.e. return that would be earned on a riskless asset and the risk- 
return characteristics of the market portfolio.
The major drawback of this measure of decomposition as a measure of bank 
profitability is that ROE can be high because a bank has inadequate equity capital5 6. 
ROE is strongly influenced by the capital structure of a financial institution - in 
particular, how much use it makes of equity financing versus debt financing. Banks 
that do not keep much of their own capital, for whatever reason, will have higher ROE, 
even if the overall scale of activity is the same. Management may be able to boost ROE 
simply by greater use of financial leverage, that is, increasing the ratio of debt to equity 
capital. Increased use of debt in place of equity capital will improve ROE, other factors 
held constant. Thus undercapitalised financial institutions i.e. those with high financial 
leverage through heavy use of debt, can increase their returns to equity. Consequently, 
banks in environments where capital is heavily regulated may be erroneously 
suggested to be less successful under this measure than those that are not.
Additionally, a bank with negative book equity but positive profits would show a 
negative ROE. Furthermore, the definition of equity suffered several substantial 
changes over the past decade that makes difficult the computation of ROE for the same 
country over time. Finally, international rules are permissive to some flexibility in 
what concerns tier-two7 capital; that distorts any comparative analyses between
5 The equity capital includes common and perpetual preferred stock, surplus, undivided profits 
and capital reserves.
6 Because ROE=ROA*EM. Alternatively, consider, a vary simple bank that generates only 
interest income and has all of its assets (A) in the form of loans earning an annual rate of rt .
The bank is financed solely with debt (D) paying rD per year, and with equity (E). If we 
measure the profitability o f the bank with the return on equity ratio, we have: 
Net Income _ r tA -  rnD
ROE  = ■
Equity
■. Recall that the equity multiplier is defined as
EM=A/E=D/E+1. So: ROE= rt + [(r( - r D ) D/E]. If the spread between lending and
borrowing rates is positive, the higher debt-to-equity ratios lead to a higher ROE. Clearly, in 
this case, high leverage is desirable.
7 Tier-two capital elements present a range of internationally accepted items for use as 
supplementary equity capital, subject to inclusion by national authorities at their discretion in 
light of their respective accounting and supervisory regulations. Tier-two capital could include
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countries. The various legal requirements for equity levels make the amount of equity a 
number defined not by an autonomous management decision but determined 
externally. So, for Davis et.al. (1993), retum-on-equity is not a good measure of 
performance. In that respect, ROA appears to be preferred measure of overall bank 
profitability.
2.4.2. R e turn -on -A ssets  (R O A )
ROA equals net income divided by total assets (or average assets) and thus measures 
net income per pound of assets (or average assets) owned during the examined period 
[Rhoades (1982), Kwast and Rose (1982), Rhoades and Rutz (1982), Barry (1988), 
Woosley and Baer (1995) etc.] (see also Annex 3). So,
ROA reflects management ability to utilise the bank’s financial and real resources in 
order to generate net income. For that reason it is used as the best measure of 
efficiency. Analysts looking to compare profitability (while ignoring differences in 
equity capital ratios) generally focus on ROA, while those wishing to focus on returns 
to shareholders look at ROE. Edwards and Heggestad (1973) used ROA since several 
measurement errors (e.g. in some cases the capital accounts included reserves for 
possible loan losses, while in others it did not) would have introduced a serious error in 
the dependent variable if rate of return on capital were used. Heggestad (1979) notes 
that it is actually ROA that has provided the strongest evidence on the concentration- 
profitability relationship in banking. ROA is preferred to other profit measures because 
(i) it measures the efficiency of banks with respect to banking operations and (ii) 
minimises differences resulting from differences in capital structure or manipulation of 
security accounts. Kwast and Rose (1982) employ this ratio since the statistical cost 
accounting model that is implemented and relates the firm’s income to its asset and 
liability mix typically uses this measure as the dependent variable.
undisclosed reserves, revaluation reserves, general loan losses reserves, hybrid debt capital 
instruments, and subordinated term debt.
Net Income 
Total Assets
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However, the problem with ROA is that it doesn’t properly take into account the fact 
that much banking business is no longer on the balance sheet. The increasing 
importance of off-balance sheet activity has made return on assets as a measure of 
profitability less meaningful over time. Using capital gets round this problem, since 
capital can be defined as acting as a buffer against all unexpected losses (such as the 
potential loss arising from a foreign exchange position, or a derivatives trading book). 
However, interpreting trends by using this measure is complicated by the significant 
increases in capital-to-assets ratios in recent years in response, in part, to regulatory 
changes. Nevertheless, a large fraction of banking is still tied to traditional on-balance 
sheet items, and in interpreting changes in net income, assets remain a useful scaling 
factor for separating the effects of growth from those of improved profitability.
2.4.3. Equity  Multiplier (EM )
ROE is linked to ROA by the equity multiplier (EM), which equals total assets divided 
by total equity, such that,
The inverse of the equity multiplier is the familiar capital to assets ratio. The capital to 
assets ratio measures capital adequacy -what decline in assets’ value could be covered 
by a firm’s equity. The smaller this measure is, the riskier is the firm (with other 
relevant factors held constant). A bank’s equity multiplier compares assets with equity 
such that large values indicate a large amount of debt financing relative to equity*. EM 
thus measures financial leverage and represents a profit and a risk measure* 9. Hempel 
et.al. (1994) noted that since ROA is lower for financial intermediaries than for most 
non-financial businesses, most intermediaries must utilise financial leverage heavily in 
order to increase ROE to a competitive level.
* Because the relationship that always holds in a bank’s balance sheet is Assets «  Liabilities +  
Equity and the liabilities represent what the bank owes e.g. involve various debt instruments.
9 EM represents a risk measure because it reflects how many assets can go into default before a 
bank becomes insolvent. A high EM raises ROE when the income is positive, but it also 
indicates high capital risk.
Net Income Total Assets 
Total Assets Total Equity
ROE = ROA-EM
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2.4.4. S e c o n d  D ecom po sit ion  Stage
The second stage of ROE decomposition shows ROA to be derived from the bank’s 
profit margin (PM) and asset utilisation (AU). Thus:
Profit margin (PM), which equals net income divided by total revenue, reflects profits 
per unit of total revenue. This measure is affected by interest margin -interest yields on 
assets and interest cost of funds- and by the burden. The burden reflects the difference 
between non-interest expense and non-interest income. PM measures a bank’s ability 
to control expenses and reduce taxes. Interest expense and non-interest expense should 
be further examined by source. Interest expense may vary between banks for three 
reasons: rate, composition, and volume effects. Non-interest expense -or as it is 
commonly labeled overhead expense- can be similarly decomposed.
Asset utilisation (AU) equals total revenue divided by total assets and reflects how 
many assets are employed as earning assets and the yields earned on those earning 
assets.
The components of the third stage of the ROE decomposition framework usually are 
analysed with respect to a bank’s total revenue or total assets. The objective of this 
stage of the analysis is to identify symptoms of good and bad performance by 
pinpointing trends and significant peer-group differences.
2.5. Other Measures
ROE and ROA do not exhaust the measures used by financial analysts to track the 
earnings records of banks and other financial institutions (see Annex 2 and Annex 3).
2.5.1. Return-on-Capita! (R O C )
Another profit measure that is used extensively in the literature is the return on total 
capital (ROC). ROC equals net income after taxes divided by the book value of 
capital (= equity plus debt capital) [Fraser et.al. (1974), Mingo (1975), Rhoades and 
Rutz (1981), Hannan (1991), etc.] (see also Annex 3). This measure is similar to the 
ROE in the case of a bank whose capital consists entirely of ownership accounts: 
common stock, preferred stock, surplus, undivided profits, and capital reserves.
ROA = PM • A U
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ROA may be of more universal interest than ROC, but Mayne (1976) supports the 
view that in the case of bank holding companies10 the parent holding company is 
interested only on the efficient utilisation of the scarce investment capital, so ROC is 
preferable as a measure of profitability. Haslem (1968) notes that ROC is the most 
inclusive measure of bank performance. Because his study is interested in the 
management variable, an important quality of the profitability criterion is the inclusion 
of all transactions influenced by management. According to this view, the numerator 
should cover all items influenced by management, including gains and losses on loans 
and securities, and the denominator should measure the ability to earn on invested 
capital. The return on capital ratio thus seems to be the appropriate measure. Molyneux 
and Thornton (1992) use the net income before tax as per cent of capital and reserves 
(alternatively and total borrowings). In this case government intervention, through 
fiscal policy, is independent of bank performance. Also, Brimmer (1978) uses the 
current operating income as percent of total assets or capital account.
But Haslem also mentions that ROC has disadvantages for the examination of 
management efficiency. Because management has considerable leeway in affecting net 
income through the ‘non-operating’ transactions (i.e., gains, losses, recoveries, charge- 
offs, and transfers to and from valuation reserves for loans, securities and all other), it 
can be dangerous to judge management efficiency in this area by short-run results. Net 
income can be (i) relatively low, (ii) quite variable, and (iii) both of these, for reasons 
such as conservative reserve accounting, tax switching, liquidity needs, and loan 
demand. In fact, low short-run profits may actually result in higher long-run profits e.g.
10 Any organisation that owns controlling interest in one or more commercial banks Is a bank 
holding company. Control is defined as ownership or indirect control via the power to vote 
more than 25 percent o f the voting shares in a bank (Koch, 1995). The holding company is 
labelled the parent organisation, and the operating entities are the subsidiaries. The 
phenomenon of bank holding companies emerged in the 1950s and 1960s as a response to 
restrictions on the scale and scope of banking activities. By holding banks as affiliates a holding 
company can expand the geographic scale of its banking operations and broaden the scope of its 
nonbank activities to certain permissible lines of financial series. One-bank holding companies 
(OBHCs) control only one bank and typically arise when the owners of an existing bank 
exchange their shares for stock in the holding company. The holding company then acquires the 
original bank stock. Multibank holding companies (MBHCs) control at least two commercial 
banks. Over the last two decades, multibank holding companies have become an increasingly 
important element in American banking structure.
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from tax switching. For Davies et.al. (1993) the problem for ROC drives from the fact 
that if we are assessing competitive advantage, we should look at the value of outputs 
derived from each unit of input. Any measure of capital is only one input among the 
total that the bank uses, and no measure of capital is a good measure of all inputs.
ROC became the logical measurement benchmark of profit centre (i.e. branch) 
performance. This use of ROC becomes difficult when banks start to engage in 
multiple, heterogeneous activities. Firstly, these activities may not be directly 
comparable with each other, unless some method is found to allocate capital in a truly 
risk-adjusted way. If capital is driven mainly by the size of the balance sheet, then any 
off-balance sheet activities (such as guarantees -or under some accounting standards- 
derivatives) will appear to be using no capital at all, giving rise to an infinite ROC.
2.5.2. Net Interest M argin
Revell (1980) uses the net interest margin which is the ratio of interest margin (the 
difference between interest income and interest expenses) to average total assets (or 
average earning assets)11. Changes in a bank’s net interest margin depend on a complex 
interaction between resource availability, asset-liability composition and interest rate 
movements. If bank manages its assets and liabilities such that the bank earns 
substantial income on its assets and has low costs on its liabilities, profits will be high. 
In this case, the management’s success is affected by the spread between the interest 
earned on the bank’s assets and the interest costs on its liabilities. If the bank is able to 
acquire assets with high interest income, the net interest margin will be high, and the 
bank is likely to be highly profitable. If the interest cost of its liabilities rises relative to 
the interest earned on its assets, the net interest margin will fall, and bank profitability 
will suffer. 1
11 Barry (1988) defines the net interest margin as the difference between interest income and 
interest expense as a percentage of average earning assets. Earning assets include: loans (net of 
unearned income) in domestic and foreign offices; lease-financing receivables; obligations of 
the U.S. government, states and political subdivisions and other securities; assets held in trading 
accounts; interest-bearing balances due from depository institutions; federal funds and 
securities purchased under agreements to resell.
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Woosley and Baer (1995) present also the adjusted net interest margin. It is simply the 
difference between a bank’s interest income (adjusted for tax-exempt securities 
earnings and loan-loss provisions) and interest expenses, divided by average interest- 
earning assets. This measure is similar to a business’s gross profit margin except that 
sales of fee-based 12 services by banks are not included. As the authors explain, interest 
revenue from tax-exempt securities is adjusted upward by the bank’s marginal tax rate 
to avoid penalising institutions with substantial state and local securities portfolios, 
which earn less interest but reduce tax burdens. Loan-loss expenses are substituted as a 
rough measure of risk to place banks that make lower-risk loans at lower interest rates 
on a more equal basis with institutions whose higher-risk loans earn higher rates. This 
measure could be improved by adjusting the operating profits to reflect changes in 
reserves.
Finally, another measure that is used in some studies is the net non-interest margin 
(Barry, 1988). The net non-interest margin is an indicator of the efficiency of a bank’s 
operations and its pricing and marketing decisions. The net non-interest margin is the 
difference between non-interest income and non-interest expenses as a percentage of 
average assets.
2.5.3. Value A d d e d  M easures
For many authors, the best method for assessing the performance of any institution is 
the value added method, which calculates the amount by which a production process 
increases the value of a good or a service. It is computed by sales revenue less the cost 
of inputs used to produce the good/service. Many authors use as a value added measure 
for financial institutions the difference between total receipts, including interest 
received, and interest paid. The netting of interest received and paid greatly reduces but 
does not eliminate the enormous variation in bank revenues stemming from changes in 
the level of market interest rates.
12 Fee based (non-interest) income is derived from deposit service charges, charges for letters of 
credit, and other bank-related activities. It is more stable than other revenue sources because it
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Heffeman (1996) lists some of the efforts that have been taken in the direction of the 
definition of the value added method in the banking sector. Initially she mentions the 
LBS and First Consulting attempt in a study of 25 European Community (EC) banks. 
Operating profits were adjusted to reflect changes in reserves not otherwise caught in 
reported profits. Then a notional charge for shareholder’s equity (the home country’s 
bond yield plus a 10% risk premium) was subtracted from the adjusted operating 
profits. The value added figure was then divided by factor inputs used in the bank. 
Boyd and Gentler (1994) defined the value added as the sum of payments to all factor 
inputs, that is, the sum of wages, salaries, profits, interest expense and depreciation. 
The value added was expressed as a percentage of the total value added of the financial 
intermediary sector.
Davis et.al. (1993) provide the added value to input calculation. It is the profit before 
tax with the reserve changes excluding the cost of expenses including premium divided 
by all operating costs including the cost of equity (with premium). This measures the 
extent to which management has created value from the funds provided by 
shareholders, and it does so accurately. It can be compared from bank to bank, and 
country to country. A bank that creates comparatively large amounts of value in 
relation to its equity can be said to be performing well given the initial capital is raised. 
The measure proposed in this study does not always generate results very different 
from those of return on equity.
Bourke (1989) and Molyneux and Thornton (1992) use also as a proxy of the bank 
profitability the value added return on total assets. It is defined in two ways: either as 
the ratio of net income before taxes plus the staff expenses to total assets or the ratio of 
net income before taxes plus the staff expenses and the loan losses to total assets. 
Davis et.al. (1993) propose the proportion of rents (or added value) to all the inputs; 
this measure provides neutrality in numerous different dimensions.
is less likely to rise and fall with the general level of interest rates or with shifts in the term 
structure.
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Value added has several advantages over the other profitability indicators. It is a better 
reflection of competitive advantage and it provides a much clearer degree to which a 
bank, and hence its management, is under-performing. This measure is not affected by 
bank size, variable interest rates, or differences in regulatory regimes. Nor is it based in 
favour of capital intensive banks. But the measure is not without its problems. It 
focuses on operating activities, rather than on return to shareholders. For this reason, 
value added statements are usually computed for operating units within a firm, rather 
than for the firm as a whole. Thus, it is often not possible to obtain the required data 
from published accounts. Computing value added for banking services is so difficult 
that many countries with value added tax systems do not attempt to tax financial 
services.
2.5.4. The P rice -Earn ings Ratio
The price-earnings ratio equals the ratio of market price per share to earnings per share 
(EPS), commonly referred to as the price-earnings or P/E ratio. The researcher share 
the view that earnings per share is not a good measure of bank profitability because 
dividend pay-out ratios may differ. This means that the percentage growth in earnings 
for a bank with a high dividend pay-out ratio -ceteris paribus- would not be as great as 
one with a low dividend pay-out ratio due to the smaller increase in the first bank’s 
capital base in the previous years13. Another weakness of this measure is evident in the 
case of a rapidly growing bank that must add outside equity capital to maintain an 
adequate equity base. The new share will dilute EPS, so in the years after the new 
share issue EPS will not be a fair indicator of bank performance.
13 The constant-growth model provides valuable insight for interpreting P/E ratios. The simple 
model says that the present value (P0) of a share of common stock equals the expected 
(constant) dividend, D |, divided by the difference between investors’ required rate of return, r, 
and the expected rate of dividend growth, g. For r>g, the constant-growth model is as follows: 
P0=D|/(r-g). If we divide the equation by expected earnings per share for the next period, EPSi, 
this generates the basic determinants of a firm’s P/E ratio: Po/EPS|=[D|/EPS,]*il/(r-g)]. The 
first term on the right-hand side of the equation is the firm’s expected dividend-payout ratio. All 
other things being equal, the higher the payout ratio is, the more valuable the firm is.
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In banking EPS gives managers latitude to ‘manage’ earnings by manipulating the loan 
loss provision and other reserves. And perhaps more important, the use of EPS fails 
almost completely to hold managers accountable for their use of capital.
2.5.5. The M arket-to-Book Ratio
The market to book ratio (sometimes referred to as the q ratio)14 relates the market 
value of the firm (or of its shares) to its book value (or the book value o f its shares). 
For financial institutions where the majority of investments are publicly traded 
financial assets, the market to book ratio measures the market capitalisation of a firm’s 
franchise value or goodwill. Part, if  not all, of this franchise value will be lost in the 
event of insolvency or substantial increase in financial distress. It is therefore in the 
best interest of the financial institutions to protect its franchise value. Increases in the q 
ratio might reflect increases in anticipated profitability or reduction in the cost of 
capital. Aliber (1984) (reported in Heffeman’s book, 1996) reported q ratios for the 
national banks of the United States and eight other industrial countries for the period 
1974-1982 and compared them with the performance of the industrial sector. A market 
to book ratio greater than one implies that the firm is creating value, whereas a ratio 
less than one suggests the firm is destroying value. He showed that q ratios for 
international banks had fallen relative to the q ratios for all other firms listed. Also 
McCormick (1987) (reported in Heffeman’s book, 1996) compared bank q ratios in 
1984 with those of other US industries.
Smirlock et.al. (1984) use the Tobin’s q (the ratio of market value to replacement cost 
of the firms) to measure the firm rents. Tobin’s q bounds total rents that accrue from 
either efficiency or monopoly. By relying on market valuation, these authors avoid 
some of the shortcomings of accounting rates of return. Loan losses, in particular, may 
not show up in the accounting data for years. For that reason, they used market-based 
estimates of rates of return. In so doing, they took advantage of the fact that most 
measurement errors in banking accounting data are in the assets. Bank liabilities are 
relatively homogeneous and short-term, except for small amounts of subordinated debt.
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Thus, for liabilities, book values should be reasonable proxies for replacement cost. 
Among its advantages, capital market valuation appropriately incorporate firm risk, 
corresponds to an equilibrium valuation of rents, and minimises any distortions 
introduced by tax laws and accounting conventions. Its measurement combines 
financial market data with accounting data.
But this measure is troublesome, for several reasons. Calculation of Tobin’s q is an 
intricate procedure that may itself introduce errors. The researcher questions the 
conceptual appropriateness of the use of book value as a proxy of replacement cost. As 
Heffeman (1996) also notes, the book value of a firm is retrospective, based on the 
historic value of physical assets, adjusted for depreciation and inflation. Market value 
is a prospective estimate of the firm’s net present value, that is, its discounted dividend 
stream. Computing the market to book ratio for banks is even more problematic 
because much of their book value is based on goodwill and the intangible assets they 
possess, meaning cross-industry market to book ratios are not strictly comparable.
2.6. Recent Trends and Approaches
The main problems with many of the above figures are that (a) many of the 
performance measures were based on retrospective balance sheet data, which may not 
be good indicators of future performance, and (b) they ignore off-balance sheet 
operations. Off-balance sheet (OBS) instruments are contingent commitments or 
contracts which generate income for a bank but do not appear as assets or liabilities on 
the traditional balance sheet. They can range from stand-by letters of credit to complex 
derivatives. Banks enter OBS business because they believe it will enhance their 
profitability for different reasons. First, OBS instruments generate fee-income. Second, 
these instruments may improve a bank’s risk management techniques, thereby 
enhancing profitability and shareholder value added. Third, to the extent that regulators 
focus on bank balance sheets, OBS instruments, in some cases, may take it easier for a 
bank to meet capital standards. These instruments may also assist the bank in avoiding 
regulatory taxes that stem from reserve requirements. As banks diversify into fee-based 14
14 The market to book ratio, sometimes referred to as the q ratio, should not be confused with 
Tobin’s q, which measures the total market value of a firm’s assets (debt plus equity) relative to
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financial products, their performance may be less sensitive to interest rate fluctuations. 
The increased use of off-balance sheet instruments in recent years is to be welcomed, 
since these instruments allow both greater diversification of risk and the closer 
tailoring of risk borne to risk preference; but they may place a greater burden on 
management control systems.
Moreover, banks now originate billions of dollars (or pounds) of loans which are sold 
in the secondary market and don’t appear on their balance sheets. That activity covers a 
wide spectrum of loans, including residential mortgages, credit card and other 
consumer, and commercial loans. Although banks may not be the ultimate holders of 
these loans, they are key players in originating and servicing them, and they earn 
substantial fee income in the process.
As an even larger portion of banks’ activities moves off the balance sheet, bank 
management is becoming more sensitive to the shortcomings of conventional measures 
of operating performance like ROA and ROE. At many of the largest banks, such 
accounting-based measures are giving way to economic performance measures like 
risk-adjusted return on capital (RAROC) and economic value added (EVA) that do a 
better job of reflecting the new reality of where banks are putting their capital at risk, 
and whether the rates or return they are earning on their different activities are high 
enough to reward their shareholders.
Boyd and Gentler (1994) used two indirect estimates of off-balance sheet activities. 
The first was the credit risk equivalents computed to satisfy the requirements of the 
Basle15 risk assets ratio; the second was the credit equivalent of off-balance activities 
that would be required to generate the observed level of non-interest income. The
the estimated replacement cost of its assets.
15 The Basle framework, i.e. the regulatory issues formated by the Basle Committee (consisting 
of the central bank governors of the G-10 countries plus Luxembourg and Switzerland), carries 
five-weighted categories at which all claims (including off-balance items and credit equivalent 
amounts of off-balance items) are allocated. The immediate and most direct impact of Basle has 
been to increase the capital demands of international banks.
Christos Staikouras 35
Bank PerformanceCV|yünMm«V 
fchMMrvim« S riio o tiXifJUt*
authors then recomputed the banks’ share in total intermediated assets and bank credit 
relative to GDP.
The above conditions have increased the need for additional profitability information. 
Information on business unit profitability is needed to help identify and possibly 
eliminate products and business units. In a recent paper, Kimball (1997) discusses the 
evolution of commercial banks into semiautonomous lines of business over the past 20 
years. The retail business began to fragment as specialised distribution channels began 
to emerge for products such as credit cards, residential mortgages, auto loans, and for 
high-net-worth customers. While this innovation permits greater management focus 
and specialisation, it also gives rise to new issues concerning performance 
measurement, risk management, and resource allocation. He concludes that “new 
approach to profitability measurement based on products, customers, or distribution 
channels were needed i f  the profitability dynamics o f the new lines o f business were to 
be understood and exploited?'. In that respect, Leempute and Kearney (1990) have 
developed the concept of “Break-Up Value Analysis” in order to identify value 
creators and value destroyers in banks’ retail business, and this way to assist in the 
efficient operation of bank businesses. This approach uses CAPM and market-based 
pricing techniques to evaluate the risk-return characteristics of various businesses. For 
Kimball (1997) the solution is the development of a funds transfer pricing system 
[also Uyemura et.al. (1996) and Matten (1996)] in combination with the 
implementation of an activity-based accounting methodology.
The funds transfer pricing system manages to disaggregate the net interest margin and 
identify the bank exposure to interest rate risk, by dividing the organisation in funds- 
generating businesses which were seen as origination funds to be sold in an internal 
capital market to funds-using businesses16. The transfer prices used to value the 
transferred funds were the rates at which the bank could acquire or sell funds in the 
external capital market. For the funds-using business, the balance sheet would consist 
of the loans it generated on the asset size and funds purchased from the transfer “pool”
16 For example, branches typically generate far more deposits than assets, while lending units 
such as corporate banking or consumer lending do the opposite.
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on the liability side. On its income statement, the net interest revenue of a funds-using 
business would consist of the spread between the rates it earned on the loans it 
generated and the transfer rate paid to acquire funds from the transfer pool. For funds- 
generating businesses, the balance sheet would show funds sold to the transfer pool as 
the principal asset, while deposits would be the principal liabilities. The net interest 
revenue of such a business would consist of the spread between the transfer pool rate 
received on funds sold to the pool and the rates paid on deposits. Thus, the transfer rate 
served to divide the overall net interest margin of the bank into two sub-margins, one 
from asset origination and one from liability origination. The transfer rate is either 
single rate or multiple rate, where the maturities of the funds are matched.
The innovation of activity-based costing (ABC) is to build cost allocation systems 
around business processes. A business process consists of all the activities associated 
with a particular customer interaction. By focusing on complete business processes, 
activity-based costing has highlighted opportunities by substantial expense reductions 
that occur through the reengineering of the entire business process rather than 
incremental improvements to its constituent parts. This method permits banks both to 
better understand the forces driving their costs and to allocate those costs to their 
sources. It makes possible for the banks to reduce the proportion of shared costs treated 
as overhead and instead allocate such costs to the products or customers responsible for 
generating them.
Also, the Functional Cost Analysis is an exceptional useful management tool for 
participating banks. They can compare their costs for each function from year to year 
with averages of banks of similar size and deposit structure. The distribution of all 
costs (plus the overhead costs) provides a total cost for each function. This total is then 
divided by the size of each function to yield a percentage cost which is useful for 
comparative analysis.
If a bank is organised in such a way that different units are designated profit centres, 
then the return on economic capital (ROEC) of the unit is important. The return on 
economic capital, in this case, is the earnings of the bank or a unit of a bank divided by
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the capital allocated to it. Provided capital allocation reflects the risks undertaken, 
ROEC recognises the risk attributes of the activity. It is only when each shows a 
positive shareholder value added that the bank is compensated for the risks it 
undertakes, which in turn ensures shareholders earn a compensating return.
2.6.1. E co n o m ic  Value A d d e d  (EV A) Perform ance  M ea sure
Uyemura et.al. (1996) and Kimball (1998) analyse the use of economic profit for 
measuring the performance of banks17. They describe in detail one performance 
measurement, known as the economic value added (EVA). The EVA system is built 
on the concept o f economic value added, defined as the excess of adjusted earnings 
over the opportunity cost of the capital involved. The measure assumes that it is 
possible to allocate earnings and equity capital to lines of business, products, and 
customers in a way that isolates the economic revenues and costs of each activity. 
However, if lines of business are related, either in the production of output or in their 
use of capital, then the isolation may not be possible, and these methods of measuring 
performance may mislead managers. The conclusion argues that banks need to 
recognise the ambiguities inherent in the calculation of economic profit and be 
prepared to create and apply multiple specialised performance measures. The principle 
contribution of EVA, however, is the emphasis on economic as opposed to accounting 
profits. By establishing the weighted average costs of capital as the hurdle rate, EVA 
correctly recognises that the projects to add value they must generate enough cash not 
only to service debt, but to provide shareholders with their required rate of return. For 
Uyemura et.al. (1996) EMA is the best performance measure for financial institutions 
since it offers a top-down comprehensive evaluation of the risk dynamics of the 
organisation, it can unify all financial management activities, and provides a capital 
allocation methodology that is manageable.
17 To the accountant, profit is the excess of revenues over expenses and taxes and is best 
measured by earnings. To the economist, earnings fail to include an important expense item, the 
opportunity cost of the equity capital contributed by the shareholders o f the firm. Earnings 
always exceed economic profits (a firm earns economic profits only to the extent that its 
earnings exceed the returns it might earn on other investments), and a firm can be profitable in 
an accounting sense yet unprofitable in an economic sense.
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2.6.2. R isk-adjusted  Perform ance  M ea su re s (R A P M )
Risk-adjusted performance measurement (RAPM) has been one of the buzzwords of 
banking over the last five years or so. The term actually embraces a whole bundle of 
concepts -indeed, just about every institution which has introduced or is toying with 
RAPM will give a different definition of what it means. However, among many 
different flavours and labels one may encounter, all RAPM techniques have one thing 
in common: they compare return against capital invested by adopting some form of 
risk-adjustment, based on internal assessments of how risky something (an assets, a 
transaction, a business etc.) may be.
In all cases, this riskiness is judged by a statistical analysis of the potential volatility of 
outcomes (for example, the potential change in value of a particular asset). This is 
usually based on a technique called ‘value-at-risk’ (VAR).
The four more commonly cited RAPM models are RORAA, RAROA, RORAC, 
RAROC. These come in two pairs; the first pair are asset-based, and are a derivation of 
ROA. The second pair uses a broader definition: ROC than ROA.
■ Return on Risk-Adjusted Assets (RORAA). This takes the ROA ratio, but instead 
of ranking all assets equally as in the ROA, the assets are adjusted to factors in 
their relative riskiness. This is essentially the approach taken in the Basle Accord 
of 1988.
■ Risk-Adjusted Return on Assets (RAROA). This also uses the ROA ratio as its 
base, but the risk adjustment is made by deducting a risk factor from return. Thus 
if there were a 1% chance of a default occurring on a loan to a corporate in any one 
year, then 1% of the amount of the loan would be deducted from the return 
generated.
* Return on Risk-Adjusted Capital (RORAC). This measure starts off with the usual 
ROC measure, and replaces the regulatory capital in the denominator with the 
internal measure of the capital at risk.
Christos Staikouras 39
Bank PerformanceOty Uiwpmiy IBikmmpw SbiadìUJ*3ü«<
■ Risk-Adjusted Return on Capital (RAROC). This uses the same basis as the 
RAROC measure -the starting point is return on capital- but instead of adjusting 
the denominator, the numerator is adjusted.
As noted above, different products, customers, or transactions will absorb different 
amounts of equity capital, with larger and more risky transactions requiring more 
equity than smaller, less risky ones. To ensure that a transaction is profitable, managers 
must assign the appropriate amount of capital and a required contribution to equity 
must be calculated and incorporated in the price applied to the transaction. This use of 
allocative capital to ensure adequate pricing was first implemented by Banker’s Trust 
in its RAROC system, which adequately has been adopted since then by many other 
commercial banks. It is the net income from an activity -with a few adjustments for 
interbank charges and expected losses- divided by the amount of supporting economic 
capital. The great contribution of the RAROC system was to include explicit charges 
for both the credit risk premium and the use of capital. By doing this, it ensures that 
banks price individual loans to cover credit risk and generate an adequate return to 
shareholders. However, an exclusive focus on RAROC can lead to corporate 
underinvestment, otherwise to the rejection of positive NPV projects. This is why 
RAROC is not a useful objective but a tool that enables the measurement of economic 
profit.
2.7. Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this chapter was to give a theoretical and simple empirical exploration 
of bank performance measurement. The profitability indicators that are used 
extensively are the return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Recently, at 
many of the largest banks, such accounting-based measures are giving way to 
economic performance measures like risk-adjusted return on capital (RAROC) and 
economic value added (EVA). However, since we want to make comparisons at the 
European banking level, we will concentrate on the traditional profitability measures.
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Chapter 3
“Bank Structure in Europe”
Abstract
Widespread deregulation and liberalisation, accompanied by technological 
development, have changed the environment in which banks are operating. In addition, 
globalisation and the increased and transformed wealth of individuals have affected the 
operations of financial institutions, in general, and of banks, in particular. Within 
Europe these changes are especially fast and far-reaching, accelerated by the integration 
of the euro area financial markets and possibly by the circulation of the single currency. 
Financial systems in the euro area could be departing from a bank-dominated structure, 
becoming more market-oriented or even securitised. The changes in the structure of 
financial system and the role of banks are also illustrated by the emergence of new 
types of players in the financial system and the disintermediation process in the assets 
side. In this chapter we review some of the prominent structural features of the banking 
sector in Europe.
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Chapter 3: Bank Structure in Europe
3.1. The Evolving Position of European Banks
In obvious contrast with the highly securitised financial system in the United States 
banks have been the dominant intermediaries between savers and borrowers in most 
countries of the European Union area. Before the introduction of the euro, for instance, 
corporate bonds had not been very widely issued in the euro area, and stock market 
capitalisation -  relative to the size of the economy -  was much lower in the European 
Union than in the United States. At the same time the proportion of bank deposits and 
banks assets to national income had been much higher in Europe.
A number of global and EU factors are now affecting the position of banks within the 
European financial system. These include the rapid pace of developments in 
information technology, the reduced economic role of the state, changing demographic 
structure, the promotion of a single European market in banking and other financial 
services, the introduction of the euro, and the continuing processes of globalisation, 
deregulation, and product/service innovation in financial markets. These developments 
are promoting alternatives to bank intermediation, threatening the prominence of 
‘relationship* banking said to be characteristic of bank-customer interactions in 
continental Europe, and increasing both international and domestic competition within 
the banking industry.
First of all, technology has already been shaping the structure of the financial system. 
It has reshaped the relative costs of different banking and financial services and 
facilitated the provision of new types of services. The costs of collecting, processing 
and using information has decreased dramatically. The second factor underlying the 
structural changes in the financial system and banking sector is the process of financial 
liberalisation which has been ongoing for some time already. It has allowed an increase 
in the overall level of competition in financial systems. In the EU, financial 
liberalisation gained momentum with the Single Market programme. The single most 
influential act for banks was the introduction of the Second Banking Co-ordination
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Directive, which provided a passport for banks to offer services across the European 
Union (Noyer, 200018). Globalisation is expected to increase competition in most areas 
of financial services, and it may also be able to realise economies of scale and scope. 
At the same time, globalisation has opened up new markets for banks, particularly in 
trading, asset management and investment banking activities. Finally, the wealth of 
individuals has increased, and a larger proportion of the population is making portfolio 
investments. This is partly a result of the ageing of the population, which has, in itself, 
increased the average wealth of people. At the same time, it is also due to changes in 
pension systems in a number of countries from the “pay-as-you-go” to a funded basis. 
In addition, the composition of wealth has shifted towards a greater emphasis on 
wealth in the form of financial assets. This is manifest in the increase of the relative 
market value of stock exchanges, which is clearly visible in most euro area countries. 
The increase in financial wealth relates closely to the shift towards a market-oriented 
financial system and also to the increased importance of institutional investors.
The single currency may create a much wider range of choice for retail savers and, 
combined with the rapid pace of development in telephone and internet banking, there 
will be considerable growth in cross-border provision of time deposits and retail 
investment vehicles such as mutual funds.
3.2. The Structure and Importance of Banking in Europe
Competition between banks and non-bank intermediaries, and between banks and 
securities markets, has increased considerably over the past years. Nevertheless banks 
still account for a much greater share of total financial intermediation in Europe than in 
the United States.
There are considerable differences in the relative role of banks and non-banks across 
the various European countries. Non-deposit intermediaries play a major role in 
countries such as the UK and the Netherlands and are becoming increasingly important 
elsewhere. Non-bank depository institutions (money market funds) also account for an
18 Noyer, C. (2000). The euro and the banking sector. Speech delivered at the Duisburger 
Banking Symposium, 27 September 2000.
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important share of the market for deposits in France and Spain. These changes have 
blurred what were once marked differences in financial structure. While contrast is 
often drawn between “bank-” and “market-” orientated financial systems, within 
Europe only Germany can still be accurately described as a “bank-orientated” financial 
system.
Prior to the introduction of the euro, competition in the European countries banking 
sector has been mostly national or sub-national. There was relatively little penetration 
by foreign banks (except in the international banking markets of London and 
Luxembourg). In most countries institutional separation between commercial banks, 
savings banks, and other types of depository intermediary continued to prevail. There 
have also been considerable differences in the ownership and governance. In Germany, 
commercial banks owned by the state have increased in importance over the past 50 
years, and now they account for almost half the business of all commercial banks. State 
ownership until recently remained an important factor in France and Italy. In the last 
decade, substantial privatisation steps have been undertaken in many countries. The 
largest banks in Europe are now all privately owned.
The measurement of concentration in European markets has to rely on national 
indicators, which are rather unsatisfactory since they do not often correspond to the 
relevant banking market. These statistics suggest that some of the smaller European 
countries’ banking markets, at least those which continue to be purely national, are 
highly concentrated. In the large European countries the picture varies, with the five 
largest banks accounting for a large share of national markets in the UK, Italy, and 
Spain but for much less in France, and Germany. At the pan-European level, the 
European banking appears to be fairly unconcentrated, especially compared with the 
United States and Japan.
Finally, while the number of credit institutions has fallen almost everywhere, 
conventional measures of bank capacity -  bank branches and employees per number of 
inhabitants -  present a far more mixed picture, with considerable variation across 
countries in terms of both levels and trends in the euro area.
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3.3. The Importance of Bank Intermediation
3.3.1. B a n k s  v e rsu s  O ther Interm ediaries
Figure 2 provides a schematic picture of the role of banks in the wider financial 
system. There are three principal alternatives to bank intermediation. First corporate 
financial liabilities may be held directly by households, an important characteristic for 
example both of the United Kingdom during the 19th century and of modern-day Italy 
where a large proportion of companies continue to operate under family ownership. 
France has just made a major statistical reassessment, reducing the apparent 
importance of non-quoted shares. Secondly households may accumulate financial 
assets issued by non-bank financial intermediaries, such as mutual funds, life assurance 
companies, or pension funds, which in turn hold market securities. Finally, households 
may choose to hold securities directly.
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Source: Own illustration
It is usual to distinguish between depository and non-depository intermediaries. The 
distinguishing feature of depository institutions as intermediaries is that they issue 
certain liabilities, that can either be used as means of payment or can be transformed 
quickly and at low cost into means of payment. Banks are just one type of depository 
institutions, which hold illiquid assets (loans) and transform them into liquid assets
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(deposits)19. The other main type of depository intermediary is the money-market 
mutual fund, whose liabilities represent shares in a portfolio of short-term money 
market assets.
A widespread trend in developed economies over recent years has been a blurring of 
the distinction between depository and non-depository financial intermediaries, and 
between bank and other depository intermediaries. For example, the increasing use of 
securitisation by commercial banks means that banks’ loans are converted into traded 
securities so the differences between their assets and investment banks’ assets are less 
pronounced. Similarly, a growing number of non-depository financial intermediaries 
have started offering traditional bank products, like chequebooks.
It is sometimes claimed that financial systems go through a characteristic pattern of 
development, beginning from an initial situation where financial claims are 
predominantly unintermediated, evolving into a bank-orientated system where most 
claims are bank-intermediated, and then finally becoming market-orientated with the 
development of substantial and liquid securities markets.
In practice there is considerable variation in the structure and evolution of financial 
systems between countries and no clear evidence that countries are converging on a 
common market-orientated financial system. The shifting market share of each type of 
financial intermediaries and organised markets in a given financial sector depends on 
many issues, like competition, regulation, or cultural and structural differences. Banks 
not only compete for funds and investment opportunities amongst themselves, but also 
against other financial intermediaries and organised markets.
Figure 2 can be used to distinguish the concepts of “disintermediation” and 
“securitisation”. Disintermediation occurs when there is a decline in claims on 
financial intermediaries, either banks or non-banks, as a proportion of total household
19 The term "bank” is used here in a wider sense, so it includes not only “commercial” or 
“savings” banks, but also “mortgage” banks, British “building” societies, German
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financial assets i.e. in Figure 2 an increase of the proportion of household wealth held 
in the form of AA and DD relative to BB and CC. Securitisation is an increase in the 
proportion of non-financial corporate and public sector financial liabilities traded on 
securities markets i.e. an increase of liabilities issued as HH relative to AA and EE. In 
many countries there has been, over recent years, a rise in the proportion of financial 
liabilities traded on securities markets (a rise of HH) and a corresponding growth in the 
importance of non-bank financial intermediaries (an increase of CC and GG). This is 
securitisation but, because the new securities are not held directly by households, it is 
not disintermediation20.
Figure 2 also illustrates the difference between bank-orientated and market-orientated 
financial systems. Bank-orientated financial systems are those where bank deposits 
(BB) and bank loans (EE) represent respectively a relatively high proportion of total 
household assets and of total financial claims on non-financial domestic borrowers. A 
market-orientated financial system, in contrast, is one in which traded securities (HH) 
represent a relatively high proportion of claims on non-financial domestic borrowers.
3.3.2. Statistics o n  B a n k  a nd  Market Intermediation
Table 1 shows the current allocation of market and bank intermediation in the Euro 
area, Japan and the United States. The data must be interpreted with some care since 
there is no sectoral allocation. The securities could be held either directly by 
households (DD in Figure 2) or indirectly via bank or non-bank intermediaries (FF and 
GG in Figure 2).
Compared to the United States, the euro area has a larger banking sector, as evidenced 
by the weight of its deposit and loan sectors, and relatively smaller equity and debt 
markets. In the euro area the percentage of debt securities issued by the private sector 
is smaller than in the United States, indicating that corporate borrowers depend more
“bansparkassen”, Spanish “cajas de ahorro”, etc.
20 It is however still bank disintermediation, and for this reason some commentators still use the 
word disintermediation to describe a shift of intermediation from banks to non-bank financial 
intermediaries.
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on banking finance. Japan has even a larger banking sector, with a developed debt 
securities market.
Table 1: Bunking and market intermediation by major economic blocs, 1998 (%
of GDP unless stated)
Euro area United States Japan
GDP (% o f  world) 22.2 29.3 13.0
B ank deposits 84.0 54.0 122.0
Domestic credit 130.0 81.0 152.0
Domestic debt securities 91.0 155.0 132.0
Domestic debt securities issued by 
private sector (% o f  total domestic debt)
38.1 43.2 27.6
Stock market capitalisation 63.0 172.0 62.0
Source: European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin, August 1999
An intuition of the banking sector size in Europe is that the banking systems of EU 
countries taken together form the largest banking system in the world, with more than 
40% of world banking assets. The total banking assets of France and Germany alone 
would be a third larger than those of the United States; those of the four largest 
countries (Germany, France, the UK, and Italy) would be two times larger; and those 
of all EU countries would be almost three times larger.
Reflecting the predominant role of bank-intermediated credit in continental Europe, the 
EU banking system is also large in relation to the EU economy: at the end of 1997, the 
ratio of unconsolidated banking assets of credit institutions resident in the countries 
which now comprise the euro area to GDP was 234% in the EU21, compared to a ratio 
of 60% in the United States in mid 199822. This ratio, in sharp contrast with the
21 European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin, April 1999.
22 Federal Reserve Board website. This ratio includes only the assets of commercial banks.
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declining trends of the United States and Japan, has considerably grown in the period 
1985-97 (in 1985 the ratio stood at 176%), and the growth of the banking sector has 
been faster than the growth of the economy as a whole. Furthermore, there has been a 
general increase in derivative, guarantee and other off-balance sheet activities of banks 
that do not enter into the above measurement. Hence the changes in total assets do not 
fully reflect the changes in the volume of services offered by banks.
A more systematic approach to examine financial structure in different countries is to 
use sectoral balance sheet and flow-of-funds statistics, in order to quantify the financial 
relationships in the economy, such as those illustrated in Figure 2. These sources 
provide data both on stocks and on flows for all the financial assets and liabilities of 
the various sectors of the economy, including households, non-financial corporations, 
banks, non-bank financial companies, public, and overseas sectors.
3.4. Numbers and Type of Banks
3.4.1. N u m b e rs  o f  Credit a nd  O ther M onetary Institutions
European Union statistics distinguish credit institutions (i.e. banks) and other monetary 
institutions which do not offer credit (money market mutual funds). Within Europe 
there is considerable heterogeneity amongst these monetary institutions. Table 2 
provides statistics on the number of monetary financial institutions. The total number 
of credit institutions in the euro area was 8,185 at the end of July 1999 (Table 2). This 
includes the large number of savings and co-operative banks in several countries. With 
regard to the credit institutions category, Germany is the most fragmented market 
(3,180 credit institutions), followed by France (1,200), Italy and Austria (925 and 899 
respectively). France has the most money market funds (710), followed by 
Luxembourg (463) and Spain (206). In France and Spain the number of money market 
funds suggests that the FF channel in Figure 2 is relatively important. In the United 
States, where population size is comparable with that of the euro area, the number of 
credit institutions is even higher, with more than 10,400 insured commercial banks and 
savings institutions at end-1998 according to statistics published by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation. This fragmentation reflected the legislation in the
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United States that imposed restrictions on the geographical breadth of banks’ 
operations. 23
Table 2: Number of European monetary financial institutions2’ (July 1999)
Numbers Percentages (%)
Credit
institutions
Money market 
funds
Credit
institutions*
Money market 
funds*
Austria 899 8 9.8% 0.5%
Belgium 117 29 1.3% 1.8%
Finland 345 5 3.6% 0.3%
France 1200 710 13.1% 43.5%
Germany 3180 41 34.8% 2.5%
Ireland 78 17 0.8% 1.0%
Italy 925 17 10.1% 1.0%
Luxembourg 210 463 2.3% 28.4%
Netherlands 613 28 6.7% 1.7%
Portugal 228 0 2.5% 0.0%
Spain 390 206 4.2% 12.6%
Euro zone 8185 1524 89.6% 93.4%
Denmark 212 3 2.4% 0.1%
Greece 59 42 0.7% 2.6%
Sweden 148 29 1.7% 1.8%
UK 508 33 5.6% 2.1%
EU total 9112 1631 100% 100%
* As percentage of EU total monetary financial institutions. 
Source: European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin, August 1999
23 “Monetary Financial Institutions” (MFls) comprise resident Credit Institutions as defined in 
Community Law, and other resident Financial Institutions whose business is to receive deposits 
and/or close substitutes for deposits from entities other than MFIs, and, for their own account 
(at least in economic terms), to grant credits and/or make investments in securities”. “Credit 
institutions” are depository financial intermediaries; and “money market funds” include 
investment vehicles whose shares or units are close substitutes to deposits but the government 
does not insure them. The investors in these funds can usually redeem the invested amount at 
par value and have transaction facilities similar to banks’ cheque accounts.
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Tallii1 3: Number of credit institutions
1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 %
change
1985-
1995
%
change
1996-
1997
%
change
1994-
1998
France na 2105 2027 1469 1407 1299 1041 -30.2 -7.7 -25.9
Austria 1595 1241 1210 1041 1019 995 925 -16.1 -2.4 -9.1
Italy 1156 1192 1156 970 937 935 921 -18.6 -0.2 -8.1
Germany 5356 4740 4720 3785 3675 3578 3295 -20.2 -2.6 -11.8
Spain na 695 696 506 458 416 404 -27.2 -9.2 -20.8
Finland 669 654 529 381 373 371 361 -41.7 -0.5 +0.8
Portugal 35 224 260 233 228 235 226 +4.0 +3.1 -25.2
Luxembourg 111 118 177 220 221 215 209 +86.4 -2.7 -5.9
Belgium 176 165 157 145 141 134 95 -12.1 -5.0 -22.1
Netherlands na 81 111 102 101 90 na +25.9 -10.9 na
Ireland 61 58 48 56 62 70 53 -3.5 +12.9 35.9
Euro zone na 11273 11091 8908 8622 8338 na -26.5 -3.4 na
Denmark 197 166 124 122 125 100 201 -26.5 -20.0 -3.4
Greece 34 38 39 53 55 54 43 +39.5 -1.8 +10.3
Sweden na 779 704 249 237 242 210 -68.0 +2.1 -11.8
UK na Na na 564 550 551 525 Na +0.2 -7.4
EU na 12256 11958 9896 9589 9285 8618 -23.9 -3.2 -12.9
Source: European Central Bank (ECB), February 1999, and for 1998 data European 
Commission Publication (October 2000).
Table 3 concentrates on the figures for the credit institutions of the EU countries and 
shows how their numbers have altered over time. Particularly since the early 1990s, the
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number of credit institutions has shown a declining trend. In 1985 there were more 
than 12,200 credit institutions in the European Union. Since then, in most European 
countries the total number of credit institutions declined, with the exception of Finland, 
Ireland and Greece (smaller countries). At the end of 1998 there were 8,618 financial 
institutions in EU countries, a 13% reduction from 1994. Similar is the trend for US 
(8,817 financial institutions in 1998, a 16% reduction from 1994). Major reductions in 
the number of institutions occurred in France, Portugal, Belgium, and Spain. The 
decline in the number of credit institutions reflects mergers rather than closures of 
existing institutions. The largest reduction in the number of institutions has taken place 
among the smaller savings and co-operative banks.
3.4.2. Types o f  Credit Institutions
We usually think of banks as commercial banks. However, in many European 
countries other depository institutions e.g. savings banks play a significant role. Major 
institutional demarcations within the banking sector continue to be important in both 
Germany and Spain. In Spain the market share of the savings banks, which can be 
either privately or publicly (i.e. state, provincial, or municipal) owned, expanded 
significantly in the early 1990s. By and large, the restrictions initially imposed on their 
business activities by the Savings Bank Act of 1933, one of which limited their 
operations to regions, were abolished in 1989. However, each savings bank (caja) is 
anchored to its own region. It can buy private bank networks and open branches 
anywhere in Spain -  nearly 50% of Caja Madrid’s 1,600 offices are outside the Madrid 
region -  but it may only merge with another savings bank if it is within its own region; 
it cannot buy the caja of another region. There are 51 savings banks in Spain, but the 
12 largest, those with more than euro 8bn on their balance sheets, account for about 
70% of the total savings banks assets, and La Caixa and Caja Madrid, alone account 
for 35% between them. By March 1999, Spanish savings institutions held about 44% 
of total bank deposits, the highest proportion of any European Union country.
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In Germany the savings banks sector (savings banks plus Landesbanks) is state owned 
and accounts for 36.7% of banking sector business (1997)24. The different types of 
commercial banks hold 25.2% and the cooperative banks 14.4% of business volume. 
Mortgage banks and credit institutions with special functions each carry out 14.4% and 
9.3% of the total business volume of all types of banks respectively. Comparing 1995 
with 1997 figures it can be seen that the Grossbanken (the big three banks) have 
increased their share of the market at the expense of the savings and co-operative 
banks.
In other countries institutional demarcations matter somewhat less than in Spain or 
Germany. At the opposite extreme of the two countries is the UK, where former 
distinctions between clearing banks and merchant banks are no longer operative, and 
where conversion of mutual building societies to private owned banks has meant that 
only a rump of mutual institutions remains.
In Italy commercial banks (banks accepting short term deposits) are now the dominant 
institutional form. Co-operative and mutual banks are an important sub-sector, 
accounting for just over a quarter of bank branches. Co-operative and mutual banks are 
also an important subsector in the French banking system. There were 124 mutual and 
co-operative banks in 1998, while commercial banks accounted for 359. It is 
significant that many of the most recent important French banking takeovers -  
including that of CIC by Crédit Mutuel, Banque Indosuez and Sofinco by Crédit 
Agricole, and Banques Populaires by Natexis -  have been mutuals absorbing 
commercial banks.
3.4.3. O w nersh ip
Banks which are owned or strongly supported by the state have traditionally played a 
very significant role in France, Italy, Germany, Spain, and some other smaller 
countries. Among the smaller EU countries, ownership was until recently almost
24 At the end of 1998, the savings banks had 36m customers -  twice as many as the big banks 
(Grossbanken) combined, and more than five times as many as Deutsche Bank (Financial 
Times, 25 October 1999).
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entirely public in Greece and Portugal. The role of the state in European banking has 
changed in virtually all respects in the last decade. With the exception of some of the 
German Landesbanks, the largest banks in Europe are now all under private or mutual 
ownership. In Austria, Greece, France, and Italy steps have been taken to reduce direct 
state ownership of banks. In Greece there has been a sale of four state-owned banks to 
the private sector and the partial privatisation of the fifth in the last three years.
Only in Germany do state-owned institutions remain of central importance. The 
savings banks, the regional giro institutions (Landesbanks) and a large proportion of 
specialised lending institutions are state-owned. They account for over 40% of German 
banking assets, and since the German co-operative sector accounts for a further 14% of 
banking assets, less than half of bank assets are held by private institutions (the 
commercial, regional, and mortgage banks).
To Germany’s non-public sector banks, and to the European Commission’s 
competition authorities the main problem with Germany’s banking structure is that it 
assigns a special role to the public sector, including the 13 so-called Landesbanks. 
Landesbanks benefit from legal support mechanisms, known as Anstaltlast and 
Gewahrtagerhaftung, which amount to an unlimited guarantee against insolvency. 
Savings banks (Sparkassen) carry as capital a guarantee from local municipalities, 
which makes it difficult for them to merge or be purchased by a shareholding 
company. This enables them to receive higher credit ratings and to borrow money at 
lower interest rates than their financial strength might otherwise justify. In response to 
a complaint by private German banks, the EU is currently considering whether German 
public law banks (Sparkassen and Landesbanken) have an unfair competitive 
advantage deriving from subsidised public capital injections. The European 
Commission recently ruled (July 1999) that Westdeutsche Landesbank (West LB) must 
repay euro 808mn in aid to its main owner, the State of North Rhine Westphalia25. The 
decision, though under appeal, could erode what Germany’s commercial banks regard 
as the public sector’s privileged position in the banking market. West LB in particular
25 Financial Times, 25 October 1999, Survey.
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stands out among the Landesbanken for its ambitious international strategy. It had euro 
345 bn assets in 1998 and representation in 35 countries (data from Fitch-IBCA 
Bankscope database).
In Italy there has been a major transfer of bank assets from public to private sector 
during the past six years. When the Credito Italiano was sold in December 1993, 70% 
of the banking system was in public sector ownership26. The share of banks controlled 
by the state, local authorities and foundations fell to 25% in 1997, and to 18% in 1998 
(Banco dTtalia, 1999)27. With the privatisation in November 1999 of Mediocredito 
Centrale, the government has sold its last controlling stake in a banking group.
Since World War II, French banks have been moved between the state and private 
sector. In 1982, three banks were nationalised: Société Générale, Crédit Lyonnais and 
Banque Nationale de Paris. Five years later, a few important banks returned to the 
private sector, notably Société Générale, Paribas, Suez and BNP. In 1999, Crédit 
Lyonnais has been privatised. The restructuring undertaken in 1998 in France led to a 
change in the control of 139 credit institutions and 16 investment firms and the 
revocation of authorisation from 36 credit institutions and 17 investment banks 
(Banque de France, 1999).
3.5. Asset and Liability Structure
The European Central Bank (ECB) publishes balance sheet data covering the monetary 
financial institutions of the euro area. The data gives a good perspective of the relative 
importance of the different channels of funds across the euro countries (see Table 4) 
(see also Annex 4 for the structure according to the Fitch-IBCA Bankscope database 
and our own calculations).
26 The Banker, February 1999, p. 31
27 And has fallen further in 1999 with the privatisation of Mediocredito Centrale and of Monte 
dei Paschi di Siena (MPS). At 2.1 million, the number of applicants for shares in MPS was
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Table 4: Balance sheet structure of euro area monetary financial institutions, 
(Vû of national total assets or liabilities, .March 1949)
À
Liabilities
Deposits Debt
securities
issued
Money
market
funds
share
/units
Money
market
paper
Capital Other
liabilities
Total 
liabilities 
<% o f  
national 
GDP
Austria 71.4 17.2 0.0 0.0 5.0 6.3 243.1
Belgium 76.0 11.3 0.2 0.0 3.9 8.7 318.9
Finland 67.4 5.0 0.0 14.1 5.9 7.6 95.9
France 63.4 9.6 4.9 3.5 5.5 13.0 272.1
Germany 67.3 22.4 0.4 0.5 4.1 5.3 274.6
Ireland 78.1 8.3 0.0 0.0 7.2 16.5 146.5
Italy 59.6 16.5 0.2 0.0 7.2 16.5 146.5
Luxembourg 78.4 5.6 5.8 2.4 2.4 5.4 3768.3
Netherlands 74.7 13.9 0.0 0.0 4.9 6.5 253.0
Portugal 63.8 5.1 0.0 0.0 6.0 25.2 295.8
Spain 78.0 3.4 4.8 0.0 8.0 5.8 187.5
Euro zone 67.8 14.9 1.9 1.2 5.1 9.1 249.5
UK* 69.7 11.0 273.2
Assets
Loans Securities 
other than 
shares
Shares
and
other
equity
Money
market
paper
Fixed
assets
Remaining
assets
Total 
assets (% 
o f
national 
GDP)
Austria 77.3 12.4 5.7 0.0 1.0 3.6 243.1
Belgium 63.5 27.1 2.3 0.0 0.5 6.6 318.9
Finland 70.6 13.2 1.9 3.6 2.4 8.3 95.9
France 67.2 16.1 1.7 2.1 3.4 9.5 272.1
Germany 76.3 15.2 5.0 0.1 0.7 2.7 274.6
Ireland 73.0 18.6 1.7 0.0 0.6 6.1 333.3
Italy 65.5 16.5 4.1 0.0 2.9 11.0 146.5
Luxembourg 66.9 27.1 1.6 1.0 0.5 3.0 3768.3
Netherlands 81.4 11.3 3.5 0.0 0.5 3.2 253.0
Portugal 57.2 11.0 4.5 0.0 1.3 26.1 295.8
Spain 73.9 15.0 4.1 0.5 2.2 4.3 187.5
Euro zone 71.7 16.2 3.6 0.7 1.7 6.3 249.5
UK* 68.0 10.6 2.8 273.2
greater than in any Italian privatisation and a substantial advance on the 1.6 million applicants 
for shares when Banca Nazionale del Lavoro was privatised in November 1998.
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* Data for end-1998, UK monetary financial institutions includes the Bank o f England and 
foreign banks. Also UK deposits include private deposits and money market instruments, and 
UK securities Include any type of securities except derivatives.
Sources: European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin, August 1999; Financial Statistics, 
September 1999.
Traditional bank deposits are still the most important liability in the intermediaries’ 
balance sheet, ranging from 60% of assets in Italy to nearly 80% in Spain (similar 
results are obtained from the Fitch-IBCA database, where only Greece and Belgium 
have higher proportion of deposits to total assets than Spain at the end of 1999). The 
volume of deposits in the UK is very large, even allowing for the inclusion of money 
market instruments. As expected, the liabilities of money market funds represent a 
larger proportion o f total liabilities in France and Spain. Debt securities issued 
represent the second largest liability item in the aggregated balance sheet of the euro 
area monetary financial institutions, with its share approaching 15%. The amounts 
issued are particularly high in Germany, amounted to 22.5% of total liabilities.
Banks have faced intense competition on the liabilities side, as institutionalisation took 
hold, leading to a sharp fall in deposits as a share of households’ gross financial wealth 
(this fall can be observed also from Annex 4 with the Fitch-IBCA results where there 
is observed a 10% reduction of deposits to total assets in EMU and EU countries in the 
period 1992-1999; deposits as a proportion of total assets is falling from 78% in 1992 
in EU countries to almost 70% in 1999). Money market mutual funds offered banks 
direct competition in providing liquid transaction balances. Previously, such liquid 
transactions balances have been a source of relatively cheap funds for banks. Yet more 
important, there was a shift in preferences to the longer end of life insurers and pension 
funds accounted for an increasing share of household assets.
Loans represent the main asset category of the European monetary financial 
institutions (this is also obvious from the Fitch-IBCA database results presented in 
Annex 4, although the observed levels are different). At March 1999, the overall share 
of loans in total assets was almost 72% at the euro level (Table 4). Debt securities 
(excluding equity) constituted 16% of total assets, while shares and other types of 
equity holdings had only a 3.6% share. In Netherlands, Austria, Germany, Spain and 
Ireland the volume of loans as a percentage of total assets is higher than the euro
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average. The financial intermediaries’ equity investments are relatively high in Austria, 
Germany, Portugal, Spain and Italy. In these countries, the extensive use of 
“relationship banking” means that banks often hold equity of their corporate 
borrowers. From the big EU countries, in France and Italy securities represent a high 
proportion of intermediaries’ investments.
Table 5 shows the different composition of the loan portfolio of the monetary financial 
institutions: at the aggregate euro level, households loan borrowing is just slightly 
larger than the respective for non-financial corporations borrowing. However country 
differences are striking: in Germany, non-financial corporation borrowing represents 
nine-tenths of the intermediaries’ loan portfolios, and in Italy two-thirds. Non-financial 
corporations in these countries raise the majority of their funds from banks. By 
contrast, in the UK borrowing by non-financial corporations is only a quarter of loans 
to the non-financial private sector.
, Table 5: .Monetary financial institutions loans to the nun-financial private sector 
b> type (% of total loans by country, March 1999)
Non-financial
corporations
Households Non-profit institutions 
servicing households
Austria 69.9 29.3 0.8
Belgium 50.7 48.8 0.5
Finland 40.9 58.2 0.9
France 50.8 48.3 0.9
Germany* 90.0 9.5 0.6
Ireland 46.1 52.2 1.7
Italy 66.7 32.2 1.2
Luxembourg 67.7 30.3 1.9
Netherlands 46.2 53.8 0.0
Portugal 47.8 51.9 0.3
Spain 48.3 51.2 0.5
UK** 26.9 73.1
* Own calculations for 1998 from Deutsche Bundesbank Financial Accounts, 1990-98.
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** Own calculations from Hoggarth, G., and Chrystal, A. (1998), “The UK corporate and 
personal sectors during the 1980s and 1990s", Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin, September 
1998.
Source: European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin, August 1999.
3.6. Concentration in European Banking Markets
3.6.1. G eographica l S c o p e  o f  B a nk in g  M arkets
The euro area banking sector is still very fragmented in terms of national and 
sometimes even local characteristics. In some countries a large part of the banking 
activity is in the hands of a few nationwide banks, while in some others the market 
share of banks that operate on a nationwide basis is rather small. A key to analyse the 
impact of current changes in European banking, especially the impact of cross-border 
and within-country consolidation and competition in the banking industry and hence in 
economic efficiency, is identifying the appropriate geographical unit within which 
competition takes place. Because statistics are usually available on a national basis, 
there is a tendency to identity the market within the borders of a country, but this is a 
misleading assumption if competition actually takes place at a sub- or supra-national 
level. A small share of the national banking market held by the largest institutions 
could co-exist with a high level of concentration in local markets. Equally importantly 
it suggests that, at least until competition on a pan-European scale emerges in most 
banking markets, considerable differences in pricing, branch networks, and 
employment will persist, either between countries, or between different regions of one 
country.
3.6.2. M ea su re s  o f  National Concentration
As the preceding discussion highlights, European nations do not necessarily 
correspond to the appropriate geographical area of banking competition. Nonetheless, 
virtually all the available statistics on concentration are for shares of national markets.
In recent years, the concentration of the banking system, measured by the share of 
national bank assets owned by the top 5 (or 10) institutions, has not shown a uniform 
trend. Within the different national banking markets, the degree of concentration varies 
(Annex 5). The concentration measures suggest that the market power of the major
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banks in Finland, the Netherlands, Greece, and Denmark is significant. As a rule of 
thumb, smaller markets are more concentrated as there is less room for a large number 
of banks. For example, Finland boasted a 5-firm concentration ratio of 91.5% of total 
assets in 1998 (Annex 5). Therefore, in these smaller markets consolidation is unlikely 
to go much farther.
In the Nordic countries a high degree of consolidation has already taken place, 
especially after the banking crises of the early 1990s, and they rank amongst the most 
developed banking sectors in Europe. Consolidation in the Netherlands resulted in the 
creation of huge institutions such as ABN AMRO and ING in the early and mid 90s, 
but in neighbouring Belgium the shake-up began only towards the end of 1997.
The five big banking markets in Europe (Germany, Italy, France, UK, and Spain) are 
on the other hand less concentrated. The series o f mergers has increased concentration 
further in 1998, notably in Spain, France and Italy, and the trend is continuing. In 
Germany the degree of concentration measured at the national level just approached 
40% of total German banking assets and is the lowest among the EU countries (Table 
6). Italy has shown the greatest rise in concentration in the last two years; the five-firm 
concentration ratio increased from almost 40% in 1996 to 47% in 1998. The re­
composition of the Italian banking landscape commenced in 1997 and speeded up 
during 1998; this trend is expected to continue for the foreseeable future.
Using 1998 data, it appears that the individual European banking markets are much 
more concentrated than the US market. If instead the whole European Union area is 
considered, concentration appears to increase (Table 6) but is much lower than the US 
one: the market share of the top five European banks is 12.10% of total assets while in 
the US the respective figures are double (24.25%). During the period 1996-1998 the 
degree of concentration of the US banking industry has increased considerably due 
mainly to concentration of big credit institutions (Annex 5).
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■, Tabic 6: Five-firm concentration ratios in major countries by total assets (1998)
Germany 39.31
Spain 59.58
France 44.03
Italy 47.04
UK 47.99
EU 12.10
US 24.25
Japan 33.13
Source: IBCA database and own calculations.
The EU banking industry is composed of relatively few large institutions and a 
substantial number of smaller, local and more specialised banks. Most countries in the 
European Union have three to five large well known banks, though in some countries 
such as Germany, Spain, Italy and France, regional banking is important because of, as 
we have already mentioned before, the large number of mutual and co-operative banks.
■ ' ■ ■ .......................... I ■■■■■■ p.. ■ ■ ■  ■ ■ ------ - ■ ■■■................. ■" <
Table 7: Top 2Ü European bunks by total assets !
Company name -  1997 % Cum %
Deutsche Bank AG 2.66 2.66
HSBC Holdings Pic 2.20 4.86
Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank 2.15 7.01
Crédit Agricole CA 1.99 8.99
ABN Amro Holding NV 1.96 10.95
Société Générale 1.94 12.89
Barclays Bank Plc 1.77 14.66
Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole CNCA 1.76 16.43
Dresdner Bank AG 1.76 18.19
Banque Nationale de Paris 1.61 19.80
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National Westminster Bank Plc 1.42 21.22
Commerzbank AG 1.39 22.61
Banca Intesa+Banca Commerciale Italiana 1.32 23.94
Credit Lyonnais 1.18 25.12
Banco Santander Central Hispano 1.17 26.29
Bayerische Vereinsbank AG 1.15 27.44
Abbey National 1.10 28.54
Landesbank Baden Württemberg 1.07 29.61
Banco Bilbao Viscaya Argentaria SA 1.02 30.63
Groupe Caisse d’Epargne 1.02 31.64
Company naine -  1998 % Cum %
Deutsche Bank AG 3.21 3.21
ABN Amro Holding NV 2.37 5.58
HSBC Holdings Plc 2.29 7.87
Crédit Agricole CA 2.16 10.03
Société Générale 2.07 12.10
Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank 2.03 14.13
Dresdner Bank AG 1.93 16.06
Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole CNCA 1.83 17.89
Banque Nationale de Paris 1.72 19.62
Commerzbank AG 1.70 21.32
Barclays Bank Plc 1.61 22.92
ING Bank NV 1.49 24.41
Banca Intesa+Banca Commerciale Italiana 1.42 25.83
National Westminster Bank Plc 1.35 27.18
Rabobank Group 1.32 28.50
Banco Santander Central Hispano 1.22 29.73
Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank 1.17 30.89
Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg 1.14 32.03
Abbey National 1.13 33.16
Crédit Lyonnais 1.11 34.27
Source: IBCA database
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Consolidation o f the European banking industry has been rapid. The share of bank 
assets accounted for by the top 20 European banks has risen from 31% in 1997 to 
nearly 34% in 1998 (Table 7). Ten European banks are now in the top 25 worldwide as 
ranked by capital strength (Tier One Capital)28 and five EU banks (with Switzerland 
seven banks) are among the top 10 worldwide measured by total assets ($ million)29 
(Table 8).
Tabic 8: Clobal top 10 banks by total assets, 1998 (S milium)
Deutsche Bank Germany 732,534
UBS Switzerland 685,882
Citigroup US 668,641
BankAmerica Corp US 617,679
Bank of Tokyo- 
Mitsubishi
Japan 598,720
ABN AMRO Bank Netherlands 504,122
HSBC Holdings UK 488,655
Crédit Suisse Group Switzerland 473,983
Crédit Agricole Groupe France 457,037
Société Générale France 447,545
Source: The Banker, July 1999
3.6.3. Foreign  Penetration
Cross-border competition and cross-border entry is beginning to have an input on 
certain national markets. A prominent example is in the Benelux group of countries, 
where interpenetration by different banking groups (ABN-Amro, Générale de Banque 
etc.) has proceeded to the point that with the introduction of the euro it is questionable 
whether these can be regarded as separate domestic banking markets. Elsewhere there 
have been prominent cross-border entries into other national domestic banking
28 The Banker, July 1999, p. 114.
29 The Banker, July 1999, p. 90.
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markets, most notably Deutsche Bank which has relatively large commercial banking 
subsidiaries in Italy, Spain and elsewhere.
Nevertheless, despite these examples, it is easy to exaggerate the current level of cross- 
border competition and cross-border entry. The combined market share of foreign 
branches and subsidiaries established by credit institutions domiciled in the European 
Economic area was at end 1997 below 10% in terms of banking assets in all euro area 
countries with the exception of Belgium, Ireland and Luxembourg.30
Annex 6 reports deposits held with foreign banks by all entities banks. In no country 
does the proportion of assets held with non-resident banks exceed 15% in 1997. 
However there have been rising almost everywhere throughout the 1990s, with the 
exception of Switzerland. The second table makes the same observation for bank 
lending. The figures have also an upward trend. Worth mentioning is the case of the 
Netherlands where 30.5% of the liabilities obtained by the Dutch non-financial sector 
have been issued by non-resident banks (1997). The above evidence indicates that 
European commercial banking markets remain mostly national, with few direct inroads 
by foreign competitors.
In certain countries foreign banks dominate (Luxembourg) or at least have a major 
market presence (Belgium, UK, Ireland). For the first time in the history of the banking 
system in 1998, the number of commercial banks in France under foreign control 
exceeded that of French-owned banks, with 187 against 17231. The number of non- 
German institutions with active branches or subsidiaries remains stable at about 180 in 
1998, and a similar number has representative offices32.
A key feature of the UK banking system is the presence of a large number of branches 
and subsidiaries of foreign banks in London. These institutions are primarily engaged
30 European Central Bank publication, “Possible effects of EMU on the EU banking systems in 
the medium to long term”, February 1999.
31 Banque de France Annual Report, 1998.
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in international business booked in London, international and investment banking, and 
wholesale lending to large corporates and to UK. local authorities.
3.7. Concluding Remarks
In recent months, the possible implications of the introduction o f the single currency 
for the European banking industry have received increasing attention. While the euro 
may act as a catalyst for change, it is the underlying forces (technological change, 
demographic trends, globalisation, deregulation, securitisation) that will play a more 
important role in shaping the direction of the change.
The objective of this chapter is to monitor and assess developments in the structure of 
European banking. In general, banks dominate the financial system of the European 
Union more than that of the US. There are also substantial variations between EU 
countries, particularly on the asset side of the balance sheet. There is less variation in 
banks’ liability structures, which are dominated in all countries by deposits.
Public ownership was until recently an important feature of banks in several major 
countries, but Italy and France have recently undertaken substantial privatisation 
programmes. Finally, it is hard to measure concentration in banking adequately. On the 
five-firm asset ratio, concentration at a national level seems to be excessive in some 
smaller EU countries, while among the major countries, the UK, Spain, and Italy have 
quite concentrated banking industries. Some product markets are already EU-wide, and 
at this level European banking is not highly concentrated, with a five-firm 
concentration ratio lower than in Japan or the US. But other markets are national or 
local in character, and high local levels of concentration will remain a concern until 
they are challenged by cross-border European banking competition. Important policy 
issues include establishing the degree of national consolidation likely to enhance
M Financial Times, 25 October 1999.
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efficiency whilst maintaining competition. Closely related are prudential issues having 
to do with ensuring financial stability during a period of heightened competition.
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Chapter 4
“European Bank Performance and Profitability” 
Abstract
In this chapter we first make comparisons of overall profitability of banks in Europe, 
using return on assets as our measure of profitability, examining both trends over time 
and differences between countries. Data from the comprehensive Fitch-IBCA database 
of bank income statements and balance sheets show that there are substantial 
performance variations across countries. We then examine in greater detail the various 
income sources, both net interest and non-interest income. Our goal here is both to 
assess the contribution of these various components to overall profitability and to 
discuss economic and other factors explaining differences in performance, both over 
time and between countries (an econometric analysis for these factors will continue at 
Chapters 5 and 8).
Christos Staikouras 68
European Bank Performance and ProfitabilityEH23 Ofy UIfciKMnwm $rjho*dUJ **.*-
4. European Bank Performance and Profitability
4.1. Introduction
Our principal data source on both banks’ balance sheets and profit and loss accounts is 
taken from the database produced by the rating agency Fitch-IBCA (Bankscope 
Database). This database does not give quite complete coverage of all banks in Europe, 
but all except the very smallest are included in the database. The advantage of using 
the Fitch-IBCA database is that, since the data are provided at the level of the 
individual institution, it is possible to filter this, so it covers a subset of comparable 
institutions allowing sensible comparisons to be made between European countries. It 
contains fewer banks in the beginning of 1990s than in very recent years. Separate 
categorisation is available for commercial, savings, mortgage and co-operative banks 
and it is also possible to select banks by criteria such as the size of balance sheet items.
We find that net interest income measured as a share of assets, has declined since the 
early 1990s in all European countries. However, this is not obviously due, as is often 
claimed, to increased competition. It seems likely to be the consequence of reductions 
in nominal interest rates which -  because of the mismatch between a relatively high 
proportion of interest earning assets on bank balance sheets compared with the 
relatively lower proportion of interest earning liabilities (the endowment effect) -  
lower gross interest received by more than gross interest paid (see also Chapter 5). We 
also note that net interest income is unusually low as a proportion of bank assets in 
France and Germany, perhaps due to the important influence of state owned and 
mutual institutions. Across Europe the reduction of net interest income in the 1990s 
has been roughly offset by an increase of non-interest income, net of costs, so that total 
net income before loan loss provisions and taxes was broadly flat during the 1990s. 
Despite this, non-interest bank income remains remarkably low in some European 
countries, notably Germany. The increase in European bank profitability was largely a 
cyclical reduction of loan loss provisions.
Total costs, in relation to either income or assets, do not show any systematic 
relationship with more direct indicators of excess capacity either over time or between
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countries. But these numbers are affected both by the linkage between non-interest 
income and total costs and by IT expenditures. Distinguishing personnel expenses from 
other costs, we find that significant reductions of personnel expenses have occurred to 
date in only a few European countries (Italy, Spain) and that there is considerable 
scope for further reductions in bank personnel costs in most European countries 
(Annex 7 and 8).
4.2. Profitability Comparisons
4.2.1. Trends O ver Time
Because the Fitch-IBCA data are available only from 1992 onwards, longer-term 
analysis of the trends in bank profitability requires us to make use of the OECD Bank 
Profitability publication on banking performance. Table 9 summarises OECD data on 
the ratio of return on assets (ROA) for the European countries. This indicates that 
banking profitability in most of the European Union countries fell from the mid-1980s 
to mid-1990s (see also Annex 7).
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Table 9: Long-term treuils in banks’ RO A*
Countries Pre-tax profits
1982-84 1988-90 1995-97
As a percentage of assets
Austria NA 0.52 0.42
Belgium 0.34 0.27 0.37
Denmark 2.00 0.32 1.23
Finland 0.47 0.46 0.25
France 0.34 0.28 0.08
Germany 0.62 0.69 0.47
Greece 0.42 0.43 0.80
Italy** 0.79 1.11 0.40
Luxembourg 0.28 0.31 0.53
Netherlands*** 0.55 0.77 0.75
Portugal 0.47 0.89 0.71
Spain 0.61 0.82 0.75
Sweden 0.38 0.43 1.08
UK 0.88 0.78 1.15
* For Belgium, Austria, and the Netherlands, all banks; for all other countries, commercial 
banks only.
** For Italy commercial banks, except the period 1995-1997.
*** For Netherlands 1983-1984, Portugal for 1989-1990, and the UK. for 1984.
Source; OECD and own calculations
The principal contribution to this declining trend in return on assets has been a 
narrowing of net interest income/total assets (or of the net interest margins = net 
interest income/total earning assets) (Annex 7). There have also been substantial 
declines in operating expenses and rises, in most countries, in non-interest income as a 
share of total assets (Annex 7).
Abolition of the interest rate and service charge regulations in most countries during 
the 1980s seems to have narrowed significantly banks’ interest margins. The most 
important reduction has taken place in France. While banks’ net non-interest to net 
interest income has risen in most countries, most significantly in France and Sweden
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(Annex 7), the rise has not generally been strong enough with respect to asset growth 
to offset the fall in intermediation margins. A downward trend therefore tends to 
characterise the evolution of banks’ overall gross margins. Although showing a 
downward trend, banks’ overall profit margins have been relatively large in the UK.
Also, among the major EU countries, the recession in the early 1990s seems to have 
resulted in higher aggregate write-offs and provisions only in the case of the UK. In 
Scandinavian countries, banks have experienced a vast increase in credit losses in the 
early 1990s, which has resulted in substantial pre-tax losses.
To examine more recent trends we use the Fitch-IBCA database (providing data from 
1992-1999)” . This indicates that something of a reversal in the longer-term downward 
trend in profitability has taken place since 1994 (Table 10 and Annex 8). This 
improvement was most pronounced in the UK and the smaller European Union 
countries. It was however primarily a cyclical upswing in profitability, due to a 
reduction in loan-loss provisions. In general, sustained economic growth throughout 
the year contributed to the improved quality of credit portfolios on the European 
market. Aggregate banking profitability before provisions remained fairly constant 
between 1991-94 and 1995-98.
Our analysis with Fitch-IBCA data using income statement data for the period from 
1992 to 1999 reveals that net interest margins have continued to decline in the majority 
of EU countries. With the prominent exception of Germany profitability before 
provisions increased in the period 1996-1999 compared with the period 1992-1995, as 
the fall of net interest income was more than offset by lower costs and higher non­
interest income.
The declines of net interest margins have been particularly marked in those countries 
that had the highest interest margins in 1990 -  namely, Greece, Portugal and Spain. In 3
33 However, we should be very careful on the use of the figures for years 1992 and 1999 since 
the number of banks that provide data is quite small relative to other years (see also Annex 8).
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fact, even though Spain had its worst recession between 1991 and 1993, margins at 
levels close to 3% were still being achieved in this period.
In France during the 1990s there was also a particularly large decline of net interest 
income, down from 1.85% of total assets in 1992-95 to 1.32% of total assets in 1996- 
99 (Table 10). As a result, despite substantial reduction of operating expenses and 
increases of non-interest income, profitability before provisions actually declined 
during the 1990s and French banks continue to be the least profitable in Europe in 
1999, after Germany and Austria. However, profits before tax increased by 0.2% of 
total assets, from an average value of 0.26% in 1992-1995 to 0.46% in 1996-1999.
Germany also diverges somewhat from the overall European trend. In the German case 
there has been little increase in non-interest income as a share of bank assets. As a 
result significant reductions of net interest margins led to a decline of overall 
profitability (profits before tax were 0.58% of total assets in 1996 and 0.39% of total 
assets in 1999) (Annex 8).
Table 10: Bank profitability in Europe (% of total assets) (1992-1999)
-I
G e rm an y S p a in F ra n c e Ita ly U K
1992 1996 1992 1996 1992 1996 1992 1996 1992 1996
-95 •99 -95 -99 -95 -99 -95 -99 -95 -99
Profits before 
tax
0.59 0.48 0.83 1.07 0.26 0.46 0.51 0.76 0.98 1.16
Net interest 
income
2.03 1.37 2.84 2.63 1.85 1.32 2.72 2.32 2.18 1.98
Non interest 
income
0.56 0.68 0.92 1.21 0.86 1.09 0.85 1.24 1.38 1.26
Operating
expenses
1.64 1.37 2.48 2.47 1.97 1.76 2.75 2.49 2.12 1.87
Source: 1BCA database and own calculations
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4.2.2. C o m p a riso n s  Betw een  Countries
Table 10 and Annex 8 also allow us to make “cross-sectional” comparisons of the level 
of profitability between countries. Among the major EU countries, Spanish and the UK 
banks have consistently earned the highest return on assets in recent years. Return on 
bank assets has been especially low in Germany and France. Largely for cyclical 
reasons banks in Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Austria and France earned particularly 
low return on assets in 1990-95 (Table 9, Annex 7 and Annex 8). Among the smaller 
countries, the highest levels of ROA are observed in Greece, Ireland, and Finland 
(Annex 8).
E223
Comparing with Table 9, it seems that the relative profitability of banks within Europe 
has not altered greatly since the 1980s. At that time Spanish and UK banks were again 
among the most profitable. Italian and German banks were comparatively more 
profitable, and French and Belgian banks were the least profitable. Throughout Europe 
banking is less profitable than in the United States where banks’ (foreign and domestic 
but excluding the investment banks) recorded profits before tax of 1.65% in the period 
1996-99, more than double the respective European figures (Table 11 and Annex 8). 
But also throughout the 1990s banks from all European countries have reported much 
higher profits as a share of assets than banks in Japan.
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'Table 11: Hank profitability (% of total assois) 11992-1999)
European Union
1992-95 1996-99
Profit before tax 0.55 0.72
Net interest income 2.11 1.69
Non interest income 0.87 1.26
Operating expenses 1.99 1.78
Loan loss provisions and other 0.44 0.45
United States
1992-95 1996-99
Profit before tax 1.31 1.65
Net interest income 3.00 2.98
Non interest income 1.64 2.02
Operating expenses 2.91 3.07
Loan loss provisions and other 0.42 0.28
Japan*
1992-95 1996-99
Profit before tax 0.10 -0.44
Net interest income 1.54 1.36
Non interest income 0.39 0.52
Operating expenses 0.78 1.18
Loan loss provisions and other 1.05 1.14
*We do not have data for Japan for the year 1999. 
Source: IBCA database and own calculations
It is also worthwhile to compare differences in the sources of income between EU 
countries (see again Table 10 and Table 11). Among the major EU countries Spain and 
Italy have especially high net interest income, while Spain, Italy, and the UK have 
particularly high non-interest income (all measured as a share of total assets). Germany 
and France have low interest margins, undermining the overall profitability of their 
banking sectors. It is unclear quite why French and German banks earn such low
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interest margins in relation to bank assets, though perhaps the most plausible 
explanation is competition from mutual or state-owned institutions which undercut the 
pricing of profit maximising commercial shareholder owned banks.
The level of non-interest income is almost similar in the UK, Italy and Spain (around 
1.25% of total assets in the period 1996-1999). Finally operating expenses (including 
wage and non-wage expenses) are particularly high in Italy and Spain (see also Annex 
8).
4.3. The Decline of Net Interest Income
Despite its recent decline as a share of total assets, net interest income continues to be 
the most important source of bank income with at least two-thirds of banks’ gross 
income coming from this source of income in most countries. Interest on loans and 
investments comprises the bulk of revenue. Interest payments on borrowings similarly 
represent the primary expense. Understanding the trends of net interest income is 
therefore central to monitoring and predicting bank performance.
Our findings of a continued decline of net interest income as a share of assets is 
confirmed by a number of other studies, e.g. a BIS study (1999) reports that between 
1996-98 net interest margins fell in all the countries surveyed except Finland and 
Spain34. For the euro area countries surveyed net interest margins fell by 13% between 
1996-9835.
A number of hypotheses can be advanced about the causes of this decline in net- 
interest income. One explanation frequently put forward is increased competition in 
both deposit and lending markets. It is however difficult to test this explanation 
because it is not at all easy to measure the level of competition. A related hypothesis
34 The other countries surveyed were the United States, Japan, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, Canada, Australia 
(Quarterly Review of International Banking and Financial Market Developments, November 
1 9 9 9 ).
35 The euro area countries surveyed were France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium 
and Finland.
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explaining declines of interest margins is deregulation and financial innovation. The 
removal of administrative constraints on interest rates paid on customer deposits and 
the increasing common practice of making some interest payments on sight deposits 
has tended to reduce interest margins. But most of this deregulation took place in the 
1980s or earlier. It cannot explain the recent decline of net interest income. Reductions 
in requirements to hold non-interest bearing reserves will have a positive impact on net 
interest income as a share of assets, but this makes the widespread decline of net 
interest income more rather than less difficult to be explained.
The mix of assets is also an important determinant of net interest income. If secure 
components of the loan book, such as mortgage lending, grow relatively fast then this 
can lead to a decline of net interest income as a share of total assets (or net interest 
margin). Similarly increases of inter-bank lending or of holdings of marketable 
securities could reduce interest margins.
Much the most compelling explanation of the reduction in bank net interest income as 
a share of assets for European banks is the reduction of inflation and nominal interest 
rates in the 1980s and early 1990s (see also Chapter 5). Banks have access to important 
sources of non-interest bearing or funding, notably capital reserves and non-interest 
bearing sight deposits. As nominal interest rates decline then the “endowment” income 
on interest free liabilities, i.e. the income arising because interest-bearing assets exceed 
interest-bearing liabilities, is reduced. This is the case that occurs in the great majority 
of EU banks (see also Chapter 5).
A related point, made in several studies examining the impact of nominal interest rates 
on bank earnings, is the long lags between adjustments to market and bank rates of 
interest. According to the Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report:
“...the reasons fo r  this lagged connection are the price and volume responses through 
which changes in interest rates affect balance sheet structures and interest rate lock-in 
periods. In the process, different elasticities and lock-in periods which are reduced at 
a different pace result in corresponding time lags. ”
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The “endowment” effect is not a complete explanation of recent changes to net interest 
margins in Europe. Amongst the major European countries the decline of interest 
margins in France has been particularly sharp. This may be explained, at least in part, 
by the competition for bank deposits from higher-yielding money-market mutual 
funds. The decline of net interest margins in Italy, on the other hand, seems much 
smaller than would have been expected from the fall in nominal interest rates.
Net interest income/total assets is much higher in the United States than in the EU (at 
2.98% in the US compared with 1.69% for the EU in 1996-1999), and has also 
remained stable in the examined period (Table 11). A partial explanation of this might 
be the widespread securitisation of mortgage assets in the United States, leaving banks 
with relatively higher interest earning assets (but also higher risk assets) on their 
balance sheets. The result is that declines of nominal interest rate may have a rather 
different short run and long run impact on bank interest margins.
4.4. The Contribution of Non-Interest Income
As discussed above, our data (Table 10 and Annex 8) show that the ratio of non­
interest income to total assets varies considerably across Europe. In 1996-99 among the 
major EU countries it is the highest in the UK and Italy (1.26% and 1.24% 
respectively) and the lowest in Germany (0.68%.) Among other EU countries Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal have relatively large non-interest income exposure (Annex 8) - 
the first one is the only European country where the ratio of non-interest income to 
total assets is higher than in the United States in the last three years. Many different but 
important conclusions can be reached referring to the non-interest income structure.
First we note that there seems to have been a modest but steady rise, across several 
countries in non-interest income as a proportion of total assets. This was most 
pronounced during the 1980s, with OECD data indicating a substantial rises of non­
interest income as a share of bank assets in almost all countries (Annex 7). Our 
analysis of the Fitch-IBCA database indicates that during the 1990s the rate of increase 
in non-interest income, in relation to assets, slowed but was still on an upward trend in 
most countries (Annex 8).
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There is also observed considerable variation in the rate of increase of non-interest 
income during the 1990s across the EU. Increases of non-interest income have been 
especially strong (around 0.20% of total assets) in France, Italy and Spain. In 
Germany, the UK, Switzerland and in most of the smaller EU countries there have 
been more modest increases or even declines in non-interest income as a share of total 
assets (Annex 8).
The breakdown of non-interest income into its components is also informative. Two- 
thirds of the total non-interest income derives from fee and commission revenues 
(Annex 8). The average proportion of net trading income to non-interest income in all 
EU countries has remained stable since 1995 (around 22% of total non-interest 
income). Credit institutions benefited from the buoyant financial environment and 
increased the volume of their trading activities. However this increase may prove to 
have been a temporary phenomenon driven by lower inflation and interest rates and the 
consequent rise of asset prices, i.e. the case of Greece. Nevertheless, although trading 
activities continued in general to boost the performance of the French banking sector, 
the financial turmoil observed in 1998 caused concern and underscored the volatility in 
income from such activities. In any case trading income still remains a relatively small 
contributor to total non-interest income.
It is unclear what factors explain either the differences between countries in the 
contribution of non-interest income or the trends in non-interest income. The only 
studies that we have been able to uncover are for the comparison of non-interest 
income in the United States. While not directly informative about the situation in 
Europe, this work indicates that in the United States traditional banking services are 
the major source of fee and commission income for commercial banks (see also 
Chapter 6).
Turning to Europe, we can do little more than advance alternative hypotheses about the 
substantial variation in non-interest income. One possibility is that the variation in fee 
and commission income reflects differences in charging practices rather than in 
underlying banking activity, with banks in some countries making explicit charges for
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payments and other services while banks in other countries cover the cost of equivalent 
services out of interest margins. Changes in these charging practice could explain 
substantial changes in reported non-interest income over time.
International comparisons provide some support for this view. According to OECD 
data, the ratio of non-interest income to total bank assets was around 1.8% in the UK in 
the mid 1980s (it then actually fell slightly by the mid-1990s (Annex 7)) and around 
1.4% in the United States (and has risen further to over 2% during the 1990s). This 
suggests that UK and US commercial banks earned substantial amounts of non-interest 
income from “traditional” banking services such as checking, asset management and 
cash management. Amongst European banks, in contrast, non-interest income was 
relatively unimportant in the early 1980s and even now still amounts to less than 1% of 
total bank assets in some European countries e.g. Austria, or Sweden etc.
It is difficult to believe that the cross-country differences in the contribution of non­
interest income, dating back to the early 1980s, are entirely due to differences in 
underlying banking services. Throughout Europe banks provided payment services and 
cash management for companies not entirely unlike the services provided by the UK 
and the US banks. Of course it may be that payments and cash management services in 
the UK and the United States were more advanced than in continental Europe, at least 
in the early 1980s, and this might explain higher levels of charging. Nevertheless 
relatively low shares of non-interest income on traditional banking services outside the 
United States and the UK can be explained simply by differences in charging practice.
One can hypothesise that the practice of providing such services at relatively low cost, 
subsidised out of net interest income, may be a feature of more “relationship 
orientated” banking systems. Certainly this is one explanation of the relatively low 
levels of non-interest income in Germany. Regulation may also play a role, e.g. in 
France where banks are forbidden from charging for cheque payments and clearing 
even to business customers. Ultimately however this is speculative. We have been 
unable to determine the extent of implicit charging for payments and other bank 
services in Europe.
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Another suggestion sometimes made is that increased non-interest income is due to a 
greater volume of off balance-sheet services, such as guarantees, loan commitments, or 
market making in derivatives.
r------------------- "—  --------—  ■ — ......... ................................ ■
j Table 12: OlT-bukiiHx- sheet iU-ins/tutal assets (%) j
Avg. 1992-95 Avg. 1996-99
EU 22.71 24.45
EMU 20.35 21.80
Japan 5.97 5.08
US 45.49 58.64
* We do not have data for 1992 for the UK and 1999 for Japan. 
Source: IBCA database and own calculations
Table 12 indicates that there has been a substantial increase in the proportion of off- 
balance sheet items to total assets both in the US and the European Union area. France, 
Italy, and the UK have the largest proportions of off-balance sheet items to total assets 
(Annex 8). Between 1992 and 1998, the average ratio of off-balance sheet items to 
total assets in EU area has increased by almost 4% and in 1998 stands at about 25% 
(Table 12 and Annex 8). The data mask variation in the importance of off balance 
sheet activities across countries: one country has banks registering more than 100% of 
off-balance sheet items relative to total assets (Denmark) and another country includes 
banks with as little as 2.41% of off-balance sheet items (Ireland). Two points are worth 
mentioning: a) this proportion is higher in the United States than in the EU, and b) the 
smaller EU countries rely more on off-balance sheet items compared with the big five 
continental countries. Not all, possibly only a small part, of this off-balance sheet 
exposure will be fee generating. To the extent that it reflects hedging or insurance 
activity -e.g. through the purchase of interest rate swaps or interest rate options -  it will 
be risk reducing and cost increasing, not fee generating.
Yet another possible explanation of the statistics on non-interest income is sale of 
financial products such as life-assurance, casualty insurance, pension products etc.
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Certainly bank management sees the exploitation of economies of scope through such 
cross-selling as an important contributor to future profits and it is a justification for the 
purchase of life-assurance subsidiaries.
This can help explain higher levels of non-interest income in the Switzerland, the 
United States, the Netherlands, and the UK, where banks play an important role (along 
with other financial intermediaries) in the provision of asset management services. The 
widespread switch from state to private provision o f retirement income offers the 
opportunity for banks in Europe to raise over time their share of non-interest income 
derived from commissions on savings products.
We are unable to determine which of these factors explains the substantial differences 
in the contribution of non-interest income to the returns of European banks. What we 
can say is that over time most these factors should move in the same direction, 
generating increased non-interest income in relation to total bank assets. Many analysts 
assume that the dramatic rise in non-interest revenues as proportion of total income 
came from investment banking, trading, and brokerage activities. These new products, 
in addition to generating fee income, make banks more competitive with other banks 
and non-banks that offer a wide array of services and products.
4.5. Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we make comparisons of overall profitability of banks in Europe and we 
examine the sources of income. Data from OECD publications and Fitch-IBCA 
database of bank income statements and balance sheets confirm that there are 
substantial performance variations across countries.
Generally speaking, net interest income has declined over time. This has been due 
mainly to the fall in nominal interest rates and the consequent fall in banks’ 
“endowment” income, and only to a small extent to increased competition in lending 
and deposit markets. Meanwhile there have been substantial rises in non-interest 
income, though even now it is nothing like as important, in relation to total income, as 
in the US banking industry. Across major EU countries, it appears that Spanish and
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Italian banks are the most reliant on interest margins, while those in the UK earn most 
from fees and other non-interest sources.
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Chapter 5
“Net Interest Income, Balance Sheet 
Structure and Interest Rates”
Abstract
This chapter examines the response of bank net interest margins to changes in the level 
and volatility of market interest rates, the funds gap ratio (i.e. the difference between 
the interest rate sensitive assets and liabilities divided by total assets), and market 
conditions. The gap position gauges a bank’s exposure to interest rate risk. In fact, 
however, a number of factors may affect the yields that banks earn and pay on assets 
and liabilities and therefore their interest income flows. These factors include market 
demand characteristics, market supply conditions including market structure, and 
macroeconomic conditions. Exclusion of relevant influences from the model will result 
in inefficient estimation and may lead to biased coefficient estimates. This is why in 
our analysis we include variables such as the level and variability of interest rates 
(principally the result of changes in the rate of inflation), the size of the bank (log of 
total assets), and the concentration ratio of the banking industry in the several 
European countries. Regression models are tested to determine the effects o f all these 
variables on net interest margins.
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Chapter 5: Net Interest Income, Balance Sheet Structure and 
Interest Rates
5.1. Introduction
The sensitivity of a commercial bank’s income and market values to changes in interest 
rates is of interest to bankers, regulators, investors, and researchers. Conventional 
wisdom has long viewed financial intermediaries, such as banks, as being susceptible 
to interest rate risk. Since the early 1970s, bankers have become increasingly aware of 
the effects volatile interest rates have on net interest margins. This arises because of 
banks’ propensity to undertake asset transformation or intermediation functions by 
lending long (often at fixed rates) and borrowing short (often at variable rates). 
Although there is no generally accepted view as to why ‘banks’ have an advantage in 
undertaking this asset transformation function (as compared to other firms) banks 
typically keep title to the relatively long-term loan portfolios they originate while 
selling (deposit) contracts of short maturity. A priori, such mismatched asset-liability 
structures make bank earnings (or stock values) more susceptible to interest rate 
changes than firms who choose not to specialise in providing asset transformation 
services.
Interest sensitivity (or gap management) is the popular concept used for managing 
banks’ net interest income and exposure to interest rate risk. The sensitivity or gap 
position, defined as the relationship between rate-sensitive assets and rate-sensitive 
liabilities, gauges a bank’s exposure to interest rate risk. Assets, liabilities and equity 
are valued in book terms. Common equity is usually treated similarly to non-sensitive 
liabilities. Most of the banks have a positive funds gap i.e. the interest sensitive assets 
exceed its interest bearing liabilities (the same occurs with the data of our analysis). 
Nowadays, banks make increasing use of non-deposit sources of funds and began 
challenging more of these funds into interest earning assets other than loans. We 
assume that the yields on sensitive assets and cost rates on sensitive liabilities vary 
simultaneously and proportionately. Under rising short-term rates, this positive gap 
would increase net interest margin, which is defined as the ratio o f net interest income 
divided by total assets. In other words this is the interest yield on the intermediation
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process.
A common fallacy of interest sensitivity analysis is to attribute all credit cycle variation 
in interest margin to changes in market rates. The traditional statistical cost model 
implicitly assumes that all banks face identical interest rates on various asset and 
liability items, so that interbank variations in portfolio mix simply reflect different 
portfolio preferences. In fact, however, a number of factors may affect the yields that 
banks earn and pay on assets and liabilities respectively and therefore their income 
flows. These factors include market demand characteristics, market supply conditions 
including market structure and the cost of non-fmancial factor inputs, and 
macroeconomic conditions. Ho and Saunders (1981) found that the size of the interest 
spread was a function of four variables: the degree of managerial risk aversion, average 
transaction size, competition within the bank’s market, and the variability of interest 
rates. Exclusion o f relevant influences from the model will result in inefficient 
estimation and may lead to biased coefficient estimates.
In this chapter we examine the effect of the funds gap on the net interest margins of the 
European banks. We then evaluate the sources of net interest margin behavior via size 
effects, macroeconomic effects and market structure effects. Finally, we carry out the 
same analysis for the several types of financial institutions in Europe.
5.2. Literature Review
The impact of market interest rates on commercial bank revenues, costs and 
profitability has increasingly concerned economists and policymakers as financial 
market conditions have become more volatile in recent years. Two distinct aspects of 
market rate conditions may affect bank profits: the level of interest rates and the 
variability of rates around their average level within each period.
A substantial proportion of banking activities involves small investors and borrowers. 
Differential information and transaction costs in these investors’ portfolio allocations 
make them unable to respond fully to a change in the level of market rates. Because of 
such retail customers, bank profit margins can vary with the level of market rates.
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Thistle, McLeod and Conrads (1989) have found that (a) the composition of the 
balance sheet depends on both the level and the change in interest rates, and (b) the 
response to changes in interest rates is different, depending on whether rates are rising 
or falling.
Banks no doubt experience short-term profit fluctuations when market rates change, 
perhaps because they are actively speculating on nominal rate movements. The 
potential for adverse effects on bank profitability of increased rate variability was 
noted long ago. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, Flannery (1981, 1983) found 
that for bank organisations the reported profits generally fluctuate little when market 
rates change. When market rates change, their revenues and costs adjust equally 
quickly, leaving net current operating earnings largely unaffected. Individual banks 
certainly can choose to undertake interest rate risk, but most banks possess a sufficient 
range of asset and liability choices to hedge their annual profit margins effectively. As 
he writes: “... fo r  most banks they [the fluctuations of interest rates] represent no 
serious threat to long-run viability and profits", Flannery examined the sensitivity of 
large and small banks’ net current operating earnings to interest rate movements. He 
found a significant long-term impact for only two of the fifteen large banks sampled, 
while for small banks only seven out of sixty were significantly affected (all in a 
positive direction). Flannery supports the view that a ceteris paribus increase (for 
example) in market rate variability has two potential effects on financial intermediary 
firms. First, firms with a comparative advantage in securities trading would tend to 
benefit at the expense of less informed traders in the market. Such bank profits are 
reported separately. Secondly, the public’s demand for intermediated securities - 
deposits and/or loans- might depend on the degree of uncertainty in primary security 
markets. For example on the loan side, the demand for fixed rate intermediary loans 
might be expected to increase with higher market rate variability. Elsewhere, Maisel 
and Jacobson (1978) arrived at basically the same conclusions.
For Scott (1966) bank profitability does not depend to any significant extent upon the 
level or the pattern of interest rates. For him, there are issues involving the capital 
values of bond holdings, and the special tax advantages accruing to banks from their 
ability to offset capital losses against ordinary income that may depend upon the
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movements of interest rates as well as the levels of interest rates. But these are short­
term considerations, and bankers at large should perhaps not be greatly concerned 
whether monetary policy is ‘tight’ or ‘easy’ from the narrow point of view of their 
concern over firm profitability, although, of course, they should be concerned about 
monetary policy from the broader point of view of its impact upon economic stability.
The level of market interest rates is used in bank performance studies as proxy for 
capital scarcity. When capital is scarce, the cost of money is high, something that will 
be reflected in market interest rates. High interest rates can produce deteriorating asset 
quality. These high rates contribute to lending problems because some borrowers lack 
the ability either to pass along or to absorb increased funding costs. However, 
Samuelson (1945) wrote that "...the banking system as a whole is immeasurably 
helped rather than hindered by an increase in interest rates...and commercial banks 
would profit more than savings banks". The nominal interest rate increasingly 
influences the net interest revenues and these in turn influence positively the ratio of 
net profits over the assets. When market interest rates increase, central banks raise their 
discount rates, and commercial banks may raise their lending rates sooner by more 
percentage points than their deposit rates. In this case, banks’ ‘spread’/ interest margin 
(interest income - interest expense) widens, thus banks’ net interest margin increases. 
When the inverse situation arises, banks lower their interest rates but the reduction on 
the deposit rates is lower than the reduction on their lending rates. Although interest 
costs of banks would also decline with a reduction in rates, these costs amount to only 
about half the interest income of banks. As a result, a given percentage point drop in 
both interest income and interest costs would reduce revenues twice as much as costs. 
Therefore, banks’ net interest income shrinkages, and so do their profit rates. This 
could be more valid where banks possess some market power so that their interest rates 
are not market determined.
For Revell (1980) banks and other credit institutions will benefit from a rise in interest 
rates if the proportion of assets on which they can raise the rates is greater than the 
proportion of deposits on which they must pay increased rates. Santoni (1986) supports 
the view that an increase in interest rates reduces the bank’s capital. In other words, an 
interest rate change affects the payment stream obligated by the bank’s liabilities
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before it affects the bank’s receipt stream, as maturity dates of a bank’s assets 
generally extend beyond those of its liabilities. Consequently, an increase in the 
interest rate reduces the expected net stream of dollar receipts as the bank’s creditors 
renegotiate for the higher interest rate, while the interest rate earn by the bank on the 
existing loans is locked up. O f course, the loans eventually mature and are renegotiated 
at the higher nominal rate, but the bank’s capital is reduced nonetheless.
Anderson (1979) found that a reduction in interest rates cuts the income of banks 
significantly, while similarly, the high interest rates during 1980 in US led the insured 
commercial banks to experience relatively strong profitability (also Opper, 1981). Cole 
(1981) mentions that the improved profitability of small banks in the period 1977-1980 
occurred due to the increase in gross interest earned on assets. High average interest 
rates provided an opportunity to increase yields on interest-earning assets. Small banks 
were able to take advantage of this opportunity because of their relatively large 
holdings of assets with moderately short-term maturities. Hancock (1985) in an 
examination of eighteen New York-New Jersey member banks for the period 1973- 
1978 concluded that banks appear to have profits that increase with interest rates. 
Davis et.al. (1993) note that those banks that reside in a high interest rate environment 
generally make higher profits than those who do not cover the higher opportunity cost 
of their own capital.
Hence, a positive relationship between interest rates and net interest margins and an 
adverse between variability of interest rates and these margins is proposed.
5.3. Empirical Implementation
The analysis will be based on cross-country time-series data (panel data). A panel data 
set offers a certain number of advantages over traditional pure cross section or pure 
time series data sets. The most obvious advantage is that the number of observations is 
typically much larger in panel data. A related advantage is that panel data sets may 
alleviate the problem of multicollinearity. When the explanatory variables vary in two 
dimensions they are less likely to be highly correlated. A third advantage is that these 
data sets make it possible to identify and measure effects that are simply not detectable 
in pure cross section or pure time series data. It is sometimes argued that cross section
Christos Staikouras 89
» T U T  T O  T O  C*I U n Net Interest Income, Balance Sheet Structure and Interest Rates 
M * ft * ' l l  fkmnmm ftohnolJ m U U
data reflect long-term behavior, while time series data emphasise short-run effects. By 
combining the two sorts of information, a distinctive feature o f panel data, a more 
general and comprehensive dynamic structure can be formulated and estimated.
A panel data regression differs from the regular time-series or cross-section regression 
in that it has a double subscript on its variables, i.e.
y it =a + x it/3 + uit i = l ,...,N ;t=  1,...,T
where a is the intercept.
Many models and corresponding estimation techniques can be used to pool time-series 
and cross-sectional data. These models differ according to the assumptions about the 
constancy of coefficients and the various error terms. These models are:
• Ordinary Regression Model
• Individual Regression Model
• Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR Model)
• The Error Component Model
• The Fixed Effects Model
• The Random Coefficients Model
When N is very large and T relatively small, as in many panel data problems, there is a 
serious lack of degrees of freedom necessary for the implementation of the individual 
regression and the SUR model (this problem is also applied in our case).
Panel data (or longitudinal data) permit correcting for the effect of any combination of 
omitted variables that are stable over the period of observation. This is done by 
“simulating” the combined effect of such time-invariant omitted variables by the 
individual-specific intercepts a¡.
The previous model becomes:
y it =a¡ + x uP  + uit i=  l,...,N ;t=  1,...,T
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The individual specific intercepts a* capture any combination of time-invariant 
variables that have been omitted, knowing or not, from the regression model. There are 
two approaches to estimate that model, the fixed effects model and the random effects 
model.
The salient distinction between the fixed effects and random effects models is whether 
the time-invariant effects are correlated with the regressors or not. Many authors have 
observed that when the random effects model is valid, the fixed effects estimator will 
still produce consistent estimates of the identifiable parameters. It would appear 
therefore that, in general, the fixed effects estimator is to be preferred to the random 
effects estimator unless we can be sure that we can measure all of the time-invariant 
factors possibly correlated with the other regressors. In our case we will use the OLS 
and the fixed effects and random effects models. The Hausman test bears on the 
question of which estimator, random or fixed effects, is to be preferred. The null 
hypothesis in this instance is that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the 
included variables. Under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the error and 
the regressors, the random effects model is applicable.
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5.4. Data
The data have been taken from the Fitch-IBCA Bankscope database and cover the 
period 1992-1999. We have data for banks across all the countries of the European 
Union area, but we do not include Luxembourg since we do not have figures on 
interest rates for that country (from Datastream). Initially the sample was unbalanced, 
however, in our analysis, we have avoided including years 1992,1993, and 1999 since 
the availability of data for these years is small. We conclude with a balanced data set 
i.e. observations are available for all the variables for all the units-banks at all dates in 
the period 1994-1998 (5 years time period). We include commercial banks, savings 
banks, mortgage banks and co-operative banks. Then we split the data according to the 
type of institution. Also we include in each country all banks, even foreign banks, to 
capture for the effects o f changes in the macroeconomic and market environment of the 
host country. We try to use unconsolidated data, only where these are not available do 
we use consolidated data. All banks are sorted by 1998 data for total assets. We
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exclude data that seem peculiar e.g. when the proportion of interest bearing assets to 
total assets exceeds 1 (or 100%), or the figures for the proportion of interest bearing 
assets and liabilities is very small e.g. 0.12 (or 12%), or large differences exist between 
interest bearing assets and interest bearing liabilities (we have inserted the cut off point 
at 0.20 for their difference). So, we conclude with a sample of 2,324 banks. We have a 
panel data set since a given set of individual firms (financial institutions) is repeatedly 
sampled at different points in time. Table 13 shows the number of banks that are 
included from each EU country in our sample.
The net interest margin, i.e. the net interest income divided by total assets, is a measure 
of portfolio returns before considering the net burden; the latter refers to non-interest 
expenses minus non-interest income divided by total assets. It is the overall interest 
yield on the intermediation process. The ratio of rate-sensitive assets minus the rate- 
sensitive liabilities divided by total assets is called the funds gap ratio. In our 
regression models we multiple the funds gap by the level of interest rates of the 
country where the bank is established.
The external factors are assumed to be similar in each type of institution category. The 
level and volatility of interest rates are assumed to be determined in the loanable funds 
market and, thus, are exogenous to the model. The traditional statistical cost model 
implicitly assumes that all banks in a country face identical interest rates on various 
asset and liability items, so that interbank variations in portfolio mix simply reflect 
different portfolio preferences (Kwast and Rose, 1982). Relevant money market rates 
are summarised by weekly observations on the interbank three months offered rates. 
The rate level for each year (measured in percentage points) was the simple average of 
52 weekly rates. The source for interest rates is Datastream. Unfortunately this 
database does not provide data for short-term treasury bills for all the European 
countries in order to use a second measure for the level of interest rates. The variability 
measure constructed for each interest rate is the standard deviation o f weekly rates 
around their annual average.
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Table 13: Sumplc of financial instil utiuns liy country and type of institution
Country Number o f banks Country Number o f  banks
Austria 31 Ireland 9
Belgium 28 Italy 363
Denmark 67 Netherlands 28
Finland 6 Portugal 25
France 212 Spain 96
Germany 1327 Sweden 10
Greece 15 UK 107
Type o f institution Number o f  banks
Commercial banks 603
Savings banks 676
Cooperative banks 936
Mortgage banks 109
Source: Own calculations from Fitch-IBCA Bankscope Database
A number of alternative hypotheses can be advanced about the causes of the decline in 
net interest margin. One explanation frequently put forward is increased competition. It 
is however difficult to test this explanation because it is not at all easy to measure the 
level of competition. In this case, for the concentration we calculate the three-firm 
concentration measure, which is simply the market share of the three largest banks in a 
country in terms of total assets. We take the natural logarithm of the total assets of each 
financial institution to measure the size effects on net interest margin. It would seem 
natural to include in the regression equation a full set of time dummies in order to 
allow for time effects. However, since the number of years is small (only 4 years) we 
avoid using time dummy variables.
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5.5. Results
The initial specification for the examination of net interest margin is the following:
where
j enumerates jth firm within country k; 
k enumerates the country; 
t enumerates the year;
m is the interest margin defined as the net interest income (interest income minus
interest expenses) divided by total assets;
aj the proportion of total assets that are interest bearing;
lj the proportion of total liabilities that are interest bearing;
i the market level of nominal interest rates.
Table 14 provides the descriptive statistics of the variables for the banks in the sample 
and the different types of financial institutions. From this analysis we can mention the 
high variation of the level of interest rates and concentration measures among the EU 
countries. The mean value of the net interest income is 3.07% of total assets, while that 
of the funds gap (already multiplied by the level of interest rates of the country) is 
0.21%. It must be mentioned that there are some banks that have negative funds gap i.e 
the interest sensitive liabilities exceed the interest sensitive assets. From the analysis of 
the several types of institutions, the cooperative banks (CoB) have the highest interest 
margins (mean value of 3.30%), followed by the savings banks (SB) (3.10%). 
Commercial banks (CB) not only have lower interest margins than the previous 
financial institutions, but also much higher standard deviation (the standard deviation 
of commercial banks is 1.85%, followed by that of the co-operative banks with 
standard deviation at 1.36%). Moreover, commercial banks exhibit the highest funds 
gap levels compared with the other types of financial institutions (with the exception of 
the mortgage banks), but have also higher variability. The skewness (the extent to 
which a distribution of data points is concentrated at one end or the other, the lack of 
symmetry) and kurtosis (the degree of peakedness of a distribution of points) statistics
m j t = a <ik t - l a j t - l j t V + £j t
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for the net interest margin of co-operative banks are huge (23.94 and 81.60 
respectively).
The mean size of commercial banks is the largest. The mean natural logarithm of assets 
for commercial banks is 14.30, while for co-operative and savings banks are 12.81 and 
13.96 respectively. Since the number of mortgage banks in the sample is quite small 
(only 109 financial institutions with the vast majority being the UK building societies) 
we don’t refer on their size which seems to be the largest one. Commercial banks have 
also the largest variation on their size. The skewness and kurtosis statistics for all size 
of all types of institutions are quite similar.
f 11 1 1 ;■ ... ;.... ................. ..  "■
Table 14: Descriptive statistics for the variables
A
mean st. dev. min max Var skewn. kurt.
nim 3.0669 1.4392 -2.3345 18.3610 2.0714 3.0816 23.1027
int. rat. 5.0977 2.1639 3.0753 27.2734 4.6825 2.4798 14.9128
funds gap 0.2054 0.3413 -5.7767 2.7614 0.1165 -1.3636 30.4845
cone. 30.8991 11.1563 23.9400 88.7000 124.4600 2.5983 6.4563
Inassets 13.5520 1.6051 8.9899 20.0383 2.5766 0.6789 1.0159
mean st. dev. min max var skewn. kurt.
nim CB 2.7486 1.8480 -2.4165 17.1425 3.4151 1.2127 2.7412
CoB 3.3049 1.3581 -5.3873 16.7679 4.05619 23.9400 81.6200
SB 3.0963 0.8284 0.1554 7.7422 0.6863 1.5783 5.0517
MB 1.8481 0.9542 -0.1938 7.3038 0.9104 1.1668 5.0942
funds
gap
CB 0.3249 0.3328 -1.7586 2.4433 0.1108 0.8394 3.8454
CoB 0.2008 0.3173 -1.4297 2.3513 0.1007 1.6044 5.1321
SB 0.1481 0.2475 -0.4677 1.9050 0.0613 2.7698 8.7701
MB 0.3593 0.2585 -1.1536 2.6540 0.0668 1.9117 16.8538
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Lnasset CB 14.256 1.9084 9.4966 20.3752 3.6421 0.7117 0.1689
CoB 12.809 1.3228 9.3496 19.9843 1.7499 0.9380 2.9407
SB 13.955 1.1561 9.3393 19.2779 1.3367 0.2132 1.6676
MB 14.724 1.8425 10.6350 19.3309 3.3947 0.0040 -0.7636
Where CB: commercial banks, CoB: co-operative banks, SB: savings banks, and MB: mortgage 
banks.
Table 15 provides data on the correlation matrix of the variables. A check of the 
correlation matrix revealed no evidence of multicollinearity for all pairs o f variables. 
There is quite high correlation of the level of interest rates with their variability (as to 
be expected) and the funds gap (also expected since gap-to-assets ratio is multiplied by 
the level of interest rates), and a negative correlation of the natural logarithm of assets 
with the net interest margin. Similar results exist for the several types of institutions 
(see Annex 9).
Table 15: C'oiTclaliun matrix
* —- .....  ................ -a
nim in. rat. var. o f  
int. rat.
funds gap cone. Inassets
nim 1.0000
in. rat. 0.2730 1.0000
var. o f  int. rat. 0.0479 0.5568 1.0000
funds gap -0.1915 0.3262 0.0269 1.0000
cone. -0.0223 0.1971 0.2012 0.1400 1.0000
Inassets -0.4006 -0.0618 0.0054 -0.0431 0.1415 1.0000
Initially, we run the plain ordinary least squares (OLS) and within (fixed effects) 
estimates when the independent variable is only the funds gap. However we present 
only the fixed effects estimates since, from the results, these are the best (Table 16). In 
many applications, the easiest way to implement a fixed effects estimator with 
conventional software is to include a different dummy variable for each individual unit. 
This method is often called the least-squares dummy variable (LQDV) method. If n is
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very large, however, it may be computationally prohibitive to compute coefficients for 
each cross-section unit. In that case, another way to implement a fixed effects estimator 
is as follows: a) transform all the variables by subtracting bank-specific means, and b) 
run OLS on the transformed variables. This approach will work perfectly, apart from 
the fact that the standard errors need to be corrected. The fact that the fixed effects 
estimator can be interpreted as a simple OLS regression of mean-differenced variables 
explains why this estimator is often called a within group estimator. That is, it uses 
only the variation within an individual’s set of observations. The analysis that follows 
is carried out using the TSP 4.3 econometric software.
' Table 16: Wiihin (fixed effects) estimates (independent variable: funds gap)
Dependent variable: net interest margin
Sum of squared residuals = 4014.69 R-squared = 0.8331
Variance of residuals = 0.4319 Adjusted R-squared = 0.7915
Std. error of regression = 0.6572
Variance Estimated Coefficient Standard error t-statistic
Funds gap 0.2009 0.0360 5.5834
F (2323, 9295) = 19.106, p-value = [0000]
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(l) = 68.995, P-value = [0000]
The table above shows that the funds gap has a positive and significant effect on net 
interest margin. The sign of the influence is expected. If the gap-to-assets ratio is 
positive, an increase in the level of interest rates will have a major effect on net interest 
margin. The R-squared is high, and much higher compared with the other estimation 
methods. A confirmation of the result arises from the examination of the OLS 
estimates (Annex 10), where, however, the R-squared and the standard error o f the 
regression are much smaller and larger respectively.
To test for the significance of the firm effects the F statistic is used. The F statistic for 
testing the joint significance of the firm effects is given by the formula:
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F { n - \ , n T - n - K )  =
( R l -R l ) l (n - t )
( l - R l ) / ( n T - n - K )
where u indicates the unrestricted model and p indicates the pooled or restricted model 
with only a single overall constant term. Since the p-value of F obtained is sufficiently 
low, we reject the null hypothesis that all the coefficients are equal to zero and the 
evidence is strongly in favor of firm specific effects.
A Hausman test for correlation between the error and the regressors can be used to 
check for whether the random effects model is appropriate. Under the null hypothesis 
of no correlation between the error and the regressors, the random effects model is 
applicable and its generalised least square (GLS) estimator is consistent and efficient. 
Under the alternative it is inconsistent. The OLS estimator of the fixed effects model is 
consistent under both the null and the alternative. Consequently, the difference 
between the variance-covariance matrices of the OLS and GLS estimators is the 
variance-covariance matrix of the difference between the two estimators, allowing 
calculation of the chi-square statistic to test this difference against zero. Based on a 
Hausman test we can conclude that of the two alternatives (fixed versus random 
effects), the fixed effects estimator is the appropriate choice since the p-value of chi- 
square obtained is sufficiently low and we reject the null hypothesis. We expected this 
since the data exhaust the population, and the fixed effects approach, which produces 
results conditional on the units in the data set, is reasonable.
At that point of the analysis we add some more variables, namely the level and 
variation of interest rates, the concentration measure and the asset size of each 
financial institution. (Table 17) [there is no difference in the results if we exclude the 
size variable or even the concentration measure (Annex 11 and Annex 12)]. The model 
has improved a lot; the R-squared has increased from 0.8331 to 0.8616, while the sum 
of the squared residuals and the variance of the residuals have both been reduced. The 
interesting point is that the introduction of these variables has done the effects o f the 
funds gap on net interest margin insignificant, although the coefficient has the right 
positive sign (the t-statistic is 0.1736 while the coefficient 0.0057). It seems that there 
is a strong positive impact of the level of interest rates (the t-statistic is 23.2239 and the
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estimated coefficient 0.1451), and a negative impact of the variability o f interest rates 
(the t-statistic is -10.8739 and the estimated coefficient -0.1042) on net interest margin. 
For example, a 100-basis-point increase in the average level of market interest rates 
raises the net interest margin of banks by 0.14 percentage points. There is also a 
negative impact of the size of the financial institutions on net interest margin (t-statistic 
equals to -18.3968 while the estimated coefficient is -0.6973). Smaller banks are able 
to take advantage of possible increase in the yield of interest earning assets because of 
their relative large holdings of assets with moderately short-term maturities. The large 
banks can diversify and earn profits from other activities e.g. non-interest income from 
fees and commissions36. The concentration variable is significant and negative. 
However, there is an ambiguity on the interpretation of this negative sign. If banks are 
able to exert market power, interest margins will be higher due to lower deposit rates, 
higher loan rates, or both. However, the collusion effects of that power may lead to a 
regulation of the interest rate sensitive part of the total income with clear implications 
for the net interest margins. In any case, as we have already mentioned, it is difficult to 
make conclusions since it is not easy to measure the level of competition.
36 Sinkey (1998) shows that net interest margins vary inversely with bank asset size. The 
smallest banks (i.e., those not among the 1,000 largest, about 9,000) had, on average, a 173 
basis point advantage over the 10 largest banks (4.41% versus 2.68%).
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Table 17: Wiiliin (fixed effects) estimates (independent \ariubles: level and 
variability of interest rates, the funds gap, concentration and asset)
Dependent variable: net interest margin
Sum of squared residuals = 3330.98 R-squared = 0.8616
Variance of residuals = 0.3585 Adjusted R-squared = 0.8269
Std. error of regression = 0.5987
Variance Estimated Coefficient Standard error t-statistic
in. rat. 0.1451 0.0063 23.2239
var. of int. 
rat.
-0.1043 0.0096 -10.8739
funds gap 0.0057 0.0033 0.1736
cone. -0.0249 0.0029 -8.4654
Inassets -0.6973 0.0379 -18.3968
F  (2323, 9291) = 17.952, p-value = [0000]
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(5) = 181.88, p-value = [0000]
We conduct the same analysis for the several types of financial institutions. In Annex 
13 we present the results from the within (fixed effects) estimates when the only 
independent variable is the funds gap ratio. In all cases the funds gap ratio has a 
significantly positive effect on profitability. The only exception is the case of the co­
operative banks where the t-statistic is negative but insignificant (-0.9169). The R- 
squared of the model is the highest for commercial and mortgage banks (0.9252 and 
0.9331 respectively) and the lowest for co-operative banks (0.7813). The most 
significant is the effect of the funds gap on savings banks, where the coefficient is 
1.2913.
In Table 18 we present the results of the fixed effects estimators for the four different 
bank types when the independent variables are the level of interest rates, the variability 
of interest rates, the funds gap, the concentration and the asset size. The R-squared is 
very high in the case of commercial banks (0.9318), savings banks (0.9344), and
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mortgage banks (0.9412), and significant but smaller for co-operative banks (0.8253). 
Also the sum of squared residuals is much higher for the co-operative banks. In all the 
types of financial institutions, the fixed effects model seem to provide the best 
estimates, since the p-value of the chi-squared is significantly low. With the exception 
of the mortgage banks (where we have the smallest sample), the level of interest rates 
has a positive and significant effect on net interest margins; for mortgage banks it 
remains positive but insignificant. The t-statistics are 10.7278, 11.3392, and 12.6501 
for commercial banks, savings banks, and co-operative banks respectively. The 
coefficient is larger in the case of the co-operative banks (0.1657), followed by that of 
the commercial banks (0.1026). Commercial banks seem to profit more than the 
savings banks from an increase in the level of interest rates (similar results to those of 
Samuelson, 1945). The variability of interest rates has a significant negative effect in 
the case of commercial and savings banks (the t-statistics are -7.1752 and -6.5422 
respectively) while it is negative but insignificant in the case of co-operative banks (the 
t-statistic is -0.8365). Also, the funds gap is significant and positive for the commercial 
and savings (the t-statistic are 3.8469, and 8.6116 respectively), but negative and 
significant for the cooperative banks (the t-statistic is -3.6786). The latter has not the 
expected sign but an explanation can be that many cooperative banks have a negative 
gap-to-assets ratio (more interest bearing liabilities than interest bearing assets), so an 
increase in the funds gap through the increase in the level of interest rates will have 
negative effects on net interest margins. Finally, in all types of financial institutions the 
effect of the size is negative and significant, as is the case for concentration (only for 
commercial banks the t-statistic for the concentration measure has negative sign but is 
insignificant).
Christos Staikouras 101
Oty IfcnMPTWy
UrrtaalL>J < «.< •
Net Interest Income, Balance Sheet Structure and Interest Rates
---------------------------------------.— .--------------------------------------------- —
Table 18: Within (Fixed e Heels) estimators fur the different hunk tvpes
X
Dependent variable: net interest margin (commercial banks)
Sum of squared residuals = 725.482 R-squared = 0.9318
Variance of residuals = 0.2917 Adjusted R-squared = 0.9146
Std. error of regression = 0.5401
Variance Estimated Coefficient Standard error t-statistic
in. rat. 0.1026 0.0096 10.7278
var. int. rat. -0.0849 0.0118 -7.1752
Funds gap 0.2613 0.0679 3.8469
Cone. -0.0049 0.0039 -1.2464
Lnassets -0.3780 0.0404 -9.3590
F  (622,2487) =49.157, p-value = [.0000]
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(5) = 8.7780, P-value = [1183]
Dependent variable: net interest margin (savings banks)
Sum of squared residuals = 156.536 R-squared = 0.9344
Variance of residuals = 0.0563 Adjusted R-squared = 0.9179
Std. error of regression = 0.2373
Variance Estimated Coefficient Standard error t-statistic
in. rat. 0.0691 0.0061 11.3392
var. int. rat. -0.2160 0.0330 -6.5422
Funds gap 0.5169 0.0600 8.6116
Cone. -0.0315 0.0027 -11.8823
Lnassets -0.7816 0.0476 -16.4233
F  (695, 2779) = 28.214, p-value = [0000]
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(5) = 467.03, P-value = [0000]
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Dependent variable: net interest margin (cooperative banks)
Sum of squared residuals = 1572.25 R-squared = 0.8253
Variance of residuals = 0.4032 Adjusted R-squared = 0.7814
Std. error of regression = 0.6350
Variance Estimated Coefficient Standard error t-statistic
in. rat. 0.1657 0.0131 12.6501
var. int. rat. -0.0484 0.0579 -0.8365
Funds gap -0.2512 0.0683 -3.6786
Cone. -0.0376 0.0067 -5.6295
Lnassets -0.4700 0.0873 -5.3855
F (975, 3899) = 11.369, p-value = [.0000]
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(5) = 93.121, P-value = [0000]
Dependent variable: net interest margin (mortgage banks)
Sum of squared residuals = 30.2157 R-squared = 0.9412
Variance of residuals = 0.06776 Adjusted R-squared = 0.9258
Std. error of regression = 0.2600
Variance Estimated Coefficient Standard error t-statistic
in. rat. 0.0212 0.0180 1.1756
var. int. rat. 0.0577 0.0725 0.7970
Funds gap 0.1341 0.1289 1.0397
Cone. 0.0066 0.0053 1.2424
Lnassets -0.4429 0.0590 -7.5041
F  (112, 447) = 45.406, p-value = [.0000]
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(5) = 14.316, P-value = [.0137]
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An extension to the above models is the introduction of the lagged values for the 
independent variables. The number of financial institutions is the same, however the 
time period is now 4 years, so the total number of observations is 9296. Initially we 
work with a simple model which includes as independent variables only the funds gap 
and the lagged funds gap (Table 19). The lag is presumed to reflect uncertainties, 
delays inherent in the decision process, and institutional rigidities. For example, banks 
may adjust their sensitivity positions only a little at a time in order to determine 
whether their rate forecasts are materializing as planned37. Compared with Table 16, 
the R-squared is worse, while the effect of the funds gap continues to be positive and 
even more significant (the t-statistic rises from 5.5834 when we do not include the 
lagged values of the independent variables to 12.1322 and the estimated coefficient 
from 0.2009 to 0.3007). An interesting point is that the lagged value of the funds gap 
has also a significant positive effect (the t-statistic is 5.7576 and the estimated 
coefficient 0.1427). However, the p-value of the chi-square is quite significant. By 
implementing the random effects model the R-squared is smaller (0.6161) but the 
effects of the funds gap continues to be positive and significant (the t-statistic is 
12.2172 and the estimated coefficient 0.3015), while the lagged value has also a 
positive effect (the t-statistic is 5.7555 and the estimated coefficient 0.1420).
37 Lags may also arise in the decision process itself. “Once interest rales begin to change, the 
asset-liability management committee will have to decide (forecast) whether the shift is 
permanent or merely an aberration. I f  the change is regarded as lasting over several intervals, 
the committee will have to develop an intermediate-term strategy which sustains the long-run 
strategic plan. Time may elapse between the recognision o f  the need to modify the intermediate- 
term strategy and its actual implementation” (Graddy and Kama, 1984).
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Tabic 19: Within (fixed iffi-clx) estimates (indi-pcndi-nt variables: funds gap and
%A
Dependent variable: net interest margin
Sum of squared residuals = 5598.27 R-squared = 0.7121
Variance of residuals = 0.8032 Adjusted R-squared = 0.6161
Std. error of regression = 0.8962
Variance Estimated
Coefficient
Standard error t-statistic
funds gap 0.3007 0.2479 12.1322
funds gap (-1) 0.1427 0.2479 5.7576
F  (2323, 6970) = 7.3488, p-value = [0000]
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(2) = 0.2488, P-value = [0137]
We also add the lagged values of the level and variability of interest rates, and also the 
concentration and the size measures (Table 20). The R-squared has increased slightly 
(now at 0.7324, while the variance of the residuals have been reduced). In this case the 
level of interest income is not significant (as also the lagged value of the level of 
interest rates), while the variability of interest rates and the funds gap (and their first 
lagged values) are significantly negative and positive respectively. The t-statistic for 
the level of interest rates, the variability of the interest rates, and the funds gap are 
1.5872, -17.4729, and 2.9772 respectively. The t-value of the concentration measure 
continues to be negative and significant (-7.6168), as well as for the natural logarithm 
of the assets (-3.9106 and the coefficient becomes equal to -4).
We conduct the same analysis for the several types of financial institutions and the 
results are quite similar (Annex 14). In the case of commercial banks the level of 
interest rates, their variability, and the funds gap have significant effect on net interest 
income (the t-statistics are 4.8510, -2.0124, and 4.0307 respectively), while the size 
has significant negative effect. Similar are the results for the savings and co-operative 
banks with the exception of the level of interest rates for the savings banks and the
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funds gap for the co-operative banks which have significant negative effect on net 
interest margin (for the latter case an explanation may be again the balance sheet 
structure of the co-operative banks).
I Table 20: \ \  itliin (fixed effects) estimates (independent variables: level und • 
i \ uriabilily of interest rules, funds gap, their lagged values, coneentrutiun and
■A
Dependent variable: net interest margin
Sum of squared residuals = 5203.01 R-squared = 0.7324
Variance of residuals = 0.7471 Adjusted R-squared = 0.6429
Std. error of regression = 0.8644
Variance Estimated Coefficient Standard error t-statistic
in. rat. 0.0194 0.0123 1.5872
in. rat. (-1) 0.0575 0.0444 1.2946
var. int. rat. -0.0812 0.0047 -17.4729
var. int. rat. (-1) -0.2442 0.0212 -11.5201
funds gap 0.0823 0.0277 2.9772
funds gap(-l) 0.0552 0.0257 2.1449
cone. -0.1973 0.0259 -7.6168
Inassets -4.0079 1.0249 -3.9106
F (2323, 6964) = 5.9656, p-value = [.0000]
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(8) = 314.96, P-value = [0000]
To conclude, the main findings from the examination of the above tables are the 
following:
■ The funds gap has a significant and positive effect on net interest income; 
however, when we introduce the level and variability of interest rates this becomes 
insignificant (for the several types of financial institutions the funds gap continues 
to be significant and positive with the exception of co-operative banks).
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■ The level and variability of interest rates have significant positive and negative 
effects respectively on net interest income. Also, concentration and the size of each 
financial institution have significant negative effects.
■ If we introduce lagged values, in all the cases (even with interest rates), the funds 
gap and its first lagged value is significant and positive (except for co-operative 
banks). In this case, the variability of interest rates, the size, and the concentration 
measure continue to have negative sign, while the level of interest rates is no 
longer significant (the latter does not occur if we split the sample in the four 
different types of institutions that we have).
It is important to understand that those financial observers concerned about the 
potential costs associated with greater interest rate volatility generally have not been 
opposed to changes in the level of interest rates over time. Thus, a central issue in the 
debate over the appropriate short-run policy strategy has not been interest rate 
movements per se, but rather the character of interest rate movements per unit o f time. 
To illustrate the distinction between these concepts, assume that the movement in “the 
interest rate” within the period [to-ti] “required to keep the money stock on a smooth 
growth path is an increase of 100 basis points, followed by a decline of 50 basis points, 
and another increase of 50 basis points. Facing this prospect, the central bank has 
nearly always preferred to take actions designed to smooth the interest rate path. 
Although the net change in the interest rate over the period might be the same in both 
cases (100 basis points), the presumption is that the larger variance implied by the 
former could seriously disrupt financial markets.
5.6. Dynamic Models
Panel data are well suited for examining dynamic effects, as is the first-order model,
y it = a, + x\,b + Syit_x + eit
The problem with the estimation of dynamic (or autoregressive) error components 
models is that there is a correlation between the lagged endogenous variable and the 
individual effects. The problem of heterogeneity is very serious in that case. In our 
case the stationarity assumption is not necessary as long as T is finite and small. This 
problem is well-known in classical econometrics as the inconsistency of the least
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squares method for dynamic models with autocorrelated errors. The general approach, 
which has been developed in several stages in the literature relies on instrumental 
variables estimators and, more recently on a Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator. Several such estimators have been proposed, based on different instruments 
sets and/or different ways of (re)writing the model. This requires to look for a set of 
instrumental variables, whose number must be at least equal to the number of 
regressors in the model, and which must satisfy the following two conditions:
• They must be uncorrelated with the disturbances, at least assymptotically,
• They must be assymptotically correlated with the X variables.
In our case dynamic modelling cannot have serious implications since the number of 
observed years is small. The dynamic model introduces the lagged value o f the 
dependent variable. In its simplest form only the funds gap is included (Table 21). The 
R-squared is quite significant (0.7248), while the sum of the squared residuals is 
5350.60 and the variance of residuals 0.7677 (the standard error of the regression is 
0.8762). The result is that the funds gap is significant and the estimated coefficient is 
0.0644. The t-statistic for the lagged value of the dependent variable is very significant 
and positive (the t-statistic is 18.9029 and the coefficient is 0.1584).
, Table 21: Within (fixed effects) estimates (independent sarlables: funds gap and . 
the lagged value of the net interest margin)
Dependent variable: net interest margin
Sum of squared residuals = 5350.60 R-squared = 0.7248
Variance of residuals = 0.7677 Adjusted R-squared = 0.6331
Std. error of regression = 0.8762
Variance Estimated
Coefficient
Standard error t-statistic
nim (-1) 0.1584 0.0084 18.9029
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funds gap 0.0644
F  (2323, 6970) = 6.8497, p-value = [0000]
0.0258 2.4988
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(2) = 12.474, P-value = [0020]
Any observation about x corresponding to a date other that t is a valid instrument i.e. 
there exist at least T-l instruments for estimating this model at each time period, which 
implies a total of T(T-1) instruments for the whole period. In other words lagged 
values of the endogenous variable are valid instruments.
In econometric textbooks it is proposed estimating the model by using lagged values o f  
the X  variables as instruments. This estimator is consistent as long as the X variables 
are exogenous i.e. do not exhibit any correlation with the individual effects and the 
non-specific disturbances. If it is not satisfied, the Balestra-Nerlove estimator is 
inconsistent; except when it can be assumed that at least one of the X variables does 
not suffer from such correlation, lagged values of this variable being then used as 
instruments. In order to avoid this problem, it is usually proposed using as instruments 
the first differences of the X’s of the model as well as either yi.,.2 or (yu-ry^o). We add 
as an instrumental variable the second lagged value of the dependent variable. In this 
case we conclude with three years time period and 6,972 total observations (Table 22).
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: Table 22: Inst riiim-nlul variables ((', tin1 lugged value or tin1 funils gup, uud till' 
! second lugged value of the net interest income)
Dependent variable: net interest margin
Sum of squared residuals = 18607 R-squared = 0.0218
Variance of residuals = 2.6700 Adjusted R-squared = 0.0215
Std. Error of regression = 1.6340 Durbin-Watson statistic = 0.6125
Variance Estimated Coefficient Standard error t-statistic
C 2.6567 0.0814 32.6275
nim (-1) 0.0556 0.0137 4.0677
funds gap 0.7398 0.1962 3.7708
In this case the R-squared is very small (0.0218) while the sum of the squared residuals 
is more than tripled compared with the previous case (from 5350 becomes 18607). The 
funds gap effect continues to be positive (the coefficient is 0.7398) and more 
significant (the t-statistic is 3.7708). Compared with Table 16 where we used the 
within (fixed effects) estimates with the funds gap as the only independent variable, the 
estimated coefficient is almost four times larger (from 0.2009 becomes 0.7398).
5.7. Concluding Remarks
Monetary policy affects banks’ income and profitability in many ways. Examining the 
effect of interest rates changes captures only one aspect of the issue. The endowment 
effect and the spread are captured in our analysis by the level of interest rates and the 
funds gap. From the analysis above it seems that there is a direct (level and variability) 
or indirect (through the balance sheet structure) influence of nominal interest rates on 
the net interest margin of the banks. In the long run, the direct effects have the major 
impact, while in the short run the indirect effects do. Rising rates increase the demand 
for rate-sensitive assets relative to that of rate-sensitive liabilities, while falling rates 
have the opposite effect. Incremental changes in bank net interest margin are directly 
related to the movement in market rates. However, although these effects are highly 
significant, there are also some other variables that have a great effect on the net
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interest margins, and these are the concentration of the market and the asset size of the 
financial institution.
In today’s volatile interest-rate environment sound gap management is important. 
Asset decisions must not be made independent of liability decisions; they must be 
coordinated through a written asset-liability management policy. Since cyclical gap 
management involves speculation on the movement of future interest rates, the size of 
the gap needs to be monitored closely. With volatile interest rates, the stability of net 
interest margin indicates that the interest sensitive assets and liabilities are matched. If 
not, the monetary authorities must have estimates of the impact of market rate 
fluctuations on bank profitability in order to evaluate the trade-off between rate 
stability and the other policy goals. The Bank of International Settlements (BIS) 
reported in its Fifty Second Annual Report (June 1982) that “...the liquidity and 
balance sheet positions o f  some [financial institutions] have been adversely affected by 
distorted interest rate relationships and by the need to make increased provision for  
loan losses. Some commercial and savings banks which traditionally engaged heavily 
in maturity transformation have been locked into long-term low interest rate loans and 
securities while having to pay high money-market related rates to retain deposit funds" 
(in our analysis the funds gap ratio has a significant and positive effect on net interest 
margin).
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Chapter 6
“Non Interest Income and Total Income Stability”
Abstract
Banks differ markedly in their sources of income, with some banks focusing on 
business lending, others on consumer lending, and some on non-interest fee income 
activities. Whether differences exist primarily across size classes or business lines, this 
variation suggests reallocation effects will be important as the aggregate data reflect 
the changing mix of heterogeneous banks within the industry. A key feature in 
stabilising profitability can be diversification. Expanding a firm’s range of activities 
can reduce the variability of the earnings stream. But it may not do so; key is whether 
or not income from the various activities move in the same direction. In this chapter we 
examine what is the effect of the increase on the level of non-interest income on the 
stability of the banks’ total income. While all return and risks are ex post, considerable 
attention is given to the issue of whether the distribution of ex post returns and risks is 
stable across time and groups of banks. Experiments designed to estimate the effect of 
using industry and time aggregated data are performed.
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Chapter 6: Non Interest Income and Total Income Stability
6.1. Introduction
Traditionally banks have been thought of as firms which take deposits and make loans, 
and profit by the difference between the costs of the former and the earnings from the 
latter activities. There have, of course, been specialised institutions -  UK merchant 
banks were a good example of these -  where activities, such as advising on how to 
raise capital, were mainly fee-earning. But such banks were small relative to the 
banking system as a whole, and were not a key part of the monetary system of an 
economy.
In recent years, though, the distinction between types of banks has become blurred, 
partly by takeovers and partly by traditional retail banks going into fee-earning 
activities. As a source of funds for financial institutions, deposits have steadily 
diminished in importance. In addition, the profitability of traditional banking activities 
such as business lending has diminished in recent years. As a result, banks have 
increasingly turned to new, non-traditional financial activities as a way of maintaining 
their position as financial intermediaries. The changes are of importance for financial 
stability. The reason is straightforward. The more unstable is a bank’s (or any other 
firm’s) earnings stream, the more risky the firm is. A recent paper by Hoggarth, Milne 
and Wood (1999) drew attention to an example of this, comparing banking sector 
profitability in Britain and Germany. It was observed that banking profitability in 
Germany was lower than in Britain, but also less variable, suggesting that the systems 
had pursued alternative routes to stability.
This chapter explores the correlation between the different sources of income and sets 
out various measures of the variability of each source. To the extent that it is possible, 
the results are reported not just for banking systems as a whole, but also separated by 
size and type of financial institution. Then we look in a little detail at the nature of non­
interest income, focussing in particular on the extent to which it represents not earnings 
from new activities, but earnings from doing the same things in a new way -  for 
example, earning a fee by arranging a loan for a customer rather than earning an
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interest spread by lending to the customer. This section provides an overview of 
different sources of non-interest income for depository institutions, including 
securitisation, and other major off-balance sheet activities. It also considers why the 
changes discovered have taken place; this may have implications both for the 
durability of the changes (where they are the result of a passing fashion, or of some 
more durable change in conditions) and for future regulation or supervisory policy. The 
study then concludes with a brief summary of our main findings and an assessment of 
their implications for the stability o f the banking system.
6.2. Literature Review
It has been widely believed that banking is a declining industry, faced with reduced 
demand for the intermediation services it produces. To support this view, economists 
have relied on data which show banks with a declining share of intermediated savings 
instruments, loans, and total savings of the customer sector. However, recent research 
suggests that the banking industry is not actually declining in any meaningful 
economic sense; rather, the nature of its intermediation activity is changing (e.g. 
Kaufman and Mote (1994)). While the basic functions of banks and other financial 
service companies have remained relatively constant over time, the specific products 
and services through which these functions are provided have changed. Economic 
forces have led to financial innovations that have increased competition in financial 
markets. Greater competition in turn has diminished the cost advantage banks had in 
acquiring funds and has undercut their position in loan markets. As a result, traditional 
banking has lost profitability, and banks have begun to diversify into new activities 
that may bring higher returns.
It appears to be the conventional wisdom that non-interest income is more stable than 
interest income and that fee-based activities reduce bank risk via diversification. The 
combination of banking, insurance and securities activities may lead to a more stable 
profit stream, since the revenues stemming from different products in a conglomerate 
organisation are usually imperfectly correlated. While banks’ net interest margins are 
highly dependent on interest-rate movements and economic cycles, fee income 
provides diversification and greater stability for bank profits. If that is correct, it then 
follows that mixing interest and non-interest income will reduce the volatility of
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earnings. For example, the Chairman of Firstar Corporation, Roger Fitzsimmons, 
observed that there is a stability to ¡fee] income that we like”3*; and Richard X. 
Bone, a banking analyst, observed that “banks that have strong fee-based business and 
that do not have major commitment to the loan sector can weather the storm much 
better than those banks that are building a loan portfolio”* 39.
Several empirical studies have indicated substantial benefits from diversification into 
nonbank activities e.g Eisemann (1976), Brewer (1989) and others. More recently, 
Gallo, Apilado and Kolari (1996) found that a high proportion of mutual fund assets 
managed relative to total assets of bank holding companies over the period 1987-1994 
was associated with substantially increased profitability for Bank Holding Companies 
(BHCs) and also with risk reduction. Canals (1993) concluded that the increased 
revenues obtained from new business units have significantly contributed to improving 
bank performance in recent years. Saunders and Walter (1994) found that the 
expansion of banks’ activities reduces risk, with the main risk reduction gains arising 
from insurance rather than securities activities.
There are also studies which find that fee-based income stabilises profitability. 
Proponents of this view point out that those studies which found risk-reduction benefits 
from asset diversification generally report their findings in terms of potential, not 
actual realisations. Heggestad (1975) examined the riskiness of various industries 
between 1953 and 1967. He measured riskiness by the coefficient of variation of return 
on equity for thirteen different industries. In addition, Heggestad correlated industry 
earnings with returns in banking. He discovered that commercial banking was one of 
the least risky activities but also found that industries such as leasing, insurance, or real 
estate offer risk-reducing diversification potential given their negative correlation with 
banking. Also, interestingly, most of these tend to suggest that a modest amount of fee- 
earning activity captures all the potential for risk reduction. For example, Boyd,
M American Banker, May 30,1997.
39 American Banker, May 30, 1997.
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Hanweck and Pithyachariyakul (1980) measured the correlation between accounting 
rates of return of bank and non-bank affiliates of BHCs between 1971 and 1977 and 
concluded that the potential for risk reduction was exhausted at relatively low levels of 
non-bank activities. Mester (1992) found that mixing traditional banking activities of 
originating and monitoring loans with non-traditional activities of loan selling and 
buying products leads to diseconomies of scope and some economies of scale.
This conventional wisdom may however be rooted in the past behaviour of non-interest 
income. Banks have, for many years, earned some non-interest income; trustee 
business, for example, is a traditional banking activity. But non-interest income 
provided only a small part of their earnings, and may well, as is certainly the case for 
trustee business, have been largely unaffected by the economic cycle.
As fee-based activity of banks has increased, this conventional wisdom may no longer 
be justified. DeYoung and Roland (1999) consider three fundamental observations 
each of which suggests that fee-based income need not be more stable than income 
from traditional banking activities. Revenue from a bank’s traditional lending activities 
is likely to be relatively stable over time, because switching and information costs 
make it costly for either borrower or lender to walk away from a lending relationship, 
while revenue from fee-based activities may fluctuate from period to period because it 
may be easier to switch from bank to bank for many of the new fee-based activities 
than it is for traditional banking. Secondly, expanding fee-based services can require 
substantial additions to fixed costs, which increase the operational leverage of the 
bank. Once a lending relationship is established the only cost of an additional loan is 
the interest expense while the same does not occur for non interest income where 
additional staff may be required. Finally, capital is not required for many fee-based 
activities. This suggests a higher degree of financial leverage; hence earnings volatility 
may increase.
In addition to these a priori reasons for doubting the conventional wisdom there is a 
growing body of evidence which casts doubt on it. Much of this evidence is for the
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USA, but there is also some from elsewhere. Also, most of the literature review refers 
to the expansion of bank holding companies into non-bank activities.
Three studies in the 1970s and 1980s showed that not all fee-earning activities would 
reduce earnings volatility. Johnson and Meinster (1974), Heggestad (1975), and Wall 
and Eisenbeis (1984) compared the earnings stream of the banking industry with that 
of other financial industries (e.g. securities, insurance, real estate, leasing). Banking 
earnings were more volatile than those of some industries but less than those of others, 
while the correlation of bank earnings was negative with the earnings of some financial 
industries and positive with others. For example, in Heggestad’s paper, data indicate 
that there is very little diversification gain for BHCs from expanding into either 
business or personal credit activities. Perhaps most troubling for the conventional 
wisdom is the fact that these studies found no consistent pattern of relationships 
between banking earnings and non-banking earnings. This suggests that the 
relationships changed over time.
Several studies have calculated the effects of hypothetical mergers between banks and 
other types of financial firms. An interesting example is that by Boyd, Graham and 
Hewitt (1993). That study, by simulating mergers between bank holding companies 
and non banking financial firms between 1971 and 1987, and using both accounting 
and market data, found that risk was reduced by merging with life insurance or 
property/casualty firms but increased by merging with securities or real estate firms. 
Wall, Reichert and Mohanty (1993) constructed synthetic portfolios based on the 
accounting rates of return earned by banks and non-bank financial firms. Their results 
suggest that, had banks been able to diversify into small amounts o f insurance, mutual 
fund, securities brokerage, or real estate activities, they could have experienced higher 
returns and lower risk between 1981 and 1989.
More recent US studies have started to disaggregate the data to a lower stage i.e. firm 
level than the industry level examined in the previous mentioned papers. A number of 
approaches were tried and again, suggesting a lack of reliable diversification effects, a 
variety of results emerged. According to Boyd and Graham (1986), expansion by
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BHCs into non-bank activities tended to increase the risk of failure. Their results 
indicate, however, that when BHCs are more stringently regulated, the positive 
association between non-bank activity and risk may disappear. Sinkey and Nash (1983) 
found that credit card lending specialisation (that activity is often securitised in the 
USA and thus generates fee income) gives higher and more volatile returns than those 
achieved by banks with “conventional” product mixes. Demsetz and Strahan (1995) 
found that, although BHCs tend to become more diversified as they grow larger, this 
diversification does not necessarily translate into risk reduction because these firms 
also tend to shift into riskier activities and hold less equity. In other words, the risk 
reducing potential of diversification at large BHCs is offset by their lower capital 
ratios, larger commercial and industrial loan portfolios, and greater use of derivatives. 
Indicating that it is easier for “fee-based customers” to move, Roland (1997) found that 
high returns from fee-based activities were less persistent than those from lending and 
deposit-taking. Most recently, De Young and Roland (1999) found that as banks move 
towards fee earning activities, revenue volatility increases, as do both total leverage 
and earnings.
Kwan (1997) studied the implications of securities activities on bank safety and 
soundness. He examined the returns on securities activities conducted by Section 20 
subsidiaries -subsidiaries that were authorised by the Federal Reserve Bank to conduct 
bank-ineligible securities activities- and their relationship with the returns on banking 
activities. He found that securities subsidiaries tend to be riskier but not necessary 
more profitable that their bank affiliates. For securities subsidiaries that are primary 
dealers of government securities, their higher riskiness partially comes from their 
higher leverage, whereas for those that are nor primary dealers, despite having lower 
leverage, they tend to be riskier than their bank affiliates because of their aggressive 
trading behaviour. Nevertheless, in this study, securities subsidiaries appear to provide 
diversification benefits to bank holding companies. Kwast (1989) found that both the 
mean and standard deviation of securities activities’ returns are greater than those of 
non-securities activities. Some potential for diversification gains is found, although this 
appears to be quite limited. A related study is that of Eisenbeis, Harris and Lakonishok 
(1984) which examined the effects of one-bank holding company formations on bank 
stock returns. They found significant positive abnormal returns to the stock o f banking
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firms announcing the formation of one-BHCs between 1968 and 1970, a brief period 
during which one-BHCs were permitted to engage in a wide variety of non-banking 
activities. The authors found no abnormal returns to announcements of one-BHC 
formations after 1970, when regulation limited the scope of these activities.
In summary, the main conclusion of the US studies is that the picture is much more 
complex than the conventional wisdom suggests. Whether diversification in fee-based 
activities actually increases or decreases risk seems to be an empirical question, with 
the answer varying from case to case and study to study. Theory alone does not answer 
this question or strongly support either side of the argument. Now, these findings 
prompt numerous questions and hypotheses, but before turning to these we set out 
some detailed finding on the behaviour of non-interest income in several banking 
industries.
Using OECD data what is found is a rise in the share of non-interest income, 
associated with a common but not universal fall in total profitability. The growth of 
non-interest income is, however, much slower than in the USA. From 1984-87 (they 
used 4 year averages) to 1992-95, non-interest income grew from 0.9% of assets to 
1.0% of assets. The corresponding US figures are 1.3% and 2.1%. Within Europe a 
wide range of non-interest variation was observed. They also noted that non-interest 
income is less volatile in Europe than in the US. Also, drawing on a survey among EU 
supervisory authorities, the European Central Bank (2000) released a report on the EU 
banks’ income structure. This report confirms the increased importance of non-interest 
income (fees, commissions and profits from financial operations and securities 
holdings) for EU banks. The growth of non-interest income seems to have a positive 
effect on bank profitability. The positive impact on profitability has, however, been 
limited by the increased operating costs associated with the development of activities 
generating non-interest income.
Findings also varied with the banks’ size: large banks tended to be (proportionately) 
more dependent on non-interest income than did small banks. Also worth mentioning 
is that high non-interest income was positively associated with high cost-to-income
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ratios. In considering whether non-interest income served to stabilise total income, the 
results were mixed; it seemed to do so in Germany, Greece, France and Luxembourg, 
but to destabilise in Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Finland and Sweden.
A publication by Aggeler and Feldman (1998) show that while net interest income of 
the US banks (Ninth District U.S. banks) rose by 12 percent over the period 1992- 
1997, the biggest gain in bank earnings came from non-interest income. Non-interest 
income grew by 34 percent in that period -  nearly three times as fast as interest 
income. Also, the most important difference in profitability between large banks 
(banks with $1 billion or more in total assets) and small banks concerns the source of 
income. Non-interest income made up an average of 27 percent of total income in the 
large banks between 1992 and 1997, compared with 12 percent for smaller banks. 
Since 1992, non-interest income as a percent of assets increased by 83 percent in the 
largest banks but was essentially flat in smaller banks.
6.3. Data and Sources
Fitch-IBCA Bancscope database provides data for interest and non-interest income of 
the financial institutions in all EU countries. It provides figures for interest revenues 
and interest expenses, so the net interest income is the difference between them. Non­
interest income includes fees and commission income, trading income, and income 
from financial transactions, and other operating income. We exclude banks that do not 
provide data for the whole period 1994-1998. We exclude also “births and deaths” 
during that time period. So we conclude with a balanced sample of 2655 financial 
institutions across the European Union area that provide data for the examined time 
period. An extension to the above sample is to take all the banks that provide data for 
some or all the years in the period 1992-1999. In this case the unbalanced sample 
consists of 4166 financial institutions (see Table 23).
The analysis is both for all the years in the time period 1994-1998 (or 1992-1999) and 
in cross section across this time horizon (the pooled results are also presented). We 
examine not only the country differences, but also the size and type of institution 
effects. Initially, we examine the income sources for the financial institutions of the
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fifteen EU countries by using the balanced sample. Table 23 shows the number of 
banks from each EU country. Then we split the European banks between large and 
small banks. We have sorted all the banks by their total assets in 1998 and we have 
selected as a cut-off point for the size separation the US$10 bn. In this case we have 
200 large banks and 2455 small banks (the respective figures for the unbalanced 
sample are 251 large banks and 3915 small banks). Finally we examine the several 
types of financial institutions. In this case we have 830 commercial banks, 700 savings 
banks, 1011 co-operative banks, and 114 mortgage banks (the respective figures for the 
unbalanced sample are 1314 commercial banks, 968 savings banks, 1711 co-operative 
banks and 173 mortgage banks) (the several categories are also presented in Annex 
15). Most of the savings banks are in Germany, Spain, and Austria, while the vast 
majority of co-operative banks are established in Germany and Italy. Finally, most of 
the mortgage banks are the UK building societies.
The study is in advance over previous efforts. First, because the unit of observation is 
the firm, returns and risks can be examined at the appropriate level of aggregation. 
Using firm-level data avoids the potential aggregation bias of using industry-level data. 
Also, the microeconomic cross-sectional yearly time series nature of the data, 
combined with the large number of banks used, means that enough observations are 
available to reliably investigate hypotheses. Finally, a recent time period is examined.
Christos Staikouras 121
B r y .  j rrf  MyiMmv
J L i l ï i  z - z r * “”*
Non Interest Income and Total Income Stability
Table 23: > umher of banks in (lie sample from each I'll country
Country Number o f institutions 
(unbalanced sample)
Number o f  institutions 
(balanced sample)
Austria 153 34
Belgium 80 45
Denmark 181 74
Finland 13 6
France 435 305
Germany 2023 1378
Greece 22 9
Ireland 30 11
Italy 617 390
Luxembourg 132 108
Netherlands 58 34
Portugal 36 28
Spain 160 90
Sweden 22 11
UK 204 132
Total 4166 2655
Source: Own calculations based on Fitch-IBCA Bankscope database 
6.4. Return and Risk of Income Sources
We provide the arithmetic mean, the statistical term for the average. However, it is 
important to measure and understand the dispersion of a distribution. If a wide spread 
of values away from the centre is undesirable or presents an unacceptable risk, we need 
to be able to recognise and avoid choosing those distributions with the greatest 
dispersion. A common measure of dispersion is the standard deviation. However, the 
standard deviation is an absolute measure of dispersion that expresses variation in the
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same units as the original data. The standard deviation cannot be the sole basis for 
comparing two distributions40. What we need is a relative measure that will give us a 
feel of the magnitude of the deviation relative to the magnitude of the mean. The 
coefficient of variation is one such measure of dispersion. It relates the standard 
deviation and the mean by expressing the standard deviation as a percentage of the 
mean.
Table 24 presents not only the mean values of net interest income, non-interest income, 
and profits before tax to total assets, but also their standard deviation and coefficient of 
variation across the five years time period for the industry aggregation experiments of 
each EU country. It must be mentioned that these statistics are only for the balanced 
sample, and this is why the figures have not the same values with the data for interest 
and non-interest income provided in previous chapters for the whole banking industry 
of the several EU countries. Also, these are the mean values of each individual 
financial institution’s the net interest income/total assets (N1I/TA), non-interest 
income/total assets (Nonll/TA), and profits before tax/total assets (PbT/TA) and not 
the ratios for the whole industry where we aggregate the country figures for the 
numerator and the denominator. We are much more interested in this chapter on the 
relative measures of net interest income and non-interest income to total assets, and on 
the risk measures of these income sources, rather than the actual levels of income (this 
analysis has been conducted in Chapter 4).
40 Two idustries with the same variability of profits but with different levels o f profits cannot be 
considered to have identical risk characteristics. The greater the average profit rate is for a 
given level of variability the safer the industry. If we have a standard deviation o f 10 and a 
mean of 5, the values vary by an amount twice as large as the mean itself. If, on the other hand,
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Talile 24: Kciurn and Risk of Income Sources for EU Counlries
Year Statistics NII/TA NonII/TA PbT/TA
Austria 1994 Mean 2.3012 1.0522 0.8802
St. Dev. 0.9094 0.6028 2.1774
C.V. 39.5178 57.2893 247.3774
1995 Mean 2.3329 1.2494 0.4562
St. Dev. 0.9134 1.1825 2.1785
C.V. 39.1558 94.6451 477.5454
1996 Mean 2.2815 1.2812 0.6379
St. Dev. 0.9048 1.0255 1.4005
C.V. 39.6577 80.0399 219.5327
1997 Mean 2.0944 1.2220 0.5087
St. Dev. 0.9039 0.9736 0.7284
C.V. 43.1603 79.6764 143.1961
1998 Mean 1.9703 1.3172 0.5636
St. Dev. 0.8203 0.8689 0.5828
C.V. 41.6322 65.9682 103.4036
Year Statistics NII/TA NonII/TA PbT/TA
Belgium 1994 Mean 2.2313 0.6643 0.6688
St. Dev. 1.4488 1.5065 1.2202
C.V. 64.9322 226.792 182.4502
1995 Mean 1.9915 0.6671 0.1591
St. Dev. 1.5914 1.2123 2.6295
C.V. 79.9106 181.7137 1652.9320
1996 Mean 2.0341 0.8169 0.5460
St. Dev. 1.3949 1.2528 1.6873
C.V. 68.5782 153.3491 309.0301
1997 Mean 1.8968 0.9556 0.6503
St. Dev. 1.6737 1.5112 2.0705
C.V. 88.2354 158.1381 318.3711
1998 Mean 1.9993 1.3486 0.4262
St. Dev. 2.0918 2.1021 4.5313
we have a standard deviation of 10 and a mean of 5000, the variation relative to the mean is 
insignificant.
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c.v. 104.6238 155.873 1063.138
Year Statistics NII/TA Nonll/TA PbT/TA
Denmark 1994 Mean 4.9599 0.8405 0.7456
St. Dev. 1.8898 0.4037 1.0115
C.V. 38.1008 48.0272 135.6601
1995 Mean 4.7202 0.7185 2.3371
St. Dev. 1.8923 0.3689 1.2769
C.V. 40.0890 51.3525 54.6345
1996 Mean 4.4501 0.8059 2.2081
St. Dev. 1.8247 0.3480 1.2768
C.V. 41.0044 43.1842 57.8222
1997 Mean 4.1010 0.8034 1.7164
St. Dev. 1.6779 0.3568 1.3249
C.V. 40.9140 44.4154 77.1888
1998 Mean 4.0122 0.8758 1.6768
St. Dev. 1.5347 0.3874 1.2230
C.V 38.2505 44.2325 72.9368
Year Statistics Nll/TA Nonll/TA PbT/TA
Finland 1994 Mean 2.0670 1.0832 -0.2861
St. Dev. 0.9157 0.6967 1.0701
C.V. 44.3007 64.3171 -373.987
1995 Mean 1.8899 1.0602 0.2990
St. Dev. 0.9179 0.6285 0.7106
C.V 48.5711 59.2847 237.6845
1996 Mean 1.7466 1.2675 0.5942
St. Dev. 0.8235 0.6681 0.2556
C.V 47.1499 52.7131 43.0151
1997 Mean 1.7482 1.0114 0.7587
St. Dev. 0.6900 0.5524 0.3537
C.V 39.4696 54.6117 46.6184
1998 Mean 1.7353 1.0184 0.4960
St. Dev. 0.5357 0.4413 0.5155
C.V. 30.8686 43.3372 103.9211
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Year Statistics N1I/TA NonII/TA PbT/TA
France 1994 Mean 2.8948 1.5039 0.6033
St. Dev. 1.9294 2.8625 1.8529
C.V. 66.6485 190.3374 307.1424
1995 Mean 2.7891 1.4122 0.7309
St. Dev. 1.8641 2.2611 1.9715
C.V. 66.8370 160.11 269.7378
1996 Mean 2.7788 1.5484 0.4675
St. Dev. 2.1518 2.9209 3.0347
C.V. 77.4361 188.6393 649.1929
1997 Mean 2.7119 1.6514 0.6906
St. Dev. 2.2883 3.4073 2.7497
C.V. 84.3810 206.3326 398.1483
1998 Mean 2.6111 1.8079 0.6974
St. Dev. 2.3800 4.5026 4.3683
C.V. 91.1852 249.0485 626.3299
Year Statistics NII/TA Nonll/TA PbT/TA
Germany 1994 Mean 3.1158 0.8158 0.7781
St. Dev. 0.9563 1.5891 0.8760
C.V. 30.6906 194.7929 112.5847
1995 Mean 2.9756 0.7606 0.8851
St. Dev. 0.8965 1.4634 0.7492
C.V. 30.1269 192.3943 84.6374
1996 Mean 2.8983 0.7685 0.8705
St. Dev. 0.9006 1.9719 1.0122
C.V. 31.0730 256.5726 116.2742
1997 Mean 2.7659 0.8127 0.7810
St. Dev. 0.9723 2.1398 1.0598
C.V. 35.1525 263.2958 135.7002
1998 Mean 2.5821 0.8534 0.6785
St. Dev. 0.9665 2.4661 1.3059
C.V. 37.4320 288.9555 192.4739
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Year Statistics NII/TA Nonll/TA PbT/TA
Greece 1994 Mean 2.7432 2.4390 0.9797
St. Dev. 1.3938 1.0778 2.6723
C.V. 50.8116 44.1907 272.7768
1995 Mean 3.0037 2.3603 1.3801
St. Dev. 1.6157 1.0448 1.5714
C.V. 53.7908 44.2631 113.8601
1996 Mean 3.0151 2.3077 1.4152
St. Dev. 1.4420 1.1066 1.4223
C.V. 47.8256 47.9535 100.5004
1997 Mean 3.0085 2.5421 1.4133
St. Dev. 1.2375 1.2630 1.5061
C.V. 41.1335 49.6846 106.5656
1998 Mean 2.8285 2.3108 1.4799
St. Dev. 1.0644 1.0093 1.7416
C.V. 37.6329 43.6799 117.6816
Year Statistics NII/TA Nonll/TA PbT/TA
Ireland 1994 Mean 2.5148 0.5107 1.1708
St. Dev. 1.2382 0.7748 0.6890
C.V. 49.2348 151.7193 58.8524
1995 Mean 2.3028 0.5675 1.2289
St. Dev. 1.3392 0.6354 0.6131
C.V. 58.1561 111.9689 49.8887
1996 Mean 2.2143 0.6001 1.2038
St. Dev. 1.2532 0.7065 0.6900
C.V. 56.5949 117.7266 57.3204
1997 Mean 1.7643 0.5984 0.9343
St. Dev. 1.0536 0.6761 0.7031
C.V. 59.7145 112.9892 75.2502
1998 Mean 1.7209 0.7022 0.9366
St. Dev. 0.9958 0.8350 0.6591
C.V 57.8614 118.9030 70.3775
Christos Staikouras 127
Non Interest Income and Total Income StabilityC*f Urwwrs%SrfjhcadlLk'Jt * Mr4
Year Statistics NII/TA Nonll/TA PbT/TA
Italy 1994 Mean 4.6970 0.6470 0.7221
St. Dev. 2.7313 0.6110 0.9267
C.V. 58.1495 94.4351 128.3434
1995 Mean 4.8872 1.0109 1.2441
St. Dev. 2.3429 0.5145 1.0114
C.V. 47.9397 50.8923 81.2953
1996 Mean 4.3335 1.2284 1.2559
St. Dev. 1.9533 1.0447 0.7738
C.V. 45.0737 85.0428 61.6123
1997 Mean 3.8387 1.2070 1.0574
St. Dev. 1.4394 1.3674 1.0670
C.V. 37.4985 113.2969 101.1886
1998 Mean 3.6685 1.5571 1.3013
St. Dev. 2.1423 1.8697 1.3029
C.V. 58.3968 120.0703 100.1226
Year Statistics NII/TA Nonll/TA PbT/TA
Luxembourg 1994 Mean 0.9222 0.7853 0.6303
St. Dev. 0.5485 1.5810 0.8813
C.V 59.4739 201.3195 139.8399
1995 Mean 0.8885 0.8811 0.6032
St. Dev. 0.5502 1.6025 0.7426
C.V. 61.9257 181.8711 123.1058
1996 Mean 0.8649 0.9020 0.6725
St. Dev. 0.5820 1.2326 0.6872
C.V. 67.2890 136.6494 102.1882
1997 Mean 0.8898 1.0654 0.8393
St. Dev. 0.7447 1.2482 1.0107
C.V 83.6870 117.1592 120.4132
1998 Mean 1.1094 0.1818 0.5242
St. Dev. 2.1321 12.1692 5.1216
C.V 192.184 6692.032 977.0428
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Year Statistics NII/TA Nonll/TA PbT/TA
Netherlands 1994 Mean 1.7184 1.0444 0.7308
St. Dev. 0.8132 1.6403 0.8673
C.V. 47.3215 157.0582 118.6830
1995 Mean 1.6737 1.1675 0.9779
St. Dev. 0.7217 1.9631 0.9389
C.V. 43.1208 168.1547 96.0192
1996 Mean 1.5504 1.1921 0.9997
St. Dev. 0.7098 2.1672 1.1245
C.V. 45.7819 181.7937 112.4768
1997 Mean 1.4377 1.2764 1.0295
St. Dev. 0.6135 2.0957 1.3001
C.V. 42.6740 164.1919 126.2883
1998 Mean 1.6754 1.5456 1.1279
St. Dev. 0.7361 2.9687 1.9624
C.V. 43.9355 192.0666 173.9833
Year Statistics NII/TA Nonll/TA PbT/TA
Portugal 1994 Mean 2.9828 1.0228 0.2761
St. Dev. 2.1912 0.9264 1.7362
C.V. 73.4610 90.5715 628.8171
1995 Mean 2.4907 0.9813 0.3804
St. Dev. 1.1379 0.8604 1.1543
C.V. 45.6863 87.6773 303.4206
1996 Mean 2.2710 1.1932 04681
St. Dev. 1.1684 1.0050 1.4064
C.V. 51.4503 84.2283 300.4334
1997 Mean 2.1632 1.3408 0.1555
St. Dev. 1.3472 1.3782 2.9665
C.V. 62.2794 102.7886 1907.844
1998 Mean 2.1924 1.1973 0.4400
St. Dev. 1.0994 0.7786 1.8100
C.V. 50.1481 65.0287 411.4070
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Year Statistics NII/TA Nonll/TA PbT/TA
Spain 1994 Mean 3.7291 0.7144 1.3239
St. Dev. 1.4489 0.7282 1.9838
C.V. 38.8539 101.9290 149.8477
1995 Mean 3.7132 0.9128 1.8052
St. Dev. 1.9111 1.1109 4.0716
C.V. 51.4685 121.7022 225.5445
1996 Mean 3.4107 0.8724 1.4154
St. Dev. 1.3862 0.5053 1.3607
C.V. 40.6417 57.9130 96.1365
1997 Mean 3.3713 1.3486 2.0174
St. Dev. 1.4779 2.8910 4.0300
C.V. 43.8376 214.3696 199.7563
1998 Mean 3.1530 1.1389 1.9153
St. Dev. 1.6426 0.7040 3.7876
C.V. 52.0979 61.8160 197.7601
Year Statistics NII/TA Nonll/TA PbT/TA
Sweden 1994 Mean 1.9240 0.7058 0.7048
St. Dev. 0.9686 1.2599 0.6105
C.V. 50.3438 178.5191 86.6160
1995 Mean 1.8357 0.6835 0.8964
St. Dev. 1.1937 1.0793 0.4670
C.V. 65.0258 157.9205 52.0934
1996 Mean 1.6752 0.6620 0.9786
St. Dev. 0.9590 0.9239 0.4992
C.V. 57.2500 139.5582 51.0093
1997 Mean 1.4103 0.5319 0.6517
St. Dev. 0.8158 0.7440 0.4321
C.V. 57.8440 139.8677 66.3051
1998 Mean 1.2765 0.6126 0.6954
St. Dev. 0.7647 0.9283 0.3370
C.V. 59.9093 151.5228 48.4634
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Year Statistics NI1/TA NonII/TA PbT/TA
UK 1994 Mean 2.6114 1.0527 1.1972
St. Dev. 2.7800 1.7995 1.3792
C.V. 106.5341 170.9382 115.2036
1995 Mean 2.6972 1.0215 1.3983
St. Dev. 2.8699 1.7121 1.4835
C.V. 106.4059 167.6097 106.0909
1996 Mean 2.5550 1.1035 1.3693
St. Dev. 2.8662 1.8643 1.5289
C.V. 112.179 168.9493 111.6580
1997 Mean 2.5293 1.1641 1.2751
St. Dev. 2.9196 1.9491 1.6974
C.V 115.4305 167.4351 133.1194
1998 Mean 2.7810 1.2715 3.1899
St. Dev. 4.6139 2.4621 24.0030
C.V. 165.9037 193.6332 752.4629
Year Statistics NII/TA Nonll/TA PbT/TA
EU 1994 Mean 3.2269 0.8785 0.7644
St. Dev. 1.7920 1.6285 1.1655
C.V. 55.5327 185.3683 152.4700
1995 Mean 3.1512 0.9034 0.9534
St. Dev. 1.7277 1.4506 1.3992
C.V 54.8273 160.5697 146.7621
1996 Mean 2.9984 0.9678 0.9041
St. Dev. 1.5938 1.8813 1.4771
C.V. 53.1552 194.3772 163.378
1997 Mean 2.8251 1.0271 0.8657
St. Dev. 1.5019 2.1623 1.6419
C.V. 53.1630 210.5313 189.6525
1998 Mean 2.6948 1.0907 0.8058
St. Dev. 1.6630 3.5495 2.4474
C.V 61.7110 325.4211 303.7217
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From the above tables the following conclusions can be drawn:
• There is a clear decrease in the level of net interest income as a proportion of total 
assets. This is accompanied by an increase in the level of non-interest income to 
total assets. Only in the UK, Belgium, Netherlands, Portugal, and Luxembourg the 
net interest income/total assets increases in 1997-1998. For the whole EU sample 
the average net interest income falls from 3.23% of total assets in 1994 to 2.69% in 
1998. Also only in Spain, Greece, Finland, Portugal, and Sweden non-interest 
income as a proportion of total assets decreases in 1997-1998. For the whole EU 
sample the average non-interest income increases from 0.88% of total assets in 
1994 to 1.09% in 1998. Profits before tax as percentage of total assets (ROA) 
increase in Europe from 1994 to 1995 and then it follows a falling trend. It seems 
that the increase of non-interest income to total assets is accompanied by a 
universal fall in profitability. This evolution may indicate that the growth o f  non­
interest income did not fully offset the reduction in the interest margin or that this 
may occur due to increased operating costs associated with the development o f  
activities generating non-interest income. However, we should repeat at this point 
that we used a balanced sample in the period 1994-1998, excluding the banks that 
entry or exit the market.
■ The standard deviation of net interest income to total assets follows a falling trend, 
except 1998. So, while it was 1.79% on the pan EU basis in 1994 it felt to 1.66% 
in 1998. Similar are the findings for the coefficient of variation. However, the fall 
in average net interest income rates and the significant increase of the standard 
deviation in 1997-1998 have led to very high coefficient of variation for that 
source of income in the last examined year. Germany and Netherlands have the 
lowest standard deviation of net interest income among the EU countries. Worth 
mentioning is the finding that the standard deviation of net interest income reduces 
through the examined period in almost all the smaller EU countries (Austria, 
Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Portugal), but increases in the larger 
countries (UK, France, Spain, Italy) or remain steady (Germany). Especially the 
increase for the banking industries in the UK and Italy in 1997-1998 is significant.
■ The standard deviation of non-interest income to total assets significantly increases 
(for the EU financial institutions from 1.63% in 1994 to 3.55% in 1998). The same 
occurs for the coefficient of variation. Among the big EU countries, only in Spain
3220
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the standard deviation of the non-interest income to total assets reduced; in all the 
others it increased substantially. In other words, the increase o f  non-interest 
income is accompanied by its higher variability.
■ In 1994 and 1995 non-interest income seems to have less variability, measured by 
the standard deviation, than net interest income (both income sources are divided 
by total assets). However the picture changes in 1996-1998. If we take also into 
account the average levels of these sources, then we see that for all years the 
coefficient of variation for non-interest income is larger than for net interest 
income. So, although net interest income levels are much higher than the 
respective fo r  non-interest income, the volatility o f  the non-interest sources o f  
income is larger. This occurs because mainly in France and Germany the standard 
deviation of non-interest income is much larger than the standard deviation of net 
interest income (e.g. more than double figures in Germany i.e. the standard 
deviation for net interest income is 0.97% and for non-interest income 2.47% in 
1998). However, if we exclude Germany, France and Netherlands, non-interest 
income has not been more volatile than net interest income for the other EU 
countries. On the one hand, profits from financial operations and, to a lesser extent, 
income from securities have demonstrated high volatility, but, on the other, fees 
and commissions have typically been quite stable.
■ If the statistical indicator used to measure volatility is the coefficient of variation, 
the volatility of non-interest income is higher than the volatility of interest income 
for most of the EU countries and the time period that is observed.
After that time series analysis we continue with the cross-sectional analysis. Table 25 
provides results using data for the period 1994-1998. In this case the variability is 
measured by the standard deviation of each bank’s interest and non-interest income to 
total assets over the period 1994-1998. As we can see, in all countries, except 
Luxembourg, non-interest income to total assets has lower standard deviation 
compared with the net interest margin over the period 1994-1998. In major EU 
countries the proportion of banks with higher standard deviation o f non-interest 
income to total assets than that of net interest margin fluctuates from around 15% in 
Germany to 34% in France. So, for most of the financial institutions in the whole 
period 1994-1998, non-interest activities do not seem to be more volatile than net
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interest income. Hence, the ongoing changes in the business activities of banks do not 
necessarily increase their income variability.
However, if we use the relative measure of the coefficient of variation the picture is the 
opposite one. With the exceptions of Belgium, Greece, and Sweden, in all other EU 
countries the coefficient of variation of non-interest income as a proportion of total 
assets is much higher than the ratio for the net interest margin for the majority of the 
financial institutions. Italy and Spain are among the countries with the highest 
proportions of banks where the coefficient of variation of non-interest income is larger 
than the respective figure for net interest income, 85% and 80% respectively of total 
banks in the sample for the two countries.
1 able 25: Risk for Income Sources among the I'.L countries
Country SDuonll > SDnh CVnohU > CVnii
Austria 10/34(29.41%) 22/34 (64.71%)
Belgium 13/45 (28.75%) 17/45 (37.50%)
Denmark 7/74 (9.46%) 53/74 (71.62%)
Finland 3/6 (50.00%) 4/6 (66.67%)
France 104/305 (34.10%) 207/305 (67.88%)
Germany 207/1378(15.02%) 1021/1378 (74.09%)
Greece 3/9 (33.33%) 4/9 (44.44%)
Ireland 2/11 (18.18%) 6/11 (54.55%)
Italy 107/390 (27.43%) 330/390 (84.62%)
Luxembourg 80/108 (74.07%) 88/108 (81.48%)
Netherlands 13/34 (38.23%) 30/34 (88.24%)
Portugal 7/28 (25%) 19.28 (67.86%)
Spain 28/90 (31.11%) 72/90 (80.00%)
Sweden 1/11 (9.09%) 5/11 (45.45%)
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UK 41/132 (31.06%) 98/132 (74.24%)
We continue the analysis by taking large and small banks respectively (Table 26). In 
the examined period, small banks have higher levels of net interest income and non­
interest income than large banks41. However, non-interest income makes up a higher 
proportion of total income for the large banks, compared with the smaller banks. In 
both size categories, non-interest income as a percentage of total assets increased. The 
trend for these two ratios is common for both categories: net interest margin decreases 
and non-interest income to total assets increases from 1994 to 1998. The mean value of 
net interest income to total assets is 2.11% and 3.35% respectively for large and small 
banks in 1994, and falls to 1.68% and 2.82% respectively in 1998. For non-interest 
income to total assets, it is 0.74% and 0.91% for large and small banks in 1994, and 
0.96% and 1.10% respectively in 1998. The riskiness (measured by the standard 
deviation or even the coefficient of variation) of non-interest income to total assets for 
large banks is much smaller than the respective one for small banks. Moreover, the 
standard deviation of net interest margin is larger than that of non-interest income to 
total assets for large banks e.g. in 1998, the standard deviation of non-interest and 
interest income to total assets is 0.90% and 1.25% respectively for large banks and 
3.64% and 1.95% respectively for small banks. However, through the years, the 
increase of non-interest income is accompanied by a similar increase on its riskiness. It 
must be mentioned that from 1996, the standard deviation of non-interest income to 
total assets exceeds the standard deviation of net interest margin42.
41 If we take time series cross sectional data for the period 1994-1998, the net interest and non­
interest income are 3.1041% and 1.0030% of assets for small banks, and 1.8983% and 0.8258%
of assets respectively for large banks.
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! Table 26: Return and Risk of Income Sources fur Large and Small F.U Countries
Year Statistics NII/TA Nonll/TA PbT/TA
Large banks 1994 Mean 2.1114 0.7402 0.6325
St. Dev. 1.3969 0.8449 0.6787
C.V. 66.1580 114.1504 107.3111
1995 Mean 2.0259 0.7694 0.7449
St. Dev. 1.4408 0.6964 0.5841
C.V. 71.1187 90.5153 78.4152
1996 Mean 1.8948 0.8221 0.7535
St. Dev. 1.3652 0.7767 0.5731
C.V. 72.0515 94.4820 76.0590
1997 Mean 1.7790 0.8267 0.7291
St. Dev. 1.2412 0.7200 0.6322
C.V. 69.7691 87.0978 86.7088
1998 Mean 1.6838 0.9645 0.7905
St. Dev. 1.2522 0.8991 0.6717
C.V 74.3697 93.2182 84.9687
Small banks 1994 Mean 3.3543 0.9115 0.7239
St. Dev. 2.1481 1.7717 1.1904
C.V 64.0387 194.3744 164.4198
1995 Mean 3.2875 0.9344 0.9033
St. Dev. 2.1426 1.6253 1.4060
C.V 66.1747 173.9442 155.6441
1996 Mean 3.1290 1.0106 0.8574
St. Dev. 2.0312 2.1557 1.5028
C.V. 64.9152 213.3111 175.2691
1997 Mean 2.9331 1.0570 0.8158
St. Dev. 1.5880 2.2855 1.6520
C.V 54.1400 216.2334 202.4822
42 If we take time series cross sectional data for the period 1994-1998, the standard deviation of 
net interest and non-interest income are 1.3484% and 0.7945% for large banks, and 1.9931% 
and 2.4045% respectively for small banks.
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1998 Mean 2.8164 1.1016 0.8589
St. Dev. 1.9512 3.6388 6.0207
C.V. 69.2822 330.328 700.9998
From Table 27 we can see that in 33.50% of big European banks the standard deviation 
of non-interest income to total assets is larger than the respective one for net interest 
margin. For small banks the proportion with this mathematical relation is smaller, just 
exceeding 23%. However, the picture changes if we take the coefficient of variation. In 
this case for the majority of big and small banks this ratio for the non-interest income 
to total assets is larger than the respective one for net interest margin (67% and 75% 
respectively for large and small banks).
Tublu 27: Risk for Income Sources among Large ami Small LL1 banks |
Size SDnonll > SDnu CVsonti > CVmi
Large banks 67/200 (33.50%) 134/200 (67.00%)
Small banks 571/2455 (23.26%) 1851/2455 (75.40%)
The last analysis is based on data for the different types of financial institutions (Table 
28). Commercial banks rely much more on non-interest income compared with the 
other types of banking institutions. Based on 1998 figures, the mean values of non­
interest income to total assets is 1.74% for commercial banks, 0.64% for savings 
banks, 0.98% for co-operative banks, and 0.31% for mortgage banks. The figures for 
net interest margins are 2.48%, 2.76%, 2.95%, and 1.64% respectively43. There is a 
clear increase in the proportion o f non-interest income to total assets for all types of 
financial institutions and a decrease of net interest margin (with the only exception of 
commercial banks for the period 1997-1998). For all types of financial institutions the 
standard deviation of the non-interest ratio is lower that that o f the net interest margin; 
exception is the case of commercial banks which have higher variation of non-interest
43 Based on time series cross sectional data for the period 1994-1998, the mean values of non­
interest income to total assets is 1.55% for commercial banks, 0.60% for savings banks, 0.86% 
for co-operative banks, and 0.26% for mortgage banks. The figures for net interest margins are 
2.51%, 3.09%, 3.39%, and 1.81% respectively.
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ratio and even bigger coefficient of variation. It must be mentioned that the standard 
deviation of non-interest income to total assets increase significantly from 2.85% in 
1994 to 6.17% in 1998. This may occur because commercial banks rely much more 
compared with the counterparts on non-interest income. Also we can point to the 
steady increase in the riskiness of non-interest income for all types of banks.
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- — — '
)' 'fable 28: Return and Risk of Income Sources fur Types of KU Ranks
Year Statistics N1I/TA Nonll/TA PbT/TA
Commercial
banks
1994 Mean 2.6133 1.4136 0.7954
St. Dev. 2.1902 2.8514 1.9320
C.V. 83.8095 201.7133 242.9065
1995 Mean 2.5614 1.4119 0.9299
St. Dev. 2.2060 2.5254 2.3115
C.V. 86.1268 178.8662 248.5777
1996 Mean 2.4851 1.5019 0.8933
St. Dev. 2.2234 3.2145 2.5064
C.V 89.4681 214.0209 280.5702
1997 Mean 2.4088 1.6928 1.0128
St. Dev. 2.3279 3.6851 2.7583
C.V 96.6410 217.6936 272.3391
1998 Mean 2.4793 1.7405 1.2596
St. Dev. 2.8863 6.1676 10.3893
C.V 116.414 354.3544 824.8351
Year Statistics NII/TA Nonll/TA PbT/TA
Savings
banks
1994 Mean 3.3536 0.5583 0.7617
St. Dev. 0.8884 0.3145 0.5839
C.V 26.4899 56.3298 76.6502
1995 Mean 3.2462 0.5846 1.0152
St. Dev. 0.8783 0.3433 0.6870
C.V 27.0554 58.7354 67.8636
1996 Mean 3.1495 0.5955 0.9924
St. Dev. 0.8172 0.3630 0.6290
C.V 25.9474 60.9512 63.3873
1997 Mean 2.9756 0.6082 0.8633
St. Dev. 0.7888 0.3166 0.5409
C.V 26.5090 52.0659 62.6528
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1998 Mean 2.7580 0.6448 0.8025
St. Dev. 0.7405 0.3750 0.4884
C.V. 26.8510 58.1548 60.8571
Year Statistics NII/TA Nonll/TA PbT/TA
Cooperative
banks
1994 Mean 3.7480 0.7449 0.6409
St. Dev. 2.5225 0.4909 0.5372
C.V. 67.3023 65.9065 83.8246
1995 Mean 3.7015 0.8216 0.7465
St. Dev. 2.5282 0.7389 0.6051
C.V. 68.3029 89.9438 81.0491
1996 Mean 3.4560 0.9108 0.7129
St. Dev. 2.3217 1.3611 0.5744
C.V. 67.1797 149.4359 80.5650
1997 Mean 3.1536 0.8696 0.6195
St. Dev. 1.0805 0.4504 0.5164
C.V. 34.2605 51.7997 83.3505
1998 Mean 2.9545 0.9807 0.5458
St. Dev. 1.4794 0.8600 0.5219
C.V. 50.0735 87.6942 95.6189
Year Statistics NII/TA Nonll/TA PbT/TA
Mortgage
banks
1994 Mean 1.9827 0.3242 0.7619
St. Dev. 1.0024 0.7750 0.7331
C.V. 50.5592 239.0353 96.2295
1995 Mean 1.9583 0.1986 0.6434
St. Dev. 1.0547 0.3464 1.5311
C.V. 53.8599 174.5229 237.9702
1996 Mean 1.8155 0.2451 0.6120
St. Dev. 0.9806 0.5093 1.0887
C.V. 54.0114 207.7414 177.8867
1997 Mean 1.6751 0.2304 0.4982
St. Dev. 1.1095 0.4177 1.4463
C.V. 66.2342 181.2902 290.2911
1998 Mean 1.6396 0.3128 0.5759
St. Dev. 1.1094 0.5812 1.0452
C.V. 67.6585 185.8152 181.5015
Table 29 presents cross sectional analysis for the several types of institutions.
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Tullio 29: Risk Tor Incoino Sources lor the Several Tj pcs of El! Institutions
Type SDfJonll > SDm CVManli > CVNu
Commercial banks 388/830 (46.75%) 582/830 (70.12%)
Savings banks 70/700 (10.00%) 527/700 (75.29%)
Cooperative banks 173/1011 (17.11%) 798/1011 (78.93%)
Mortgage banks 26/114(22.81%) 77/114(67.54%)
The findings are similar with those observed in the cases of size and country 
examination; the standard deviation of non-interest income to total assets is smaller 
than that of net interest margins in the majority of banks in the several type categories. 
However, it should be noted the high proportion of commercial banks (almost 47% of 
total commercial banks) where non-interest activities are riskier that the interest 
bearing activities.
6.5. Return, Risk and Correlation of Income Sources
Do the results set out suggest that banking systems have become more or less stable? 
In answer to this question, the first point to be made is, quite simply, that the variety of 
responses suggest responses to different circumstances, and, as banks surely wish to 
survive, that will be stabilising. But beyond that, what matters is how these changes 
have affected vulnerability to shocks.
Shocks are of two types -bank specific or system wide. Bank specific shocks are, in 
turn, internal or external. External ones can have their effects mitigated only by 
diversification across a wide range of customers. The data presented here do not enable 
us to distinguish among earnings from different customers or classes of customers. So 
we cannot address this issue. But they do help with regard to internal shocks -fraud, 
failure of risk management, failure of part of the business. The more diversified are 
sources of earnings, the less likely is any one such shock to affect a bank. That is as far 
as we can go on bank-specific shocks.
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The methodology of this chapter is based on the modem portfolio theory. Returns and 
risks of existing securities and non-securities activities, as well as the correlation of 
such returns, are estimated and used to compute the potential for diversification gains. 
While all returns are ex post, considerable attention is given to the issue of whether the 
distribution of ex post returns and risks is stable across time and groups of banks.
Let I (t), Nil (t) and Nonll (t) represent the total income, the net interest income and 
the non-interest income respectively at time t, all of them divided by the total assets at 
time t, so that:
I (t) = Nil (t) + Nonll (t) (1)
We use the variance (or square of the standard deviation) for measuring the 
fluctuations around the trend. The main question is under what conditions will the 
variance of income (oi2) be less than the variance of net interest income (O nu2) .  s o  that 
the non-interest income succeeds in reducing the instability of total income.
By a well-known statistical theorem
CF|2 = GNU2 + C*Nonll2 + 2 rNI| Nonii CTn II °NonII (2) 
where r Nn n<»ii is the correlation coefficient between the net interest income and the 
non-interest income. If rNn Nonii = 0, the variance of income exceeds the variance of the 
net interest income by the variance of the non-interest income.
For a more precise statement we divide both sides of (2) by Onm2. This gives
a , 2/CTNll2 =  1 +  ONonl|2/CTNI 2 +  2  Tnu  Nonll O N o n ll^ N lI ( 3 )
The left-hand side of (3) is the ratio of the variance of income to the variance of net 
interest income. If this ratio is unity, the non-interest income may be regarded as 
having had no effect on stability; if the ratio is less than unity, the non-interest ratio has 
succeeded in promoting the stability of income; if the ratio is greater than unity, the 
non-interest income is destabilising rather than stabilising total operating income.
In other words, non-interest income stabilises total operating income if
Oi2/Onh2 < 1
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according as
^NonII2/ONIl2 +  2 rNII Nonll O noiiI|/CJn II <  0
or
fNIl Nonll <  * 0 .5  ONonll/ONII
The last equation indicates the conditions under which non-interest income succeeds in 
stabilising bank income: if rNn Nonli is less than -0.5 c Nonj|/oNii, the non-interest income 
will be stabilising total operating income; if it is greater than -0.5 ONonii/ONii, the non­
interest income will be destabilising total operating income. For a given magnitude of 
the standard deviation of non-interest income i.e. a given Onooii. it is obvious that, the 
closer the correlation coefficient between net interest income and non-interest income 
is to -1 , the better, since this means that the non-interest income will be better adapted 
to needs of stabilising the total operating income of the bank. A correlation coefficient 
significantly lower than one would indicate a stabilising influence, while a negative 
correlation would even imply that any decreases in interest income could be expected 
to be compensated by an increase in non-interest income.
We will present in the main text the time series and cross sectional results for the 
balanced sample. However, in Annex 16 one can find the results of the unbalanced 
sample extended over the period 1992-1999. We can make similar conclusions by 
using the unbalanced sample.
We start the analysis by presenting the results for the several EU countries (Table 30). 
With regard to the empirical evidence, it is worth mentioning that with the exception of 
some years for some countries, the correlation coefficient o f non-interest income with 
interest income is positive and quite close to zero. However, in all countries and for all 
years in the period 1994-1998 non-interest income does not seem to help stabilising 
total operating income; the only exception is for Spain and for years 1996 and 1998. 
The correlation coefficient of interest and non-interest income to total assets is not only 
larger than -0.5 (oNonii/oNii) but also in most of the cases positive, except for some of 
the examined years in France, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Germany. 
So, not only non-interest activities from the previous analysis are more risky than the
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interest earning activities for most of the countries in the period 1996-1998, they don’t 
also help stabilising total income since the correlation coefficient with interest 
activities is mainly positive. This may indicate that fluctuation in one source o f income 
could not offset fluctuation in the other. However, this result should be interpreted with 
caution, mainly owing to the fact that the composition of non-interest income has not 
been stable. Finally we observe an increase of the variation of non-interest income to 
interest income almost in all countries (similar results as previously mentioned) 
through the period 1994-1998, something that has clear implications for the future 
stability o f total income.
f ■. ■■■ ...................... . .... .............-
'ruble 30: Correlation of income sources and income stability fur the several l.L'
Country Year f  Nil Noni! -0.5 Ohohh/Gnu
Austria 1994 0.0670 -0.3314
1995 0.0655 -0.6473
1996 0.0314 -0.5667
1997 0.0027 -0.5385
199S 0.1574 -0.5297
Belgium 1994 -0.1114 -0.5199
1995 -0.0147 -0.3809
1996 0.2093 -0.4490
1997 0.0545 -0.4515
1998 0.1432 -0.5025
Denmark 1994 0.2040 -0.1568
1995 0.3066 -0.1193
1996 0.3455 -0.1202
1997 0.3872 -0.1342
1998 0.4920 -0.1497
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Finland 1994 0.6147 -0.3804
1995 0.4187 -0.3423
1996 0.3052 -0.4056
1997 0.7438 -0.4002
1998 0.9098 -0.4119
France 1994 -0.0191 -0.7418
1995 -0.0169 -0.6065
1996 -0.1232 -0.6787
1997 0.0237 -0.7445
1998 -0.0669 -0.9455
Germany 1994 0.1402 -0.8309
1995 0.1120 -0.8162
1996 0.0387 -1.0948
1997 -0.0069 -1.1004
1998 0.0092 -1.2757
Greece 1994 0.4831 -0.3867
1995 0.6901 -0.3233
1996 0.8103 -0.3837
1997 0.6619 -0.5103
1998 0.5429 -0.4741
Ireland 1994 0.5560 -0.3129
1995 0.7159 -0.2372
1996 0.7751 -0.2819
1997 0.7672 -0.3209
1998 0.7960 -0.4193
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Italy 1994 0.0771 -0.1119
1995 0.0129 -0.1098
1996 -0.0040 -0.2674
1997 -0.0275 -0.4750
1998 0.2883 -0.4364
Luxembourg 1994 0.2163 -1.4413
1995 0.3089 -1.4563
1996 0.2199 -1.0590
1997 0.4273 -0.8382
1998 -0.8349 -2.8539
Netherlands 1994 0.1695 -1.0086
1995 0.1673 -1.3601
1996 0.0137 -1.5266
1997 0.0593 -1.7079
1998 0.0798 -2.0165
Portugal 1994 -0.1489 -0.2113
1995 -0.2947 -0.3781
1996 0.1260 -0.4301
1997 0.1245 -0.5114
1998 0.1933 -0.3541
Spain 1994 -0.1127 -0.2513
1995 0.2594 -0.2907
1996 -0.2900 -0.1823
1997 0.1760 -0.9781
1998 -0.2522 -0.2143
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Sweden 1994 0.8323 -0.6504
1995 0.8036 -0.4521
1996 0.7562 -0.4817
1997 0.7601 -0.4560
1998 0.7575 -0.6069
UK 1994 0.7523 -0.3234
1995 0.7325 -0.2983
1996 0.6721 -0.3252
1997 0.6388 -0.3338
1998 0.5078 -0.2600
From Table 31, where we work with cross sectional data, we find the same results: in 
most of the countries the non-interest income to total assets in the vast majority of their 
financial institutions do not seem to help stabilising total income divided by total 
assets. Exceptions are the cases of financial institutions in Portugal, Denmark, and 
Spain where in more than 50% of the financial institutions non-interest income helps 
stabilising total operating income.
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; Table 31: C'urrelatiun of income sources and income stability fur tbc several Ell j
Country Stabilisation o f  total income
Austria 13/34
Belgium 8/45
Denmark 39/74
Finland 1/5
France 150/305
Germany 478/1378
Greece 2/9
Ireland 4/11
Italy 185/390
Luxembourg 11/108
Netherlands 9/34
Portugal 17/28
Spain 49/90
Sweden 3/11
UK 33/132
We then examine the effects of non-interest activities on the stability of the total 
income by spliting the banks according to their size (Table 32).
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'1 able 32: Correlation of income sources aiul income stability for la rye und sm all.
Size Year fNil Nontt -0.5 (TNonl/CTNU
Large banks 1994 0.1678 -0.3024
1995 0.1001 -0.2440
1996 0.0887 -0.2845
1997 0.2868 -0.2901
1998 0.1340 -0.3590
Small banks 1994 0.0647 -0.4101
1995 0.2142 -0.3771
1996 0.2594 -0.5271
1997 0.0667 -0.7116
1998 -0.0552 -0.9253
Both for large and small EU countries, non-interest activities do not seem to help 
stabilising total income44. Again we observe the increase of the variation of non­
interest income to the variation of interest income for both bank size categories; 
especially for small banks the increase o f  that ratio is significant through the examined 
years and has clear implications fo r  the stability o f their income.
In most of the financial institutions, we observe again the inability o f non-interest 
activities to stabilise total income (Table 33).
44 If we take time series cross sectional data for the period 1994-1998, the correlation 
coefficient of net interest income with that o f non-interest income is 0.1388 for large banks and 
0.0807 for small banks.
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'I able 33: Correlation of income sources und income stability lor large und small ,
Size Stabilisation o f  total income
Large banks 83/200
Small banks 923/2455
Finally, we examine the same hypotheses for the several types of institutions (Table 
34). Similar are the results that we extract45. For all years and for all types of financial 
institutions (with the exception of mortgage banks in 1997) non-interest income does 
not manage to stabilise total income. With the exception of the mortgage banks (1995- 
1997) and commercial banks (1998), in all the other cases the correlation of non­
interest income to total income with net interest margin is positive. Moreover, we 
observe for all types of institutions but mainly for commercial banks a clear increase in 
the variation of non-interest activities to the variation of interest bearing activities.
Finally, we examine the effects of non-interest income sources on income stability for 
the banks in the several type categories across the time period 1994-1998 (Table 35). 
In most of the financial institutions non-interest income does not stabilise total income.
45 If we take time series cross sectional data for the period 1994-1998, the correlation 
coefficient o f net interest income with that of non-interest income is 0.030 for commercial 
banks, 0.5168 for savings banks, 0.3039 for co-operative banks, and -0.2344 for mortgage 
banks.
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'rutile 34: Correlatiun of income sources a ml income stabilii) for (lie several types
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Type Year fNil Nonll -0.5 OXi0„//Gun
Commercial 1994 0.1519 -0.6509
banks 1995 0.1703 -0.5724
1996 0.0731 -0.7229
1997 0.1035 -0.7915
1998 -0.1067 -1.0684
Savings banks 1994 0.2116 -0.1770
1995 0.3493 -0.1955
1996 0.4429 -0.2221
1997 0.3468 -0.2008
1998 0.3314 -0.2532
Cooperative 1994 0.0992 -0.0973
banks 1995 0.7084 -0.1461
1996 0.7884 -0.2931
1997 0.2166 -0.2084
1998 0.5234 -0.2896
Mortgage 1994 0.0330 -0.3865
banks 1995 -0.1379 -0.1642
1996 -0.0388 -0.2597
1997 -0.2344 -0.1882
1998 0.0839 -0.2623
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Table 35: Com;la(ioii of income sources and income stability for the several types 
• of KU institutions
Type Stabilisation o f  total income
Commercial banks 255/830
Savings banks 300/700
Cooperative banks 204/1011
Mortgage banks 37/114
6.6. Nature of Non-Interest Income
Some sources of fee income have been available to depository institutions for many 
years, but have recently taken on a more dominant position in the overall financial 
management strategies of banks. These include deposit service charges, credit card 
fees, and fees associated with electronic funds transfer. Banks have long earned non­
interest income by offering ‘traditional’ banking services. The investment management 
and trust businesses of banks can be divided into two aspects: asset management and 
accounting/record keeping. Asset management includes personal funds management, 
personal trust and retail mutual funds, defined benefit and contribution pensions, and 
corporate money management. The account businesses include master trust, global 
custody, domestic custody, and corporate trust.
Although banks have made significant headway in generating traditional fee income, 
for banks to remain competitive with other financial institutions, they need to expand 
their product breadth and to improve sales, relationships, servicing, and investment 
know-how. New types of activities that generate fee income include securities 
brokerage, municipal securities underwriting, real estate brokerage services, real estate 
development, real estate equity participation, and insurance brokerage activities. Many 
analysts assume that the dramatic rise in non-interest revenues as proportion of total 
revenues came from investment banking, trading, and brokerage activities. These new
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products, in addition to generating fee income, make banks more competitive with 
other banks and non-banks that offer a wide array of services and products.
Banks also receive fee income from a number of off-balance sheet items including loan 
commitments, note issuance facilities, letters of credit, foreign exchange services, and 
derivative activities (contracts for futures, forwards, interest rate swaps, and other 
derivative contracts)46.
Many institutions have broadened their range of corporate services to include 
management consulting, data processing and information systems, or other 
technological services. In addition, depository institutions generate fee income from 
personal financial planning services, assisting individuals with decisions on budgeting 
taxes, investments, retirement, estate planning and other financial matters. Since these 
services can be costly in terms of hiring and training individuals, fees must be 
commensurate with the cost of producing the service.
However, fee income is not only generated by the traditional fee-based activities and 
the provision of new products; non-interest income may represent earnings from doing 
the same things in a new way -earning a fee by arranging a loan for a customer rather 
than earning an interest spread by lending to the customer, for example. Since the data 
do not distinguish new lending from lending drawn from existing lines of credit, the 
possibility exists that any acceleration in loan growth is the result of new loan 
originations. Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests otherwise. The New York Times, 
for example, reported in November 1998, that "rather than signalling a flow o f  new 
loans, much o f the lending appears to be borrowers' drawing on existing lines o f
46 r *Loan commitments are legally binding agreements by banks promising a to guarantee that a 
certain amount of funds will be available for a borrower over a given time period for a given 
rate. Letters of credit include standby and commercial letters of credit. Standby letters of credit 
provide a promise by a bank that it will perform a contract in the event that the buyer of the 
letter of credit defaults. Commercial letters of credit are similar but guarantee the credit 
standing of a buyer for an International trade transaction.
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credit”47. This process, known as securitisation, was applied first to mortgages in the 
1970s, and then to both consumer loans and business loans in the 1980s and 1990s. As 
a result of securitisation, loans originated by banks are often ultimately held by mutual 
funds and pension funds. Loan securitisation involves removing loans from bank’s 
balance sheet and selling them to investors. However, before being sold, the loans are 
packaged into securities with characteristics that make them attractive to large and 
small investors. The mechanics of securitisation are subject to a variety of tax, 
securities, regulatory, and accounting laws.
The process of securitisation allows a bank to diversify its risk, but does not eliminate 
its role in monitoring borrowers. In a securitisation contract, a loan (or the credit risk 
associated with a loan) is split in small pieces and distributed among many banks, but 
the ‘originator’, i.e. the bank which had the original contract with the borrower, still 
performs the monitoring function on behalf of the parties involved. The big difference 
is that since the originator keeps on its books only a fraction of the risk associated with 
each loan, the cost of lending -in terms of the capital required- is proportionally 
smaller. Thus the origination and monitoring of loans will largely remain with banks, 
although this function will no longer be tied to the existence of loans on banks’ books. 
Only when a loan is packaged in a larger pool, and sold to final investors, does the 
bank lose its monitoring function: but in this case it is as the borrower had financed 
itself directly in the market.
In the US over the past 10 years, non-interest income has accounted for an expanding 
share of bank revenue. A small part of the increase has been from fiduciary activities 
and trading revenue, but most of the growth has been in the broad category “other non­
interest income”, which includes merchant credit card fees, annual cardholder fees, 
fees for servicing mortgages, and income from loans that have been securitised. Thus, 
the increase in the proportion of revenue accounted for by non-interest income likely 
reflects both the expansion of bank lending to households and the growing fraction of 
bank loans that are securitised. According to De Young and Roland (1999):
41 Uchitelle, L., 1998, “Sure, Banks are Lending, But will They Keep It Up?”, New York
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“...the recent increase in the importance o f  non-interest income has come from several 
sources. First, banks have expanded into less traditional fee-for-service products such 
as insurance and mutual fund sales and (limited) investment banking activities. 
Second, banks now charge explicit fees fo r  a number o f  financial services which 
traditionally had been bundled together with deposit accounts and which customers 
previously had paid fo r  by accepting lower interest rates on deposits....Third, the 
growth o f  securitisation in mortgage, credit card, and other loan markets."
Also Radecki (1999), in a study of the importance of fee income to the top 25 US bank 
holding companies, found that payment services were responsible for as much as two- 
fifths of the total combined operating revenues. The very substantial amount of 
revenue derived from payments services indicates that the production and distribution 
of these services constitute one of the core business activities of commercial banks. 
The size of payments-related income also implies that lending contributes less revenue 
to banks than is commonly believed. Radecki ( 1999) mentions analytically the several 
categories of non-interest income (Annex 17).
Aggeler and Feldman (1998) concluded that about 40 percent of non-interest income 
was from fees earned from non-lending products and services provided to customer 
and commercial customers. These services range from issuing money orders, to selling 
insurance, to “servicing” loans (that is, administering and distributing the loan 
payments of a borrower). Another large element of non-interest income (26 percent) 
comes from service charges and fees on, for example, deposit and checking accounts 
and automated teller machine transactions. Non-interest income from these service 
charges and fees has remained at near the same percent over the last five years. Finally, 
banks also earn non-interest income from trust services whereby, for example, they 
invest funds for the benefit of clients. Over the past three decades, securities markets 
have captured a growing share of financial transactions. The decreasing reliance on 
bank loans has been more pronounced among large businesses, which routinely use the 
commercial paper market to fill short-term funding needs and the bond market for
Times, November 1.
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long-term needs. In addition, illiquid loans that in the past would have remained on 
bank balance sheets are now used to create tradable securities.
The increasing reliance on net trading income may prove to be a temporary 
phenomenon driven by lower inflation and interest rates and the consequent rise in 
asset prices. Investment banking, trading, and brokerage activities are much more 
market sensitive than trust fees and service charges for typical non-interest income. 
With volatile security markets, some analysts argue that it is too early to look at 
brokerage activities and other non-traditional securities activities as a way to smooth 
income for banks in the face of cyclical lending cycles. Hence, many bankers have 
recently focused on the “right combination” of fee-based businesses. For instance, a 
bank enjoying increased revenues from mortgage, investment banking, or mutual fund 
areas during a bull market might want to invest more in mortgage servicing, securities 
processing, mutual fund processing, insurance, or cash management, which will 
provide more consistent annuity-like fees during future bear markets.
6.7, Concluding Remarks
The two basic questions to be answered in this study are the followings: (i) what are 
the profitability and risk of non-interest activities, relative to interest bearing banking 
activities, and (ii) what are the potential diversification benefits of non-interest 
activities to a banking firm. To answer the first question, we examine the mean and 
standard deviation of the non-interest returns and compare them to those of interest 
earning activities, with the mean return measuring profitability and the standard 
deviation of returns measuring risk. To answer the second question, we examine the 
return correlation between interest and non-interest activities.
The main findings -which are deemed useful both for banks and to the public 
authorities responsible for maintaining financial stability- can be summarised as 
follows:
y  Non-interest income has increased in importance relative to net interest income.
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y  The evolution of non-interest income may indicate that this source of income did 
not fully offset the reduction in the interest margin.
> Through the years the variability of non-interest income increases. If we exclude 
Germany and France where non-interest income is much more volatile than net 
interest income, non-interest income as a whole does not seem to be more volatile 
than net interest income. However, if we use the coefficient of variation 
(according to the ECB this is the appropriate statistical indicator for measuring 
relative variability across samples or groups of data), the variability of non­
interest income is almost always larger than the respective one for net interest 
income.
y  A positive correlation between interest and non-interest income seems to exist in 
several countries, although in varying degrees.
y  The composition of non-interest income is rather heterogeneous.
As a result of the increased importance of activities generating non-interest income, 
banks’ operational, reputation and strategic risks seem to be heightened. The increased 
relevance of these categories of risk has made banks’ risk management activity, and, 
accordingly, the task of the supervisors, more complex and requires a focus on these 
other categories of risk. As regards the current view of the capital adequacy relations, 
this development supports arguments in favour of specific capital requirements for 
other categories of risk than credit and market risks.
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Chapter 7
“Determinants of Bank Profitability -  
Literature Review”
Abstract
The rate of return earned by a financial institution is affected by numerous factors. 
These factors include elements internal to each financial institution and several 
important external forces shaping earnings performance. Several authors through their 
studies have analysed the differential effects of internal and external variables on bank 
profitability. The type of explanation would determine possible policy implications and 
ought to be taken seriously. This chapter reviews the literature on bank performance 
studies and classifies the bank profitability determinants.
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Chapter 7: Determinants of Bank Profitability • Literature Review
7.1. Introduction
After reviewing the empirical literature concerning bank performance and the main 
components of income sources, we can determine the several factors that influence the 
bank performance. A number of studies have examined bank performance in an effort 
to isolate the factors that account for interbank differences in profitability. These 
studies fall generally into several categories. One group has focused broadly on the tie 
between bank earnings and various aspects of bank operating performance. For 
example, studies by Haslem (1968, 1969), and Bryan (1972) each searched through a 
set of bank operating ratios, using one or more statistical procedures, to find a subset of 
ratios that could best explain interbank differences in profitability over some time 
period, usually one or two years. The consensus of these studies is that expense control 
is the most important factor in achieving high bank profitability. A second set of 
studies has focused on the relationship between bank earnings performance and 
balance sheet structure. Principal works in these areas are those of Hester and Zoellner 
(1966), and Bond (1971) all of whom have used statistical cost accounting techniques, 
or some variations, to estimate marginal rates of return for various bank assets and/or 
liability items. Results indicate that variations in bank portfolios do explain variations 
in bank earnings. Moreover, rates of return vary considerably across balance sheet 
items.
Another body of literature has examined the impact of some regulatory, 
macroeconomic or structural factors on overall bank performance. For example, bank 
holding company affiliation, branching restrictions, interest rates ceilings, Federal 
Reserve membership for the US banks, minority or government ownership, and market 
structure have all been studied for their effects on bank performance, including 
profitability. For Schranz (1993) the performance of a firm is influenced by its size, the 
competitive nature of the market within which the firm operates, the effects o f the 
various management monitoring mechanisms, and the riskiness of the firm’s 
investment strategy. Smirlock (1985) mentions that profitability and asset quality of 
different segments of the industry to a large degree reflect the economic conditions
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impacting these institutions. When the local economy has been faring poorly, it is 
likely that the banking sector will follow suit.
The term bank structure is frequently used when referring to the characteristics of 
individual institutions. Individual bank characteristics such as the portfolio 
composition, and the scale and scope of operations, can affect the costs at which banks 
produce financial services. M arket structure, measured by the relative size and 
number of firms, can influence the degree of local competition, and, by extension, the 
quality, quantity, and price of financial services ultimately available to bank customers. 
Researchers have studied how both bank and market structure (internal and external 
determinants respectively) are related to bank performance (see also Annex 18).
7.2. Internal Determinants
Internal determinants of bank profitability can be defined as those factors that are 
influenced by the bank’s management decisions and policy objectives. Management 
effects are the results of differences in bank management objectives, policies, 
decisions, and actions reflected in differences in bank operating results, including 
profitability. The operating relationships reflect (1) overall profitability and gross 
revenue; (2) funds-use measures (asset-management measures, including return on the 
uses); (3) funds-source measures (deposit and capital measures, including cost of the 
sources); and (4) expense measures. These issues are related to the balance sheet and 
income statement structure. Zimmerman (1996) found that management decisions, 
especially regarding loan portfolio concentration, were an important contributing factor 
in bank performance. Researchers frequently attribute good bank performance to 
quality management. Management quality is assessed in terms o f senior officers’ 
awareness and control of the bank’s policies and performance.
Many of the internal determinants rely for their estimation on data which are available 
in limited local, typically American, circumstances but which may not be obtained in 
an international survey. Examples are funds source management and funds use 
management [Haslem (1968)]. Other variables for which data are available and which 
are suggested in the literature are capital and liquidity ratios, the loan/deposit ratio (in
Christos Staikouras 159
B u n a s» Determinants o f  Bank Profitability - Literature Review
principal, the reciprocal of the liquidity ratio), loan loss expenses and some overhead 
expenses.
Haslem (1968, 1969) computed balance sheet and income statement ratios for all the 
member banks of the US Federal Reserve System in a two-year study. His results 
indicated that most of the ratios were significantly related to profitability, particularly 
capital ratios, interest paid and received, salaries and wages. He also stated that a guide 
for improved management should first emphasise expense management, fund source 
management and lastly funds use management. Wall (1985) concludes that a bank’s 
asset and liability management, its funding management and the non-interest cost 
controls all have a significant effect on the profitability record.
7.2.1. B a la nce  Sh e e t  Structure a nd  B a n k  C o sts
The principal factors that influence several measures of performance e.g. bank costs, 
deposit and loan composition etc., are all under the control of bank management, 
although Bryan (1972) suggested that unsuccessful banks have unfavourable cost ratios 
on items that are assumed to be outside the banks’ control and related to the 
macroeconomic environment. The financial success of a bank depends on its 
management’s ability to generate sufficient revenue while controlling costs. Bank 
managers make numerous decisions during the year concerning, among others, asset 
and liability management, the pricing of services and operating expenses. Like bank 
revenues, bank expenses are described and measured in terms of interest and non­
interest items. Interest expenses, of course, vary considerably with the interest rate 
cycle; in contrast, non-interest expenses are a relatively stable percentage of a bank’s 
assets. Because deposits are the major source of bank funding, interest paid on deposits 
is the major interest expense.
Berger and Mester (1999) found that, during 1991-1997, cost productivity for the US 
banks worsened while profit productivity improved substantially. The most likely 
explanation is weakness in the cost minimisation approach, which does not account for 
significant revenue charges. Over time, banks have offered wider varieties of financial 
services (such as mutual funds, derivatives, and other products of financial 
engineering) and provided multi-distribution channels through more extensive
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branching and ATM networks, expanded availability of debit and credit cards, and a 
proliferation of on-line services. These additional services of higher service quality, 
which are difficult to control for in cost and profit functions, may have raised cost but 
also raised revenues by more than the cost increases, resulting in measurement of 
worsened cost productivity, but improved profit productivity.
The importance of internal bank management is demonstrated in many more papers 
which have concluded that profitable banks are those banks which have been able to 
reduce cost without scarifying revenues. Neither bank size nor market concentration 
play a significant role in bank profitability. The latter gives support to Bryan’s (1992) 
findings which indicate that aggressive balance sheet management is related to 
profitability. The strength of the argument is weakened due to the lack of other costs 
besides portfolio costs, because there is no obvious reason why differences in bank 
performance should be unrelated to operating costs of various kinds.
A number of studies have concluded that expense control is the primary determinant of 
bank profitability. Expense management offers a major and consistent opportunity for 
profitability improvement. With the large size and the large differences in salaries and 
wages, the efficient use of labour is a key determinant of relative profitability.
7.2.I.I. Operating Expenses
Wall (1985) examined small and mid-sized banks over the period 1972 to 1981 to 
identify factors important to bank profits. He found that consistently profitable banks 
had lower interest and non-interest expenses than did their less profitable counterparts 
because of more capital, more demand deposits, slightly lower rates paid on liabilities, 
greater holdings of securities, and more efficient management. Staff expenses, as 
conventional wisdom proposes, is expected to be inversely related to profitability 
because these costs reduce the ‘bottom line’ or the total operations of the bank. The 
level of staff expenses appears to have a negative impact on banks’ ROA in the studies 
of Bourke (1989) and Abdula (1994). However, Molyneux and Thornton (1992) found 
a positive relationship between staff expenses and total profits. As they suggest “high
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profits earned by firms in a regulated industry may be appropriated in the form o f  
higher payroll expenditures".
Kwast and Rose (1982) challenged this work on the grounds that no theoretical 
framework linking earnings and costs have been forwarded. They proposed the 
application of a statistical (least square) accounting technique, developed in another 
branch of the literature, which related bank earnings to balance sheet structure. A 
sample of 41 high-profit banks and 39 low-profit banks with assets exceeding $500 
million were examined over the period 1970-1977 for differences in (i) yield on assets 
and liabilities, and (ii) operating costs, as determined by statistical cost analyses. When 
certain market demand costs and supply conditions were held constant, yield 
differences between high and low profit banks using gross operating income could not 
be detected. Therefore, price efficiency was not believed to be responsible for gross 
earnings disparities. When net operating income and net income (after taxes) were used 
as dependent variables, mixed figures were resulted, with no strong evidence that high- 
earning banks had different price structures. Tests for differences in earnings flows 
from scale economies could also not be rejected. In sum, the consensus of previous 
literature, pointing to expense control as the key to profitability, was not supported. 
Kwast and Rose cited the following as being potentially responsible for differences in 
bank profitability: (a) regional conditions, (b) portfolio and risk preferences, and (c) 
management ability.
In defence of prior research, we could comment that the Kwast and Rose study is 
limited in scope to large banks; therefore, the results cannot be generalised to the entire 
banking population. Also, the sample sizes are relatively small compared to previous 
research studies, and although theory and statistical modelling are applied, further 
testing is needed to verify the results. Perhaps the most important inference to be 
drawn from their study is that the relationship between product costs and profitability 
is a complex one. Maintenance of peak pricing strategy and operating efficiency does 
not necessarily ensure impressive earnings, although they appear to be essential 
ingredients for survival.
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7.2.I.2. Economies of scale 
Another line of research concentrates on the potential existence (or not) of economies 
of scale, and if the size is related to a bank’s structural characteristics. Scale economies 
in the provision of banking services are one determinant of optimal bank size. Other 
influences include tax policies, regulatory restrictions, progressive reserve 
requirements, market size, and risk diversification. In recent years, two important 
literatures on this relation have developed. Both predict a positive relationship between 
the size of banking firms and their performance. Vennet (1998) suggests that the 
average bank size in Europe, for which no diseconomies are found, is higher in 1997 
than in the 1980s, a result that was also confirmed by studies on US banks.
Acquiring banks claim to benefit by increasing their profitability and shareholder 
value. Among their rationales for merging are scale economies that follow from 
consolidating administrative and back-office operations and from consolidating 
branches, when the merging banks’ branching networks overlap. Scale economies can 
also result from diversification of assets and liabilities that reduces the costs o f risk 
management. Moreover, given the current emphasis on relationship banking, many 
merger partners expect to achieve scope economies by combining their different 
product lines in a single institution. With a broader array of financial products, the 
consolidated bank expects to increase the potential revenues that can be obtained from 
any particular relationship and to reduce the average costs of marketing these products. 
Nevertheless, while expansion may provide many, if not all, of these benefits, it may 
also increase the complexity of the organisation, which can raise the costs of 
production and the costs of controlling agency problems. On balance, the existence of 
consolidation benefits is an empirical issue.
A substantial part of the literature deals with deposit insurance and the effect that it has 
on bank decisions. A fundamental finding is that the U.S. system of deposit insurance 
produces an incentive for insured banking firms to take risk. ‘Too big to fail’ banking 
firms receive free insurance on their uninsured deposits and other liabilities. Other 
banking firms do not. This asymmetric treatment is defended on the grounds that 
banking authorities fear the possible macroeconomic consequences of permitting a 
large banking firm to default on its liabilities. The government infuses public money
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into the problematic bank and either operates it under the government management or 
arranges for a ‘short-gun’-wedding merger with the healthier bank. So, in essence, 
attaining a certain size provides a bank with some free insurance and more complete 
coverage than it would get otherwise. The problem with this approach is that it is 
encouraging excessive risk-taking.
Another recent body of literature deals with the economic role of banking firms in 
environments in which agents are asymmetrically informed. This predicts economies 
of scale in intermediation, quite apart from any production efficiency gains. This 
modern intermediation theory supports the view that large intermediary firms will be 
less likely to fail than small ones. The costly monitoring of lenders by borrowers and 
large-scale investment projects imply that there exists increasing return on scale in 
lending and borrowing which can be exploited by financial intermediaries. Here the 
advantage of size is that it means an intermediary can contract with a large number of 
borrowers and lenders. Large numbers are assumed to result in diversification, and that 
has been shown to be valuable even in environments where all agents are risk-neutral. 
Specifically, diversification is valuable because it reduces the cost of contracting 
among asymmetrically informed agents.
Nevertheless, past studies have concluded that scale advantages in U.S. banking are 
exhausted at a fairly low level of output, suggesting that horizontal bank mergers 
would yield little or no cost savings. Clark (1986) provides an excellent survey o f the 
existence of economies of scale in the banking industry. He reports that in thirteen 
studies of the possible existence of economies of scale in banking, only two have 
found significant scale economies with deposits over $100 million. Some evidence 
even suggests diseconomies of scale for the very largest banks. These results explain 
why bank size is constructed in logarithmic form; the scale effect increasing at a 
decreasing rate as the size range of banks increases, so the expected relationship is 
non-linear. Recent U.S. studies find scale economies up to higher levels than the 
previous studies. The effect of technology and deregulation may partly explain these 
results. Wall (1985) found that bank size doesn’t have any significant effect on bank 
profitability.
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Miller and Noulas (1997) concluded that the size measure is significantly negative 
related to the return on assets, implying that larger banks are less profitable. Also, 
Boyd and Runkle (1993) found an inverse relationship between size and the ratio of 
equity to assets and the rate of return on assets. In other words, larger banking firms 
are systematically less profitable in terms of asset returns and highly leveraged.
As a conclusion, different results can generally be explained by different assumptions, 
methodology, or both. Some studies have examined just operating costs, which will 
bias the results in the direction of finding scale economies. The most appropriate 
variable to consider is total costs, including overhead and indirect costs. Other studies 
have taken as size measure individual office size instead of the overall size of the 
banking firm. Such studies also ignore overhead and administrative costs. 
Additionally, the variables measuring the cost of branching may be mispecified.
7.2.2. R isk s
A possibility is that European banks will react to strengthening competitive pressures 
by taking on increasingly risky business. The likelihood of such behaviour will be 
increased if banks focus extensively on the relative size of their portfolios (rather than 
profits) and/or keep low capital ratios, conditions which might in fact apply to a 
number of continental banks. Trading in underlying and derivative instruments also 
offers enormous potential for taking on market risk for those tempted to do so. These 
specific risks generate variability in banks’ cash flows. Excessive risk taking and 
adverse economic conditions are the ingredients for bank failure.
A possible influence on bank performance is the difference in the level of risk taking, 
and especially proclivity to take on risk. Bank managers have considerable control over 
the risk exposure of their banks in their daily portfolio decisions. Studies have 
demonstrated that one impact of managerial control will be a propensity toward 
liquidity and a tendency for more risk averse behaviour than under owner control 
(Elliott, 1972). Bryan’s (1972) study surveys 1,600 medium sized banks throughout the 
US and finds that profitable banks structure their balance sheets on less conservative -
i.e. riskier- lines than do unsuccessful banks [also Heggestad (1977)]. Bourke (1989)
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also added that some banks are profitable because they are engaged in higher levels of 
risk.
Any profit maximisation business, including banking, confronts macroeconomic risks 
(for example, the effect of recession) and microeconomic risks (for example, new 
competitive threat). However, banks also face a number or risks atypical of non- 
financial firms. Improvements in the techniques used to control risks in banking are 
intended to carry a number of potential benefits for banks: less volatile profits, which 
should improve the bank’s standing in the market; lower costs; and greater speed and 
consistency in decision-making.
A risk measure used in Whalen’s study (1988) is the standard deviation of return on 
equity over the examined period. There is some disagreement about the nature of the 
relationship between this variable and profitability. Heggestad (1979) and Clark (1986) 
have argued that the relationship should be positive; others have suggested that it 
should be negative (there is empirical evidence in support of both views). In the latter 
view, greater profit variability implies greater expected costs and associated penalties 
in the bank, resulting in a negative relationship between profit variability and expected 
profit margins.
There are five fundamental risks that are faced by all banks:
1. Credit Risk
2. Liquidity Risk
3. Interest Rate Risk
4. Operational Risk
5. Capital or Solvency Risk
Banks that engage in significant off-balance sheet activity and transactions with 
foreign borrowers also face risk associated with contingent liabilities, foreign 
exchange, sovereign, and political risk. The following analysis focuses on specific 
aspects of each type of risk.
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1.22.1. Credit Risk
The credit risk of a bank is defined as the risk that the interest, or principal, or both, on 
securities and loans will not be paid as promised. In this case we say that the borrower 
will default. Different types of assets have different default probabilities. If the 
agreement is a financial contract between two parties, counterparty risk is the risk that 
the counterparty reneges on the terms of the contract. The term counterparty risk is 
normally used in the context of traded financial instruments, whereas credit risk refers 
to the probability of default on a loan agreement. Because most of the bank’s earning 
assets are in the form of loans, problems with loan quality have been the major cause 
of bank failure.
Credit risk is associated with the quality of assets and the likelihood of default. Serious 
banking problems have arisen from the failure of banks to recognise impaired assets, to 
create reserves for writing-off these assets, and to suspend recognision o f interest 
income when appropriate. It is extremely difficult to assess asset quality because 
limited information are available. Credit risk measures focus predominantly on loan 
experience because loans exhibit the highest default rates. This risk applies not only to 
loans but to other on- and off- balance sheet exposures such as guarantees, 
acceptances, and securities investments. Symptoms of poor loan quality include high 
levels of non-performing loans, loan losses, and examiner-classified loans (i.e. 
substandard, doubtful, and loss). A high proportion of loans relative to total assets and 
rapid growth of the loan portfolio are potential early-warning signals of loan quality 
problems, which may indicate potential failure. In contrast, high performance loans 
tend to have high-quality loan portfolios as characterised by low levels of non- 
performing loans and loan losses.
Analysts frequently cited the over-exposure to commercial real estate, construction and 
land development loans as probable candidates for explaining poor bank performance. 
For Hoggarth et.al. (1999) a possible influence on bank performance is the difference 
in the case of residential and commercial property lending. Commercial real estate and
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construction loans are extremely risky as these types have the highest net charge-offs48. 
Zimmerman’s (1996) results are somehow identical. He found that the number of 
commercial real estate loans is closely driving the asset quality (ratio of loan losses to 
total loans) rather than the earnings performance of the banks. This may be related to 
the lags between the time a loan might become delinquent, when it might be classified 
as a problem loan, when expenses on loan provisions are taken, and when it might 
actually result in a charge against earnings. It also may reflect a bank’s ability to 
charge higher rates on higher-risk loans over the business or real estate cycles. In any 
case mountaining loan losses have decreased the average profitability of banks while 
continued declines in loan-loss provisions are many times the primary catalysts for 
increases in profit margins (see also Miller and Noulas, 1997). So, variations in bank 
profitability are largely attributable to variations in loan loss provisions. This means 
that net income does not vary too much after netting out loan loss provisions.
Gross loan losses (charge-offs) equal the value of loans actually written-off as 
uncollectable during the examined period. Recoveries refer to the amount of loans 
initially charged-off and is repaid. Net charge-offs equal the difference between 
recoveries and gross charge-offs. Analysts also look at a bank’s reserves for loan 
losses. When management expects to charge off large amounts of loans, it will build up 
the reserve base of the financial institution.
In order to measure a bank’s credit risk exposure, four ratios can be used:
• Loan loss reserves/total loans
• Provision for loan losses/total loans49
• Charge-offs/total loans
• Net income before loan loss provisions and taxes/Provision for loan losses
48 At this point, it must be noted that the Basle framework distributes real estate and commercial 
property to the highest (100%) risk-weighted measure.
49 The relationship between the loan loss provision, which is an income statement item, and the 
loan loss reserves, which is a balance sheet item, can be seen as follows: Beginning Loan Loss 
Reserves + Loan Loss Provisions -  Actual Charge-offs = Ending Loan Loss Reserves.
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1.2.12. Liquidity Risk
Banks need liquidity for two reasons: (i) to meet deposit withdrawals, and (ii) to fund 
customer loan demand. Bank liquidity can be stored in the balance sheet by holding 
liquid assets. Liquidity risk arises from the inability o f a bank to accommodate 
decreases in liabilities or to fund increases in assets. It is the variation in net income 
and market value of equity caused by a bank’s difficulty in obtaining cash at 
reasonable cost from either the sale of assets or new borrowings. The problem arises 
because of a shortage of liquid assets or because the bank is unable to raise cash on the 
retail and wholesale markets. Liquidity risk is greater when a bank cannot anticipate 
new loan demand or experience deposit withdrawals and does not have access to new 
sources of cash. Liquidity is generally discussed in terms of assets, with reference to an 
owner’s ability to convert the asset to cash with minimum loss from price depreciation. 
Most banks hold some assets that can be readily sold near par to meet liquidity needs.
The level of liquidity and reserve requirements may impact on bank profitability, 
because liquidity holdings represent an expense for banks. Although, conflicting 
results appear in the case of testing for this relationship, Molyneux and Thornton 
(1992), and Abdula (1994), find a negative relationship between bank profitability and 
the level of liquid assets being hold. Bourke (1989) finds the opposite result. It must be 
noted that banks at some countries (e.g. Germany) maintain “hidden reserves” which 
they use to smooth provisions and earnings from year to year.
The loans to deposit ratio is a traditional measure of bank liquidity, indicating the 
extent to which deposits are used to meet loan requests. The lower this ratio is, the 
more “stored” liquidity a bank has. The ratio of loans to total assets is another measure 
of bank liquidity. Since loans are difficult to trade in a secondary market, they are the 
least liquid assets, after fixed assets, in a bank’s balance sheet. Hence, a high ratio of 
net loans to total assets indicate a bank that is relative illiquid, whereas a low ratio 
indicates a liquid bank with excess lending capacity. Finally, the liquid assets to 
deposits ratio indicates the cash and near cash funds as a proportion of total deposits. It 
shows the proportion of funds available to meet the deposits’ withdrawals.
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7.2.2.3. Interest Rate Risk
Interest rate risk arises from interest rate mismatches in both the volume and maturity 
of interest-sensitive assets, liabilities, and off-balance sheet items. It refers to the 
potential variability in a bank’s net interest income and market value of equity due to 
changes in the level of market interest rates. For example, the removal of rate ceilings 
forced banks to pay market rates on an increased portion of their liabilities. This 
increased the sensitivity of interest expense to changes in interest rates and, in turn, 
increased the likelihood of lower net interest income and firm value because o f rising 
rates. The traditional focus of an asset-liability management group within a bank is the 
management of interest rate risk.
The primary focus of interest rate risk to which banks are typically exposed are: (i) 
repricing risk, which arises from timing differences in the maturity (for fixed rate) and 
repricing (for floating rate) of bank assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet positions; 
(ii) yield curve risk, which arises from changes in the slope and shape of the yield 
curve; (iii) basis risk, which arises from imperfect correlation in the adjustment of the 
rates earned and paid on different instruments with otherwise similar repricing 
characteristics; and (iv) optionality, which arises from the implied options imbedded in 
many bank assets, liabilities, and off-balance sheet portfolios.
A bank’s exposure to interest rate risk can be measured in two ways: funds gap or 
maturity gap measurement, and duration analysis. Gap analysis compares the 
sensitivity of interest income to changes in asset yields with the sensitivity of interest 
expense to changes in interest costs of liabilities. The purpose is to determine how 
much net interest income will vary with movements in market interest rates (see also 
Chapter 5). Duration analysis provides us the appropriate information concerning asset 
and liability durations. When asset and liability durations are matched, general interest 
rate movements should have roughly the same effects on the values of the firm’s assets 
and liabilities. Duration gap is a measure of the mismatch of asset and liability 
durations and, theoretically at least, provides an index of the interest rate exposure of 
portfolio net worth.
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1.2.1A. Operational Risk
Operational risk is the risk associated with losses arising from fraud or unexpected 
expenses. Some banks are relatively inefficient in controlling direct costs and 
employee processing errors. A bank’s operational risk is thus closely relating to its 
burden, number of divisions or subsidiaries, and number of employees. Operating 
efficiency refers to the cost efficiency of the bank’s activities. Typical ratios focus on 
total assets per employee or total personnel expenses per employee. There is no 
meaningful way to estimate the likelihood of fraud or other contingencies from 
published data across the European banks.
7.2.2.S. Capital Risk
Capital risk represents the possibility that a bank may become insolvent. A firm is 
technically insolvent when it has negative net worth on stockholders’ equity. Capital 
risk is closely associated with financial leverage, which refers to the use of debt and 
preferred stock that pay fixed rates as part of a firm’s capital structure. If all banks 
have relatively the same rate of return on assets, then those banks with the highest 
leverage will have the highest return on equity. The whole literature review on bank 
capital adequacy supports that banks want to maximise leverage in order to maximise 
profits. High amounts of fixed-rate sources of funds increase the expected volatility of 
a firm’s income because interest payments are mandatory.
Traditional measures of this kind of risk include the equity to total assets and the 
equity to deposits ratios. Equity operates as a buffer or cushion against unexpected 
losses. The ratio o f equity to loans indicates the percentage of loans financed by 
equity. The higher the ratio, the higher the ability to absorb credit risk.
Capital ratios, i.e. capital including reserves as percentage of total assets is expected to 
be positively related to profitability because capital represents a “free” resource. Revell 
(1980) noted an inverse relationship between capital ratios and cost of intermediation. 
Moreover, Bourke (1989) stated that "it is possible to speculate that well capitilised 
banks enjoy access to cheaper (because less risky) sources o f  funds or that the
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prudence implied by high capital ratios is maintained in the loan portfolio with 
consequent improvement in profit rates”. Studies by Bourke (1989), and Molyneux and 
Thornton (1992), using asset-based returns, showed a positive relationship between 
capital ratios and profitability. On the other hand, Berger (1995) noted that in banking, 
a higher capital-asset ratio is associated with a lower after-tax return on equity and 
therefore lowers the equilibrium expected return on equity required by investors. 
However, after examining data on U.S. banks in the mid-to-late 1980s, he found a both 
statistically and economically significant positive relationship between book values of 
capital-asset ratio and ROE.
7.2.3. O ther is s u e s
Arshadi and Lawrence (1987) looked at the performance of newly chartered banks in 
the USA. Fourteen endogenous and exogenous variables were selected to identify the 
external and internal factors influencing bank performance for 438 three-year-old and 
five-year-old banks chartered between 1977 and 1979. The authors concluded that the 
performance of the new banks, firs t and foremost', is a function of endogenous factors 
under the control of bank management. The success or failure of a new institution can 
be largely attributed to its organisers’ ability to attract new deposits. Containment of 
operating costs and deposit growth are two major considerations that are internally 
influenced by management’s policies (‘quality of management’). Other elements such 
as decisions about the composition of the loan portfolios, the credit standards, and the 
loan and deposit rates, clearly impact upon the performance of newly chartered banks. 
The structural variables and demand factors (demographics and effective income) are 
not by themselves critical determinants of performance.
Exogenous variables such as growth of family income, population per bamk branch 
and the number of branch offices in the trade area play an important role in 
determining the deposit growth of new banks. DeYoung and Hassan (1998) found that 
profit efficiency improves rapidly at the typical de novo bank during its first three 
years of operation, but on average it takes about nine years to reach established bank 
levels. They also identified a number of economic, regulatory, structural, and financial 
conditions associated with the de novo bank profitability levels.
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Simultaneously, the entry of a new bank has implications on some aspects of the 
performance of existing banks e.g. changes in the nature of banking services offered to 
the local community by the established banks (modification in the composition of 
assets and liabilities). Theory suggests that when the number of banks in the market is 
small, the impact of the de novo entry is likely to be more pronounced and most easily 
observed. The argument is that the chartering of new banks tend to reduce the profits 
of local banking institutions. At the same time a potentially important impact of bank 
entry performance may occur through the rate of growth of the established banks, thus 
affecting the future viability of these institutions. In particular, in the absence o f an 
increase in the rate at which an area generates deposits, the entry of a new bank would 
force previously existing institutions to share the growth potential of the communities 
with new banks.
However, Fraser and Rose (1972) did not find any adverse impact of this entry upon 
the profitability of existing banks. New banks are formed because existing banks are 
inefficient and/or too conservative. Banks, in markets where new banks entered, tended 
to have higher staff operating costs (or higher ratios of salaries and wages-to-total 
operating earnings) than the norm, and these costs returned to normal subsequent to 
entry. The force for new competition appeared to result in competing banks that better 
served their communities and, at the same time, provided at least a normal rate of 
return on capital to their shareholders. The main limitation of this study is that it 
doesn’t examine the impact of the de novo entry on the service dimensions of 
performance in banking -the quality and convenience of banking services provided to 
the local community.
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7.3. External Determinants
External determinants of bank profitability are concerned with those factors which are 
not influenced by specific bank’s decisions and policies, but by events outside the 
influence of the bank. Many differences between banks result from the different 
environments in which they operate instead of explicitly different management 
policies. The key external factors shaping the earnings performance of a financial 
institution include changes in the technology of service delivery, competition from 
bank and non-bank institutions, laws and regulations applying to financial institutions, 
government policies affecting the economy and financial system etc. Management 
cannot control these external factors. The most it can do is to anticipate future changes 
and try to position the institution (especially the composition of its assets and 
liabilities) to take advantage of expected developments. Several external determinants 
are included separately in the performance examination to isolate their influence from 
that of bank structure so the impact of the formers on profitability may be more clearly 
discerned.
7.3.1. Concentration  a nd  Market Share
A  substantial amount of effort has been devoted to the determination of the relationship 
between banking structure and performance. Many studies in the banking literature 
and in the more general industrial organisation find a positive relationship between 
profitability and measures o f market structure -  either concentration or market share. 
On first blush, this may suggest that the current wave of merger activity in the banking 
industry is motivated by the prospective benefits from greater market power created by 
increasing the concentration or market shares of the merging firms. The bulk of the 
studies examining bank performance and market concentration have been on U.S. 
banking markets. In contrast to the national markets used in industrial studies, banking 
markets that are used in these studies are generally local markets which service 
individuals and small businesses.
Two competing hypotheses with regard to market structure and performance are the 
traditional structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis and the efficiency- 
structure (EFS) hypothesis.
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7.3.I.I. Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) Hypothesis
The structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis is a general statement on the 
determinants of market performance. There is a well-defined linkage between 
structure, conduct, and performance. Market structure is determined by the interaction 
of cost (supply) and demand in a particular industry. The conduct or rivalty in a market 
is determined by market structure conditions, especially the number and the size 
distribution of firms entry conditions. This rivalty process results in unique price 
levels, advertising profits, and other aspects of market performance. Performance will 
depend on pricing behaviour.
In banking, the SCP model has been used extensively to analyse the state of the 
banking market in a given country. This relationship in banking markets, as noted by 
Gilbert (1984), “...was initiated in the 1960s, when the federal bank regulatory 
agencies began responding to new legal requirement concerning the effects o f  bank 
mergers on competition”. These studies applied the framework available at the time 
from the field of industrial organisation: the market structure-performance framework. 
The studies are industry based, and lack any explicit model for the banking firm. 
Hannan (1991) tried to rectify this deficiency by developing a theoretical model of the 
banking firm, from which the SCP relationship can be derived. He included the 
relationships between market structure on one hand and bank loan rates, bank deposit 
rates, and bank profit rates on the other. He finds that the positive relationship between 
the return on assets and concentration estimated in the empirical literature review 
reflects the summation of the effects of concentration on the profits attributable to each 
of the bank’s activities (divided by total assets), plus a positive term reflecting the fact 
that increments in concentration also serve to reduce bank assets. Estimations of the 
relationship should also include measures of the capital-asset ratio and the ratio of 
fixed costs to total assets and, most importantly, should attempt to account for the fact 
that some banks are more heavily involved in activities likely to be affected by local 
market concentration than the others.
This method has also been used by international studies of bank performance. 
However, the extent of this kind of analysis is limited. Short (1979), Bourke (1989), 
and Molyneux and Thornton (1992) are using several independent variables related to
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characteristics both internal and external to bank’s operations, in order to explain bank 
profitability either at an international or European level. For example, Bourke (1989), 
in the context of an international comparison of banks’ profitability, devote a part of it 
to apply the methodology to a sample of seventeen French banks over the period 1972
The traditional structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis, asserts that banks are 
able to extract monopolistic rents in concentrated markets by their ability to offer lower 
deposit rates and charge higher loan rates. This finding reflects the setting of prices less 
favourable to consumers in more concentrated markets as a result of collusion or other 
forms o f non-competitive behaviour. The more concentrated the market, the less the 
degree of competition. The smaller the number of firms and the more concentrated the 
market structure, the greater is the probability that firms in the market will achieve a 
joint price-output configuration that approaches the monopolistic solution. Empirically, 
the SCP relationship is usually tested by examining the relationship between 
profitability and market concentration with a positive relationship indicating non­
competitive behaviour in concentrated markets.
A related theory is the relative-market-power hypothesis (RMP) which asserts that 
only firms with large market shares and well-differentiated products are able to 
exercise market power in pricing these products and earn supernormal profits (Berger, 
1995).
Various studies support the above arguments; papers presented by Years (1974), 
Rhoades (1977), Honohan and Kinsella (1982), Rhoades and Rutz (1982), Bourke 
(1989), Hannan (1991), Lloyd-Williams, Molyneux, and Thornton (1994), and Abdula 
(1994) are the most notable of the traditional SCP studies. Rhoades, for example, in his 
survey of 39 studies from the 1961-77, determined that 30 of these studies had been 
successful in finding support for the basic validity of the SCP hypothesis. Molyneux 
and Forbes (1993) tested the SCP hypothesis using annual pooled European banking 
data for the period 1986-1989. The main finding was a significantly positive 
concentration ratio. The authors concluded that the SCP hypothesis is supported by this
to 1981.
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European banking sample. Lloyd-Williams et.al. (1994) also find support for the SCP 
hypothesis in the case of Spanish banks for the period 1986-1988. Yeats’ (1974) key 
finding is that the structure-performance relation in banking may best be characterised 
by a dichotomous relationship. If this in fact occurs, banks which operate in market 
above some critical level of concentration earn monopoly profits while those in 
markets below the breakpoint earn competitive or near competitive profits. Finally, the 
pooled country estimates reported in Molyneux’s (1993) paper indicate that, over the 
period 1986 to 1989, collusive profits occur in the Belgian, French, Italian, Dutch and 
Spanish banking markets. His estimates also imply that collusive profits do not appear 
to accrue in non-EC banking markets.
7.3.I.2. Efficient-Structure (EFS) Hypothesis
A challenge to this interpretation is the efficient-structure (EFS) hypothesis posited by 
Demsetz (1973), Peltzman (1977) [see Gilbert’s paper (1984)] and others. Market 
concentration is not a random event but rather the result in industries where some firms 
possess superior efficiency. This hypothesis states that efficient firms increase in size 
and market share because of their ability to generate higher profits, which usually leads 
to higher market concentration. In principle, firms in markets with a large dispersion of 
efficiencies could be either more or less efficient on average than firms in other 
markets. However, proponents o f the EFS hypothesis usually assume (explicitly or 
implicitly) that the dispersion of efficiencies within markets that creates high levels of 
concentration also results in greater than average efficiency in these markets, yielding a 
positive profit-concentration relationship. In effect, it is maintained that higher than 
average concentration is more often due to the high market shares of firms that are 
efficient than to the low market shares of firms that are inefficient. Otherwise, profits 
and concentration would not be positively related (Berger and Hannan, 1988).
Thus, the traditional SCP hypothesis and the usual form of the EFS hypothesis imply 
an observationally equivalent positive relationship between concentration and profits, 
but differ as to the structural model creating it. Essentially, the SCP hypothesis takes 
concentration as exogenous and maintains that high concentration allows for non­
competitive behaviour that results in less favourable prices to consumers and higher 
profits to firms. The usual form of the EFS hypothesis, however, takes firm-specific
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efficiencies as exogenous and maintains that these efficiencies result in both more 
concentrated markets and higher profits. These different explanations of variances in 
profitability levels among banks -market power versus efficiency- have directly 
opposing implications for antitrust policy. If high profits are created by market power, 
then antitrust actions are likely to be socially beneficial, moving prices toward 
competitive levels and allocating resources more effectively. However, if high 
efficiency is the explanation of high profits, then breaking up efficient firms that have 
gained large market shares or disallowing efficient firms to acquire other firms is likely 
to raise costs and may lead to prices less favourable to consumers. Regulatory agencies 
have typically followed the market-power paradigm in their antitrust policies. The 
issue is very important today because the Second Banking Directive allows banks 
chartered in one country to open branches in other EC countries. The nature of the 
structure-performance relationship must be uncovered in order the EC and European 
governments to determine whether to strengthen or weaken existing antitrust laws. If 
the SCP hypothesis is supported for European banking, then regulators may have to be 
more cautious in approving cross-border mergers, especially among the large banks. 
On the other hand, if the alternative EFS hypothesis is supported, no application of 
antitrust measures is required.
To distinguish between the two hypotheses, past researchers have included market 
share as an independent variable, with a positive coefficient usually supporting the 
EFS hypothesis (Smirlock, 1985). However, this conclusion depends on whether 
market share can be considered as a proxy for efficiency of larger firms rather than as a 
measure of market power. An obvious solution to this problem is to include a measure 
of efficiency directly in the model. A necessary condition for the EFS hypothesis to be 
true is that efficiency must be positively related to concentration and/or market share. 
Only recently, some authors [Berger and Hannan (1993), Goldberg and Rai (1996)] 
have tried to examine the implications of the EFS hypothesis regarding the effects of 
efficiency on market structure. Berger and Hannan (1993), and Berger (1995) 
formulated models that included two measures of efficiency, X-efficiency and scale- 
efficiency, to test the structure-performance relationship. The positive relationship 
between profits and concentration is explained by lower costs achieved through either 
superior management or production processes. An advantage of this model is that by
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testing the relationship between performance and efficiency directly, the relationship 
between performance and concentration has a clear-cut interpretation.
Under the X-efficiency version of the efficient-structure hypothesis (ESX), firms with 
superior management or production technologies have lower costs. In this case the 
banks may have higher quality products, enabling them to charge higher prices and 
earn higher profits. Under the scale-efficiency version (ESS), firms have essentially 
equally good management and technology, but some firms simply produce at more 
efficient scales than others, and therefore have lower unit costs and higher unit profits. 
In both cases, these firms are assumed to have larger market shares that may result in 
higher levels of concentration, again yielding a positive profit-structure relationship as 
a spurious outcome.
Evidence supporting the EFS hypothesis have been found for studies of the US 
banking system [Brozen (1982), Smirlock (1985), Evanoff and Fortier (1988)]. 
Ravenscraft (1983) found a positive profit-market share relationship. This may reflects 
higher product quality and lower unit costs in relatively large business units. Smirlock 
(1985) models bank profitability as a function of market share, concentration, and an 
interaction term between market share and concentration (as well as several control 
variables) for over 2,700 unit state banks. He finds that market share is positively 
related to profitability, and concludes that this provides evidence in favour of the EFS 
hypothesis. Once this link is controlled for, there is no discernible positive relationship 
between concentration and profitability. This study is limited to unit states banks, and 
generalisation to branching state banks may not be appropriate. Berger’s (1995) 
findings indicate some limited support for the X-efflciency version of the EFS 
hypothesis and for the relative market power hypothesis, where no support is found for 
both the scale-efficiency version of the EFS hypothesis and the traditional SCP 
hypothesis. Finally, Peristiani (1997) shows that acquiring banks achieve moderate 
improvements in scale efficiency. This moderate rise in scale efficiency may partly be 
attributed to the fact that smaller target markets are on average less scale-efficient than 
their acquirers.
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7.3.I.3. Hypotheses* Weaknesses
Generally speaking, the banking studies have not found a positive relationship as 
consistently as has been found in the inter-industry studies. Gilbert (1984), in a survey 
article, find thirty-two out of forty-four studies have produced some evidence of 
significant association between market structure and measures of performance, with 
the direction of influence as indicated by the structure-performance hypothesis. In 
seven o f those thirty-two studies the coefficients on measures o f market structure are 
not statistically significant in most of the reported equations [Fraser and Rose (1971, 
1972), Heggestad and Mingo (1976), Wall (1985), Whalen (1985), Gup and Walter 
(1989)]. In two papers Vernon (1971) and Whitehead (1978) [see Gilbert’s paper 
(1984)], the coefficients on market concentration are significant but have signs that are 
opposite from those indicated by the traditional SCP hypothesis theory. Moore (1998) 
casts doubt on the notion that concentration in banking markets continues to affect the 
terms that consumers of banking services receive and thus the banking profitability. 
The finding that a market’s profitability is no longer tied to its concentration is 
consistent with the argument that geographic distance is becoming less relevant in 
banking. Rhoades and Rutz (1981) have found a significant negative relationship 
between concentration and firm rank stability (which is itself a proxy for competitive 
behaviour and is measured by mobility -the rank changes that take place among the 
market leaders- and turnover) for U.S. banking markets. They also found no significant 
relationship between concentration and market share in these markets. Osborne and 
Wendel (1983) in a detailed critique of the literature, argue that “...it contains so many 
inconsistencies as to provide no evidence o f  a positive association between 
concentration and performance in banking”. Schuster’s (1984) regression analysis did 
not show a significant correlation between profitability and market share of banks, at 
least not in Switzerland, West Germany and New York. This makes him to conclude 
that “...concentration in the banking sector is not inevitable and that credit institutions 
need not be less profitable or even fear for their survival or independence just because 
they have a smaller market share than their competitors”.
Extent banking literature has suggested that the quantitative weakness of the 
concentration-profitability relationship is due to concentration permitting managers to 
behave in a manner inconsistent with profit maximisation. For example, banks might
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spend resources on lobbying efforts to limit the number o f new bank entries or to 
preserve geographic restrictions on branching in order to maintain barriers to entry and 
impediments to competition. Such expenditures would rise costs and reduce measured 
cost efficiency, although profits might be higher as a result. Also, market power may 
allow managerial incompetence to persist without any willful shrinking of work effort, 
pursuit of other goals, or efforts to defend or obtain market power. Some studies test 
the hypothesis that banks with market power hold less risky assets than those in 
markets with lower concentration (risk avoidance behaviour). Banks are trading off 
higher profits for less risk. Other studies test the hypothesis that banks in more highly 
concentrated markets have higher expenses than those with similar characteristics in 
less concentrated markets (expense preference behaviour).
7.3.1.3.1. Additional Problems
A serious problem has been the interpretation o f  the positive relationship between 
profitability and concentration (when it can be found) and whether it supports the SCP 
or EFS hypotheses. Several methods have been proposed to resolve this issue. Berger 
and Hannan (1988) [also Hannan (1991)] try to provide a cleaner test by using price 
data rather than profit data as the dependent variable. Since the SCP hypothesis implies 
that consumers will be treated less favourable in more concentrated markets, they 
examine whether retail deposit rates (six rates have been used and among them CD 
rates) are negatively related to market concentration. By examining the price- 
concentration relationship, this paper tests the structure-performance hypothesis as an 
alternative explanation of the results. The results strongly support the traditional SCP 
hypothesis and are robust with respect to model specification, measurement of 
concentration, and econometric technique. Even though they question the 
appropriateness of including market share in their model because of its endogeneity, 
market share does have a positive coefficient when included in the model. The authors 
say that this result may be due to firms providing different levels of quality of service 
or offering higher deposit rates, allowing banks to increase their market share. 
However, the coefficient of concentration still remains negative. A linear regression 
over the entire sample did produce a significant relationship between price and market 
share using retail deposit rates, sub-samples regressions did not. Only for the lowest
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concentration sub-sample does he find the negative relationship between deposit rates 
and profitability needed to validate the traditional SCP hypothesis.
Berger and Hannan (1992) found that the relationship varies for different concentration 
levels and for different time periods. They conclude that the price-concentration 
relationship is negative for some ranges of concentration levels, though it does vary 
across time periods. At high concentration levels, it turns positive.
Kaufman (1965) notes that market structure and performance may not be related 
linearly. It may reasonably be expected that the impact of a change in structure on 
performance becomes greater the closer structure approaches total concentration. As he 
notes “a deduction in the number o f  banks from two to one, fo r  example, may have 
greater impact on performance than a reduction from, say, twelve to eleven”. 
Simultaneously, Clark (1986) notes that the failure to identify a more consistently 
strong, positive, and statistically significant direct relationship between market 
concentration and commercial bank profitability may be due in part to problems with 
the methodology employed.
The estimation of a structural equation with the application of ordinary least squares 
(OLS) on bank profitability may result in biased and inconsistent estimates of the 
structural parameters. Such studies ignore the statistical difficulties associated with the 
interdependence among the variables and the disturbances in the equations. The 
problem of including a market share variable along with a measure of market 
concentration in a regression model is that the two variables tend to be highly, 
positively correlated. A methodological problem is that unlike in the U.S., sub-market 
banking data were not publicly available in many European countries. Only one 
concentration measure is available for any one year in each European country.
Various studies, such as those undertaken by Short (1979) and Bourke (1989), have 
examined the relationship between bank profitability and concentration across different 
countries which has enabled them to avoid this problem. These studies, however, tell 
us little about the SCP relationship in individual countries. Yet another group of
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researchers argue that the concentration/collusion hypothesis is unreasonable because it 
embodies two questionable implicit assumption. The first is that technological 
conditions, regulation, or other barriers to entry allow colluding firms in concentrated 
markets to disregard potential competitors. The second is that creating and enforcing 
tacit collusive agreements is relatively easy. For a collusive agreement to be stable, 
participating firms must institute some mechanism to set and adjust price(s) and 
allocate market shares. This is not a trivial exercise, particularly for banks, which are 
multiproduct firms selling complex, heterogeneous products and services in a number 
of different geographic markets.
Finally, the role of bank regulation tended to be neglected. Only a few of the bank 
market structure studies mention the level of market interest rates relative to these 
ceiling interest rates on deposits and loans as a criterion of choosing the timing of 
observations, and many of the studies do not mention the effects of regulations in 
interpreting the results. The point here is that there may be strong interactive effects 
between regulation and other variables which could have a significant impact on 
market concentration and performance. For example, interest rate ceilings and high 
entry barriers facilitate market collusion with the result that even markets with low 
concentration may exhibit collusive behaviour. While different regulatory regimes may 
lead to different relationships between structure and performance, it remains likely that 
market structure will impact on performance.
7.3.1.3.2. Risk Avoidance Behaviour
Edwards and Heggestad (1973), Heggestad and Mingo (1976), and Rhoades and Rutz 
(1982) have suggested that market power experienced by banking corporations may be 
translated into risk avoidance (it is measured as the ratio of the variance of profits to 
expected profits) through the creation of a ‘low risk’ loan portfolio (they found a 
statistically significant inverse relationship between a firm’s market power and its ratio 
of profit variability to profit level) rather than being reflected in higher profits. This is 
based on the Galbraith-Caves Hypothesis: uncertainty avoidance by large firms varies 
directly with the degree of market power that these firms possess. As Caves notes: "... 
he [Galbraith] has touched upon an important and oft-ignored aspect o f  the large 
firm 's behaviour: that a significant portion o f the potential profits latent in its position
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o f market power is taken in the form o f avoiding uncertainty, with important allocative 
effects on the economy” (Edwards and Heggestad, 1973).
First, large firms more frequently occupy positions of greater market power so that 
they have the option of trading off excess profits for an increased amount of the ‘quiet 
life’. ‘Quiet life’ is synonymous with less risk. Second, large firms may be run by more 
risk-averse managers, since managerial personnel may distribute themselves between 
large and small firms on the basis of their differing marginal rates of substitution 
between the level of returns and risk. Implicit in this argument is the assumption that 
the management of large firms are insulated from the kind of stockholder pressure that 
would prevent them from pursuing objectives other than the maximisation of the value 
of the firm.
Thus, this explanation is based upon two very different notions. On the one hand, it is 
postulated that managerial personnel have different utility functions. Managers of large 
firms are more risk-averse. On the other hand, it is contended that large firms have 
market power and are therefore located on an “opportunity set”, which allows them 
greater freedom to trade off profits for less risk. Although these explanations are 
entirely different in substance, they cannot in practice be neatly separated and 
distinguished. In fact, the logic underlying them requires their interrelationship. It is 
precisely because large firms (with market power) are on a preferred opportunity set 
that more risk-averse managers will gravitate towards them. The greater the monopoly 
power possessed by a firm, the more attractive that firm should be to risk-averse 
managers. Thus, if uncertainty-avoidance behaviour is characteristic of large firms, it is 
likely to be the result of both the above explanations working in tandem. In other 
words, the degree of firm uncertainty falls significantly as the level of concentration in 
the respective bank’s market increases. Therefore, banks with monopoly power operate 
under conditions of less risk than their counterparts in more competitive markets.
The implications o f these findings for the structure-profitability relationship is clear. 
Part of potential profits inherent in monopoly power are being taken in the form of 
reduced risk. These secure profits are preferred to the riskier profits earned by more
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competitive firms. This, in practise, is difficult to be evaluated because it is also 
unclear what provides the underlying mechanism for any risk avoidance to occur. 
Influences other than risk affect the variance of bank profits, such as the timing of 
recognising loan losses and capital gains or losses on securities. More direct indicators 
of the risks assumed by banks can be derived by examining the composition of assets 
held by banks. Mingo (1975) tests the hypothesis, but does find that banks in areas 
with relatively high market concentration hold relatively high percentages of their 
assets in commercial and industrial loans. These results appear to be inconsistent with 
the hypothesis that banks in more highly concentrated markets hold less risky assets.
7.3.1.3.3. Expense-Preference Behaviour
Edwards (1977) in his study of expense-preference behaviour in banking, suggests that 
managers of regulated firms may be utility maximisers rather than profit maximisers. 
Banks in market areas with higher concentration use their market power to engage in 
expense preference behaviour, rather than report relatively high profit rates. He finds 
that banks in areas with relatively high concentration have more employees than other 
banks.
However, for Berger and Hannan (1998), the high levels of market concentration allow 
firms to charge prices in excess of competitive levels, and managers take part o f the 
benefits of the higher prices not as higher profits, but in the form of ‘quiet life’ 
(another definition of this term), in which they do not work so hard to keep costs under 
control. So banks in concentrated markets may take advantage of market power in 
pricing, but much of the benefit of this power may be manifested as higher costs rather 
than as higher profits. Smirlock, Gilligan and Marchall (1984) argue that it is the size 
of a bank, not the structure of its market, that is more important in creating 
opportunities for its managers to engage in expense preference behaviour. They find 
that if the type of equations estimated by Edwards (1977) control for bank size, there is 
no evidence o f a relation between market concentration and expense preference 
behaviour by bank managers. Thus, the evidence that banks in highly concentrated 
markets pursue objectives other than profit maximisation is weak or non-existent. His 
findings, also, indicate that expense-preference behaviour better explains the
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performance of regulated firms than does in a profit-maximising framework. Bourke 
(1989), also, noted that: “...in concentrated or regulated markets, reported net income 
may not be an accurate measure o f the earning power o f  the firm because potential net 
profit may be appropriated as payroll expenses or other non-interest expenses...this 
difficulty may be overcome by use o f a ‘value added’ concept."
7.3.2. Regu lation
Historically, commercial banks have been the most heavily regulated companies. 
Regulations took many forms, including maximum interest rates that could be paid on 
deposits or charged on loans, minimum capital-to-asset ratios, minimum legal reserve 
requirements, limited geographic markets for full-service banking, constraints on the 
type of investments permitted, and restrictions on the range of products and services 
offered. Prior to the 1970s, most major countries of the world had protective and 
restrictive branching regulations. Interest rates paid on deposits were fixed or capped, 
and the division between banking and securities-related activities was fairly strict or at 
least limited.
Nowadays among the fundamental forces of change that affect the structure of banking 
-the others are innovation, securitisation, and globalisation- is the deregulation of the 
financial services. Deregulation is the process of eliminating existing regulations. This 
term is often confused with re-regulation, which is the process of implementing new 
restrictions on existing controls on individuals and activities associated with banking. 
Re-regulation arises in response to market participants’ efforts to circumvent existing 
regulations. Efforts at deregulation and re-regulation generally address either pricing 
issues, allowable geographic market penetration, or the ability to offer new products 
and services. Generally, they have introduced several changes in the banking decision­
making process related to the allocation of funding resources. Jayaratne and Strahan 
(1998) find that operating costs and loan losses decrease sharply after states permit 
statewide branching and, to a lesser extent, interstate banking. The improvements 
following branching deregulation appear to occur because better banks grow at the 
expense of their less efficient rivals.
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Many authors argue that bank activities need to be regulated in order to produce a 
finite and relatively predictable money supply. In particular it has been argued that an 
unregulated and competitive banking system would have a tendency to overproduce 
inside money, with resulting problems for financial and commercial sector stability. 
Consonant with this body of monetary theory, Saunders and Yourougou (1990) have 
found that the micro bank regulation approach to monetary policy has created a 
banking system that is less stable and exposed to a higher degree of systematic interest 
rate risk that would exist in a less restricted banking system.
Changing regulations is a key environmental factor in understanding performance. 
First, deregulation allows the fragmentation and reshaping of the industry, while 
technology facilitates this movement. There is empirical evidence that deregulation 
reduced the number of banks and banking companies while increasing their size. 
Emery (1971), Jordan (1972), Tucillo (1973), and Edwards (1977) have examined the 
effects of regulation on banks’ profitability. However, the direction of this impact is 
unclear. It is not possible to determine from the literature whether changes in the 
intensity of regulation strengthen or weaken the performance. Bourke (1989) noted that 
theory is dubious about the likely impact of regulation on bank profitability. For 
instance, contestable market theory50, and indeed regulation theory in general, point the 
importance of entry barriers in enhancing profitability, while some other regulatory 
interventions may depress profitability. For example, entry restrictions are supported as 
being necessary for the prevention of ruinous competition, unsafe and unsound 
banking practices, and bank failures. On the other hand, restrictions on branching have 
historically limited the geographic scope of bank operations, and these surely represent 
an important reason why American banks were unusually vulnerable to localised 
economic distress.
50 A contestable market is one in which existing firms are vulnerable to “hit and run” entry. For 
this type of market to exist, sunk costs must be largely absent. In the banking industry, some 
experts argue that most o f the costs are fixed but not sunk, making it contestable (see Whalen, 
1988). That is, firms can “hit and run” in banking markets by entering the market if incumbent 
firms are exhibiting price-making behaviour, hit the market and capture market share with 
lower prices, and then, because most of their costs are not sunk, exit the market when increased 
competition narrows profit margins. There are important policy implications if a market is 
found to be contestable.
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Evanoff and Fortier (1988) found that entry barriers help the traditional SCP paradigm 
to hold and market structure influence profits positively only in markets with high 
entry barriers. Edwards (1977) in his article on expense preference behaviour proposes 
that one of the regulation effects is to take profits away from the ‘bottom line’. 
Differences in the capital ratio could also be used as a proxy for regulation on the basis 
that the market could equalise capital ratios for banks of the magnitude and stature of 
the financial institutions in the sample. However, this requires that market-derived cost 
of capital figures be first obtained and excess costs of capital be computed for banks in 
each country.
Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) shows that bank performance improves significantly after 
restrictions on bank expansion are lifted. They found that operating costs and loan 
losses decrease sharply after states permit statewide branching, and -to a lesser extent- 
after states allow interstate banking. The improvements following branching 
deregulation appear to occur because better banks grow at the expense of their less 
efficient rivals. The improvements in loan losses, along with the declines in operating 
costs, suggest that banks are, on average, operating more efficiently following 
deregulation. The estimated improvements are economically, as well as, statistically 
large. Reduced loan losses in the banking system following branch deregulation may 
have implications beyond increased profits to banks and decreased loan rates to bank 
borrowers. To the extent that loan losses decrease because banks improve their 
monitoring and screening of their borrowers (they have shown that loan losses did not 
shrink because banks made safer loans after deregulation), branch deregulation may 
have helped improving the quality of bank intermediation.
The empirical problems of examining the consequences o f changes in regulation, 
however, daunting as regulation is not readily susceptible of comparative 
measurement. Bourke (1989) after examining several approaches concluded that the 
most promising one was a Delphi/Juty of Expert Opinion ranking of the intensivity of 
regulation on a limited scale. Even in this case, while it may be possible to locate 
experts who are familiar enough with regulation in each of the sample countries to
Christos Staikouras 188
Determinants o f  Bank Profitability - Literature Review
LaJ Ul'
provide a comparative ranking for a particular year, it is proved impossible to do this in 
a time series study extending over ten years.
The issues of regulation, competitive behaviour and concentration are related because 
the source of the correlation between profitability and concentration may be a 
correlation between concentration and regulatory protection, and regulatory protection 
with profitability. Superimposed on the banking industry is a complex system of 
prudential regulation e.g. state and federal regulations in U.S. that have the effect of 
moderating competition between banks. If research proves that banks earn monopoly 
profits, a prime objective of regulatory policy would be to insure against any increase 
in markets’ concentration just below the critical level and to prevent any further 
increases in the highly concentrated markets. In the structure-conduct-performance 
(SCP) literature, Gilbert (1984) stated that “...eliminating entry regulation would tend 
to weaken the structure - performance relationship in banking markets".
7.3.3. G overnm ent O w nersh ip
Various studies have found that ownership characteristics may influence bank 
profitability. This is based on the view that management incentives differ under 
different forms of bank ownership. For example, Short (1979) found an inverse 
relation between government ownership and profitability. The same author, in an 
earlier paper (1977), suggested that the predominance of government banks in a 
particular country may depress the profit performance o f all banks in that country. 
Bourke (1989), and Marriot and Molyneux (1991) also found a strong statistically 
significant inverse relationship between return on capital and government ownership. 
Molyneux (1993), in the examination of the European banking systems, concludes that 
only in France, out of a sample of seventeen countries, are state owned banks 
significantly more profitable than their private sector counterparts. One explanation of 
all these findings may be that government-owned banks may not be profit maximisers 
(as a matter of government policy). One implication of state ownership is that in the 
absence of shareholders, an institution may place less emphasis on increasing profits
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and more on other management goals. State-owned institutions may also be risk-averse 
rather than profit-maximising banks.
Unlike the previous studies, Molyneux and Thornton (1992) and Abdula (1994) found 
a statistically significant positive relationship, suggesting that government owned 
banks generate higher return on capital than their private sector competitors. This result 
can be possibly explained by the fact that state-owned banks have traditionally tended 
to be relatively undercapitalised (maintain lower capital ratios because the government 
implicitly underwrites their operations) compared with their private sector 
counterparts. Additionally, Hoggarth et.al. (1999) support the view that the dominant 
position of state-owned banks in the German banking system, which has discouraged 
competition, innovation, and risk-taking, leads to lower bank loan losses.
Evidence presented in Gilbert’s and Peterson’s paper (1975) [and also Brimmer 
(1978)] indicates that significant changes in performance are associated with changes 
in Federal Reserve membership status. The Federal Reserve System inevitably 
influences the profitability of the banking system so long as it maintains control over 
an effective legal reserve ratio and a scarce stock of legal reserves. With factors other 
than membership status taken into account, commercial banks withdrawing from the 
System experienced sharp decreases in their cash holdings, increases in their loan ratio, 
and most of them significantly increased their net current earnings ratios. The state 
reserve requirements for non-member banks are less onerous than those imposed by 
the Federal Reserve System on member banks, giving non-member banks a 
competitive advantage by allowing them to invest a larger proportion of their funds in 
earning assets and offer more attractive terms to borrowers and depositors. The 
increased quantity of loans didn’t significantly change the operating expenses or the 
rates that charge customers, resulting in significant increases in all revenues and 
income measures.
On the other hand, the results for banks that entered the Federal Reserve System offer 
symmetric evidence on charges in cash and loan ratios. Federal Reserve membership 
increased the proportion of assets held in cash, reduced the proportion o f assets
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invested in loans, but experienced no significant change in profits. It is suggested that 
this asymmetry in the impact of a change in membership status on earnings may be 
explained by different state regulations other than reserve requirements. Non-member 
banks are subject to a diversity of branching and merger laws, chartering and entry 
restrictions, and regulation of other banking activities, as well as state reserve 
requirements.
Many authors have noted that minority banks in the US i.e. banks established in areas 
with many minority groups have poor average performance compared with the non­
minority institutions. This means lower profits, higher operating costs, lower 
efficiency, substantial greater loan losses, and less adequately communities’ service 
than non-attribute banks. Meinster and Elyasiani (1988) mention that the performance 
problems in the aggregate minority banks are primarily due to the performance of 
black owned banks. The adverse loss experience of the black banks is ultimately 
related to the inherent risk of doing business in the urban: high unemployment rates, 
low family income, high failure rates among small businesses, and, sometimes, chronic 
physical deterioration. However, several factors internal to these institutions also have 
a major bearing on the outcome. Among these, capital adequacy, asset quality and 
management personnel are particular important. In fact, the severe shortage of 
management talent was probably the most critical problem facing the black banks.
Boorman (1974) and others have noted that minority banks have consistently failed to 
attain the profitability levels of non-attribute banks for several reasons. First, minority 
banks were found to be overly liquidity conscious. Second, they are not believed to 
have a stable deposit rate, and, consequently, they rely on costly purchased funds. They 
attract a large number of small, highly active deposit accounts, while they experience 
lower gross earnings resulting from the banks’ greater need to diversify into lower 
yielding but more secure assets. Third, they are believed to be located in 
neighbourhoods where there are higher operating costs -high cost of handling a relative 
large amount of small transactions- and significant volume of loan losses. In order to 
offset these factors, minority banks were charging higher loan and deposit service rates 
and paid lower deposit rates. Two interesting points are contributed to this issue by 
Boorman (1974). His study concludes that (i) the performance o f minority-owned
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banks compares substantially more favourable with that of the non-minority banks if 
loan loss experience is kept separate from the other operating statistics of these banks 
(the provision for loan losses was almost three times as large for the minority as for the 
non-minority banks), and (ii) there has been significant improvement in some aspects 
of minority-owned operations compared with studies of previous years.
The remarkable growth of bank holding companies (BHCs) in the US during the last 
three decades has created a great deal of interest and controversy among academic 
economists and bank regulators. One of the most important issues has been the impact 
of holding company affiliation on the operating performance of the acquired banks. 
Subsequent empirical testing of the question has produced a wide variety o f results 
[Mingo (1975), Heggestad (1975), Mayne (1976), Kama (1979), Graddy and Kyle 
(1980), Rhoades and Rutz (1982), Curry and Rose (1984), Meinster and Elyasiani 
(1988)]. On the one hand, as Graddy and Kyle (1980) mention, the lack of a theoretical 
model on consolidated holding company behaviour frustrates the study of affiliated 
bank performance. Early studies on the effect of holding company affiliation on bank 
performance did not find that holding company affiliation results in changes in bank 
profitability. At the same time Curry and Rose (1984) paper confirm the importance of 
disaggregating multibank holding company activity between entry by outside 
organisations and expansion by locally based companies (differences in loan 
composition, bank prices etc.).
We share the view that the acquired banks performed better in terms of profitability 
and measures o f providing community needs and services, but they may also be subject 
to greater risk exposure. Banks which are part of holding companies may have better 
monitoring capabilities and more ability to transfer problem assets to the holding 
company or an affiliate. The parent organisation of a holding company operating in 
multiple states is itself diversified geographically. Moreover, a bank subsidiary may be 
able to withstand an economic downturn in its local market better if it benefits from the 
financial strength of a parent operating over a wide area. Graddy and Kyle (1980) 
found that affiliated banks behaved differently than independent banks with regard to 
decisions concerning secondary reserves, loan portfolio composition, loan rates, 
deposit rates, and bank capital. They may focus their attention away from local markets
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and their asset and liability structures may become riskier. These concerns follow from 
the assumption that bank holding companies are formed to obtain geographic and/or 
product diversification which may result in greater market concentration. Increase risk 
structure can be illustrated by holding greater proportion of risky assets, relying more 
on purchased funds and less on equity capital.
Mingo (1975) offered evidence that bank holding companies exhibit lower capital- 
asset ratios and, hence, higher net earnings to capital ratios (ROC) than do independent 
banks. This result implies that holding companies are willing to pay premiums51 for 
banks, because they expect to raise asset-capital (and, therefore, earnings to capital) 
ratios after the takeover. There is another implication of this result. Bank holding 
companies should tend to purchase banks with high capital-asset ratios and/or low 
earnings to asset ratios (ROA). In this way, the holding company would find it easier 
to achieve a decline in the bank’s capital-asset ratio52, or an increase in the eamings- 
asset ratio -hence, increasing profitability and justifying any premium to induce the 
bank to sell.
Finally, other authors have attempted to measure the differences in performance 
between domestic and foreign owned U.S. banks (e.g. Meinster and Elyasiani, 1988). 
They show that U.S. banks owned by foreign banks had performed no worse than 
domestic owned banks, but they had greater risk exposure. It may be possible for these 
banks to better absorb more risk exposure through greater geographic and product 
diversification, and it would have to be determined by further research. Williams 
(1998) examines the factors affecting the performance of foreign-owned banks in
51 Such premiums are often measured as a ratio of book value of holding company stock to 
book value of bank stock. The researcher believes that such a measurement is a reasonable 
proxy for the true economic premium -  the difference between the sale price and the present 
discounted value of the earnings stream of the acquired bank.
52 The decline in the capital-asset ratio could be achieved in several ways. First, the newly 
acquired bank could begin to retain fewer earnings. Or the acquired bank could spend relatively 
large amounts on advertising or other non-pricing forms of competition in an attempt to 
increase deposit (asset) growth. Net earnings to assets could be increased by a portfolio shift 
towards higher-yield assets or by realising the cost advantages of affiliation.
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Australia. He concludes that firm-specific characteristics, rather than country-specific 
events, are of greater importance when modelling foreign banks.
On the other hand, several recent studies have documented that foreign-owned banks 
are not as profitable as their domestic peers because they are less profit efficient due to 
their reliance on purchased funds. Peek et.al. (1998) show that foreign-owned banks in 
the US tend to be less profitable and less input-efficient than their domestically owned 
peers. However, they find that the target banks of foreign acquirers have less capital 
and lower returns than other banks prior to the acquisition. In addition, past-due loans 
at these targets increase in the period immediately after the ownership change. Thus, 
the targets of foreign acquirers tend to be in poorer financial conditions than banks in 
general or banks targeted by domestic acquirers, even before the acquisition.
7.3.4. Market Growth
Growth in market deposits is included in many studies to cover the argument that 
rapidly growing markets are relatively attractive and easy to enter, and the possibility 
that rapid growth will disrupt the status quo of established firm relationships. Various 
researchers have found that market growth has an impact on bank profitability [e.g. 
Kwast and Rose (1982)].
Previous research has generally found that market growth has a positive effect on new 
bank formations. To the extent that new entry stimulates competition, we may 
therefore expect a positive relationship between market growth and the level of 
competitive performance in the short-run by increasing the demand for banking 
services. Market growth should also affect the level of demand. Rapidly growing 
markets may exhibit higher prices as demand curves shift out over time. This 
relationship was found for household banking products by Heggestad and Mingo 
(1976). This, in turn, may affect the prices of banking services, bank profitability and 
bank portfolio composition, apart from any longer influence due to the tie between 
market growth and new entry. So, if market growth can be exploited without the threat 
of rival entry, profitable opportunities should occur for incumbent banks. If growth 
encourages entry then profitability may be depressed.
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Growth rates, however, may affect bank costs as well. “I f  in rapidly growing markets, 
banks expandfaster than market demand in anticipation o f  even greater demand in the 
future, their current average costs may be high, reflecting excess capacity1’ 
(Heggestad, 1977). This, in turn, may result in some portfolio restructuring to improve 
earnings performance. Thus, the net effect of growth on profitability may be negative 
or positive, depending on the relative strength of the two conflicting effects. Short 
(1979) has found that assets growth in individual banks did not significantly affect 
profitability levels. He noted this assets growth can be used as a control measure for 
bank managers who were growth maximisers, rather than profit maximisers.
It is suggested that market growth in each country may be considered as a factor 
affecting individual bank performance in so far as an expanding market, particularly if 
associated with entry barriers, should produce the capability of earning increased 
profits. The rate assets’ growth is also included because some banks might sacrifice 
profits to grow faster perhaps in order to earn higher profits in the future as a result of 
increasing their market share, or alternatively to gratify managers. This is enhanced by 
the acquisition of smaller local banks.
7.3.5. Interest Rates a nd  Inflation
The effects of inflation can be substantial and undermines the stability of the financial 
system and the ability of the regulator to control the solvency of financial 
intermediaries. Inflation is a pervasive phenomenon with direct and indirect effects53 
on the profitability of the banks. It is not simply the rate of inflation that affects 
financial institutions but also the rate of change in the rate of inflation. A steady 
inflation will cause little trouble, since it can easily be allowed for in the charges. It is 
the acceleration in the rate of inflation that will expose institutions to real danger 
because it is not sufficient to increase the current charges in line with the current rate 
of inflation. Revell (1980) noted that variations in bank profitability can be strongly 
explained by the level of inflation.
53 A direct effect is one caused immediately by the rise in prices, including a rise in the price of 
labour, whereas an indirect effect is one that strikes at financial institutions through some 
secondary phenomenon influenced by inflation. Some of these secondary phenomena are 
obvious, such as changes in interest rates, asset prices, and exchange rates.
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The direct effects of inflation on the operations of financial institutions are limited, and 
the main impact has come from various indirect effects. Inflation affects the banks in 
three main ways: through the inexorable rise in operating costs, through the need for 
increased risk provision, and through the volatility of interest and exchange rates. The 
most important route by which the influence of inflation reaches banks in through the 
rise of staff cost. Since staff cost is the major non-interest expense, accounting for 10 
to 25 percent of a bank’s total income (Sinkey, 1998), an increase in this expense 
category is expected to reduce bank profits. Its effect depends on the assumption that 
wages and other non-interest costs are growing faster than the inflation rate (Bourke, 
1989).
An important indirect influence on commercial banks lies in the impact of inflation on 
their customers and the consequent changes in the demand for different kinds of 
financial services. Unexpected rises of inflation cause cash flow difficulties for 
borrowers which can lead to premature termination of loan arrangements and 
precipitate loan losses (Hoggarth et.al., 1999). Furthermore, inflation is one o f the 
main routes through which it is possible to affect the operations and margins of banks 
through interest rates. Although this phenomenon has long been recognised, it was first 
mentioned in the literature in terms of the ‘endowment effect’, a phrase coined by the 
National Board of Prices and Incomes (1967) to refer to the widening of the margin of 
London clearing banks as interest rates rose. The endowment effect came from the 
particular method adopted to charge for current account services.
The traditional theoretical approach to this problem points out that the reduced 
equilibrium interest rates, which are caused by lower inflation, have negative effects on 
profitability, if a part of the banks’ liability is composed of interest free or low interest 
rate deposits. Specifically, lower general interest rate level, with unchanged cost for 
deposits of this category, causes lower weighted average net revenues from interests 
and, consequently, lower profitability. This constitutes a simplification to the extent 
that a significant part of the assets of a modem banking system is composed of fixed 
interest rate claims, such as public securities, mortgage loans with fixed interest claims, 
etc. With such a portfolio structure, the bank possibly will benefit from a lower
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inflation rate, only if the adaptation of such asset elements’ interest rates is remarkably 
slower than the respective adaptation of the other portfolio elements’ interest rates. The 
final result depends on the total structure of the banks’ portfolio on aggregate.
These approaches are based on a theoretical framework which accepts that the banks 
operate in a non fully competitive environment. For some economists, the model of the 
fully competitive banking environment is of special interest. According to this pattern 
all interest rates, as long as these reflect the prices of the financial services, are totally 
flexible, and, consequently, they can bring forward either losses or gains in the banks.
Taking into account the existence of these opposing factors, the problem acquires a 
purely empirical content. The basic channel through which the expected inflation rate 
acts upon the banks’ profitability is the equilibrium interest rate. Given that the 
anticipated inflation rate is reflected in the long-term interest rate the long-term interest 
rate in several countries increasingly influences the net revenues from interests and 
these in tern influence positively the ratio of the net profits over the assets. From the 
above, some economists concluded that the expected fall in inflation in 1990s would 
have propitious effects on the operations of the banking system.
The effects of inflation or real bank profits has been widely discussed in the economics 
and finance literature. Two competing and conflicting models exist. Kessel and 
Alchian (1962), Alchian and Klein (1973), and Santoni (1986) support the view that 
unanticipated inflation imposes a wealth loss on commercial banks, since every bank is 
a net monetary creditor54 (i.e. their monetary assets are greater than their monetary 
liabilities). Commercial banks are, in effect, intermediaries in a wealth-transfer
54 An entity is a monetary creditor when its monetary assets (i.e. legal claims or rights to fixed 
number of dollars, currency, bank deposits, bonds, notes now or in the future) exceed its 
monetary liabilities. The monetary assets denominated in nominal terms (loans, investments 
etc.) plus the real assets (real estate, building etc.) must equal monetary or nominal liabilities 
plus equity. Since banks’ real assets are less than the value of bank equity, in order for the 
balance to balance, monetary assets must be greater than monetary liabilities. Thus, banks are 
net monetary creditors.
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process. Unanticipated inflation55 transfers wealth from net monetary creditors to net 
monetary debtors. Fluctuations in the nominal rate of interest caused by unanticipated 
inflation will form the mechanism which leads to wealth transfers. The nominal rate of 
interest fails to reflect rising prices because estimates of the course of future prices are 
biased, not because of market imperfections. Unanticipated inflation imposes a wealth 
loss on commercial banks since, they are invariably net monetary creditors. 
Depreciation of real values of monetary obligations are a real loss to the creditor and 
gain to the debtor. During an unanticipated inflation, the commercial banks obtain 
wealth from the people to whom they owe the deposits (as their real value declines), 
but they lose even more to the people who are indebted to the bank. Rising prices 
would then decrease the value of their assets more than diminishing the value of their 
monetary liabilities. Consequently, banks will lose during an inflation period. In this 
way, the inflation imposes a "private tax" (or wealth redistribution) on holders of 
money and monetary assets. A major beneficiary therefore is the government since it is 
typically a net monetary debtor to the rest of the community and gain at the expense of 
the holders of the governmental obligations, both interest-bearing and non-interest 
bearing. In other words it gains from its monetary liabilities, which serve as money, 
and also from its monetary debts (bonds and notes), which are held by the public. If the 
rate of inflation is fully anticipated, the nominal rate of interest negotiated in debt 
instruments increases just enough to maintain the real rate of interest unchanged.
There are two problems with this approach. On empirical level it is very difficult to 
measure expectations and know to what extent nominal yields in fact reflect those 
expectations. The second problem is that the net monetary position does not reveal all 
types of transfers of economic resources between government and the private sector. 
Some of these mainly related to taxation and accounting principles. For Kanniainen 
(1979), it is not enough to know the net monetary position of an economic agent. 
Information is also needed about the responsiveness of yields and rates of financial 
assets and liabilities to the rate of inflation. Furthermore, the heart of the debtor-
55 Anticipated inflation is this for which people foresee the timing and extent of the inflation 
and they plan and act accordingly. Inflation in which people inaccurately forecast (usually 
underestimate) the extent of the inflation is unanticipated inflation.
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creditor hypothesis is the assumption that inflation is not fully anticipated and that 
therefore interest rates fail to reflect completely price level changes. This is why Hong 
(1977) found no evidence of transfers from creditors to the government.
On the other hand, the inflation tax school has argued that since banks’ demand 
deposits are a portion of the money supply, they should capture a portion of the 
inflation tax and therefore gain during an inflation due to the fact that inflation acts as a 
tax on cash balance holdings. Many writers have mentioned that point, as the real value 
of cash balances decreases when prices rise. For a stationary economy, this tax is equal 
to the inflation rate times the cash balance held. In an economy where the right to issue 
the medium of exchange is a monopoly of the government, the tax is the equivalent of 
government revenues56. However, when the right to issue the medium of exchange is 
shared with private money issuers (banks), the tax proceeds are shared. The revenues 
accruing to the private money issuing firms are equal to (1-q) times outstanding 
balances issued times the inflation rate, where q is the reserve-deposit ratio57. 
Commercial banks then should gain during inflation because they collect a portion of 
the inflation tax.
For Perry (1992) both Alchian and Kessel and the inflation tax school are correct, but 
under special and different circumstances. In brief, if inflation is unanticipated and 
continues to be unanticipated, then banks, being net monetary creditors, will lose. On 
the other hand, if inflation is fully anticipated, all interest rates will rise to include an 
inflation premium; the real value of all assets and liabilities, except demand deposits 
and reserves, will then be changed. Demand deposits, net of reserves, however will 
shrink in value as prices rise. Consequently, the liabilities of the bank fall in real terms 
and banks gain. Whether banks gain or lose depends crucially on the particular 
circumstances of expectations and portfolio adjustments. For Perry, with greater 
indexing and more correct anticipation of future inflation, the banks can gain from
56 Government gains command over real resources by issuing money. The public gives up 
command over real resources of an equal magnitude owing to a decline in the real value of its 
existing monetary holdings.
This assumes no interest is paid on demand deposits issued.
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inflation. Since banks are net monetary creditors, they will gain as inflation becomes 
anticipated relative to a situation of unanticipated inflation. Further, as adjustments to 
inflation are more rapid and more complete, banks gain.
For Santoni (1986), changes in anticipated inflation have similar effects to those of 
unanticipated inflation because both reflect a misguess about inflation and cause 
nominal interest rates to rise unexpectedly. On the contrary, the anticipated inflation 
has no real effect on the bank’s capital and, therefore, on the wealth of its stockholders 
since all values of all nominal instruments in the bank’s balance sheet will be higher at 
maturity. In this case, the nominal rate of interest negotiated in debt instruments 
increases just enough to maintain the real rate of interest unchanged. The bank will 
also gain as inflation becomes anticipated relative to a situation of unanticipated 
inflation.
Hoggarth et.al. (1999) also mention that high and variable inflation has a major impact 
on bank earnings. Firstly, it creates great difficulty for the “assessment o f loan 
decisions”, since a loan arrangement which performs at the anticipated rate of inflation 
may turn out to be much more marginal if inflation is unexpectedly low and realised 
interest rates thus unexpectedly high. Uncertainty about future inflation may cause 
problems in planning and in negotiation of loans. Finally, high and variable inflation 
encourages bank financing investment in property markets, an investment strategy 
which may lead to market losses or great profitability according to the implemented 
monetary policy.
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7.3.6. O ther is s u e s
Performance is also influenced by numerous other forces that are frequently described 
as “demand” factors. While all demand factors cannot be identified or quantified, 
Kaufman (1965) believes that levels and changes in population and income may 
reasonably be assumed to be among the most important (also Yeats, 1974). Nelly and 
Wheelock (1997) conclude that state per capita income in US exerts a strong positive 
statistical effect on state bank earnings while income growth explains a relatively small 
amount of the variation in bank earnings. On the other hand, Heggestad (1977) found 
that per capita income does not affect bank profits. In any case, we suspect that per 
capita income may not be a good proxy for economic shocks that most directly affect 
bank earnings -for example, oil crises or commercial real estate crashes. A sharp 
downturn in a sector, such as real estate, could dramatically affect bank earnings 
without having a large impact on per capita income.
Schranz (1993) conducts an empirical test examining whether banks that operate in an 
environment in which takeovers are possible perform better than banks in 
environments in which takeovers are impossible or highly unlikely. The evidence 
indicates that firms in the U.S. states with an active takeover market are more 
profitable than those in markets restricting takeovers; takeovers do provide an 
incentive for managers to improve firm performance. Saunders (1994) argues that 
allowing banks to be acquired by other financial companies or even commercial firms 
would impose monitoring and create incentives for efficiency and value-maximising 
behaviour. This fact gave rise to Vennen (1996) to address the question whether 
acquisitions and mergers improve the performance of the institutions involved. He 
examines the EC banking since deregulation and harmonisation efforts have triggered a 
substantial increase in the takeover activity among credit institutions. The results 
indicate that domestic mergers among equal-sized partners significantly increase the 
performance of the merged banks. On the other hand, domestic takeovers are found to 
be influenced predominantly by defensive and managerial motives such as size 
maximisation. In such cases, the banking consolidation trend is not driven by the 
market forces but by the public policy intervention. Boyd and Graham (1991) have 
identified aspects of public policy, which arguably do produce non-market incentives 
for consolidation, especially larger average bank size. For Peristiani (1997) the
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profitability and operating cost performance of the surviving banks after the merger are 
greatly influenced by balance sheet attributes (e.g. asset quality) and other bank 
characteristics.
Fraser and Rose (1972) mentions as determinants of bank performance changes in the 
community’s economic base, demand for banking services by local households and 
business firms, bank operations, monetary policy, and the nature of nonbank 
competition. Growth in employment, reflecting favourable economic conditions, is 
expected to result in improved bank performance. Zimmerman (1996) found that 
regional employment conditions are a significant contributing factor for both 
community bank asset quality and ROA.
Nelly and Wheelock (1997) believes that greater geographic diversification would 
make it easier for banks to offset losses incurred in one region with profits from 
another, and it would, presumably make the industry less vulnerable to localised 
economic distress like that of the 1980s and early 1990s in the US. Haslem (1968) 
found that the effects of location on profitability are not important (these effects are 
important only to bank managers and others).
Tirtiroglou and Daniels (2000) suggest strongly that the regional heterogeneity of US 
banking geography and its temporal dynamics are important determinants of bank 
performance. On the other hand, Zimmerman (1996) suggests that location is an 
important factor in determining profitability. Prasad and Harker (1997) found that in 
the competitive environment of retail banking, neither IT capital not IT labour 
investments should make significant impacts on the firm’s profitability. The results 
bear this hypothesis out: IT investment has zero or insignificant effect on bank 
profitability.
The use of GDP growth as a variable does not feature extensively in the literature. 
However, Hoggarth et.al. (1999) conclude that the behaviour of real GDP fails to 
explain the greater variability of banking sector profits in the UK than in Germany. In 
the former country, average profitability is higher than in the latter. But they do not say
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that GDP variability did not affect profits, only that they could not use it to explain 
different UK/German banks performance.
7.4. Concluding Remarks
The purpose o f this chapter has been to review the literature on bank performance 
studies. In general, the SCP framework appears to be widely used to evaluate bank 
performance in and across banking areas. We find that bank performance is usually 
evaluated by profit measure (ROA and ROE) and the determinants of profitability are 
explained by, internal and external factors to the banking firm. The main internal 
factors appear to relate to management-controlled variables such as the level of risk 
included in their balance sheets, expense management, the level of capital in a bank, 
and the level of liquidity. The external factors seem to be those that are influenced by 
specific banks’ decisions and policies such as regulation, concentration, interest rates, 
and inflation. The following chapter will deal with the model specification and the 
examination of the specific factors affecting European bank profitability.
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Chapter 8
“Determinants of Bank Profitability -  
Econometric Analysis”
Abstract
As the EU banking industry continuously evolves, changes in industry 
composition and in the macroeconomic environment have a direct impact on 
the aggregate performance o f the industry. This chapter quantifies how internal 
determinants (“within effects” changes) due to changes in the balance 
composition and external factors (“dynamic reallocation” effects) due to market 
share changes and the macroeconomic environment contribute to the 
performance o f  the EU banking industry as a whole in 1994-1998. We construct 
OLS and fixed effects models, and the results provide a new perspective for 
understanding the impact o f changes in competition on the performance o f  the 
EU banking industry.
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Chapter 8: Determinants of Bank Profitability -  Econometric 
Analysis
8.1. Introduction
The main aim of this chapter is to identify the determinants of European banking 
profitability, over the period 1994-1998. The purpose is to describe the model and 
present the estimation results. A linear function of a multiple regression equation, on a 
pooled cross section time series sample, is utilised to test the effects of firm and market 
specific variables on bank profitability. Estimation results indicate that the return on 
assets models provide more robust estimates than the return on equity models.
8.2. Estimation Procedures
Haslem (1968) mentions that aggregate profitability estimating equations were 
designed to serve three purposes: (1) to give bank management and other interested 
private parties -such as bank stockholders, bank customers, and investors- insight into 
the operating relationships that best predict bank profitability; (2) to develop a set of 
equations that consider the fact that banks must, in the short run, operate in a particular 
regulation framework; and (3) to assist legislators and bank regulatory officials to 
understand better the effects of bank statutes, regulations, and policies of bank 
profitability.
8.2.1. M ultiple R e g re ss io n  A n a ly s is
The literature generally comes to the conclusion that the appropriate functional form 
for testing is a linear function although there are dissenting opinions. Short (1979) 
investigated this question and concluded that “linear functions produced as good 
results as any other functional form. On the other hand, Graddy and Kyle (1979) have 
noted that studies estimating performance equations with single equation methods 
ignore important statistical properties associated with the interdependence among the 
variables and among the disturbances across equations.
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The vast majority of bank performance studies use multiple cross-section regression 
analysis in their estimation procedure [Kaufman (1965), Haslem (1968, 1969), Fraser 
and Rose (1971), Yeats (1974), Heggestad (1977), Short (1979), Curry and Rose 
(1984), Wall (1985), Smirlock (1985), Clark (1986), Bourke (1988), Meinster and 
Elyasiani (1988), Molyneux and Thornton (1992), Berger (1995)]. The separate cross- 
sections provide a comprehensive treatment of the sector and determine whether the 
results are stable over time and across competitive environments. In multiple 
regression the relation between the dependent variable and a number of explanatory 
variables is examined. The model assumed can be described as:
y = bo + b1xii + b2X2i + ... + bnx^ + Ui, i=l,2,...,n 
The errors u* can be attributed to errors from lack of inclusion of all relevant factors, 
errors of observation or measurement, errors in the specification of the relationship 
between y and x’s, and a basic element of randomness in economic behavior.
The intercept term, i.e. the average value of y when Xj and u* are equal to zero is the bo 
and bi...b„ are called partial regression coefficients. Gujarati (1995) stated that "...a 
partial regression coefficient reflects the (partial) effect o f  one explanatory variable on 
the mean value o f the dependent variable when the values o f  other explanatory 
variables included in the model are held constant'. He, also, noted that the above 
characteristic enables the researchers not only to include more than one explanatory 
variable in the model, but also to “isolate” the effect of each x variable on y from the 
other Xi variables included in the model.
Generally, whether the objective is to explain interbank differences in costs, revenues, 
profits, or loan rates, several explanatory variables are isolated which vary 
systematically among banks, and which at least partially explain differences in the 
dependent variable. The explanatory variables which are shown to be theoretically 
relevant, and statistically significant, are then interpreted literally and designated as 
having causal characteristics.
B ^ S O  ^ ■ uaTt’ju.ji Determinants o f  Bank Profitability -  Econometric Analysis
For example, following Smirlock (1985), the traditional and efficient structure- 
performance hypothesis can be tested by estimating the profit equation shown below:
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Py = ao + aiCR + a2MS + X
where P is a profit measure, CR is a measure of market structure (usually concentration 
measure), MS is a measure of market share, and X is a vector of control variables 
which are included to account for firm- and market-specific characteristics. The 
traditional SCP hypothesis can be verified by finding ai greater than zero and a2 equal 
to zero; and the efficient hypothesis by the finding that ai equals to zero and a2 is 
greater than zero.
Kwast and Rose (1982) use a statistical cost accounting model that accounts the 
differences in market structure, regional demand and supply conditions, and 
macroeconomic factors. Flannery (1981) employs an alternative framework for 
evaluating the impact of market rates on bank profits, which has the advantage of 
utilising only reported bank data. It is based on the terms of a single valuation formula:
V=sum[(R,-C,)/(l+il)t], t= l,...
where: V=current market valuation of the firm’s equity, R,=gross after tax revenues in 
period t, C,=total after tax costs incurred in period t, i,=the discount rate applied by the 
market in period t.
A number of studies have recently attempted to explain cross sectional variations in 
selected characteristics of commercial bank operations through least squares 
regression analysis. While this general method of analysis is simple and 
straightforward, it does not take into consideration the possibility that one or more of 
the selected explanatory variables in a specific regression equation may actually 
represent a more general interaction of influences, either endogenous or exogenous. 
Further, this approach omits any specific check on the possibility that sets of two or 
more of the regressors are actually measuring similar proportions of the systematic 
variation across banks e.g. as the number of alternative measures computed from one 
cross section sample is increased, an increasing number of the measures tend to reflect 
slightly different mutations of the same limited set of basic factors. From an 
interpretative point of view the practice o f selecting one o f the several alternative 
specifications of structure while ignoring any interaction among variables included in 
the regression model is completely justifiable only if the significant independent
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variables are in fact not related to any other causal factors and are proxies for nothing 
except the literal measure they purport to reflect.
For Clark (1986) the application of OLS to such a model must necessary imply one of 
three possibilities. First, the economic structure underlying the determination of a 
bank’s profit rate can be adequately described through the use of a single structural 
equation. A second possibility is that the structural equation is part of a simultaneous- 
equations system. The application of OLS to a structural equation in a system of 
simultaneous equations will result in biased and inconsistent estimates of the 
parameters of the structural equation (Graddy and Kyle, 1980). A third possibility is 
that the model is a reduced-form model derived from an underlying simultaneous 
system of structural equations. If so, the coefficients being estimated are reduced-form 
coefficients rather than the desired structural parameters. Heggestad (1979) 
characterises the equations that relate bank performance measures to measures of 
market structure and other independent variables as reduced form equations. Some of 
the independent variables that are commonly included in these equations violate the 
characterisation as reduced forms and bias the estimates of the influence of market 
structure on performance.
Haslem (1968) uses the Wherry-Doolittle program to select the most potent 
combination of twenty-seven explanatory operating ratio variables adjusted for 
intercorrelation. This program selects independent variables in the order of highest 
correlation with the dependent variable, e.g. in this study the ratio of net income after 
taxes to total capital accounts, and the lowest correlation with any independent variable 
previously selected. The procedure is initiated by selection of the independent variable 
that has the largest simple correlation with the dependent variable.
Some authors use 2SLS or 3SLS [e.g. Graddy and Kyle (1980)] techniques for the 
estimation of the model. Meinster and Elyasiani (1988) point out that the 3SLS 
technique has two advantages over the use of OLS in the single equation models: 
avoidance of simultaneous equation bias and increased efficiency. In the single 
equation models an implicit assumption is that the cause and effect relationship is
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unidirectional. In bank performance modeling, however, there typically exists 
substantial interdependence or mutual causality. The use of OLS under these 
conditions leads to biased and inconsistent estimators since it does not utilise the 
information of cross equation relationships. Additionally, Flannery (1983) employed 
regressions which were estimated simultaneously for each bank using Zellner’s 
‘seemingly unrelated’ method, since the net income includes more than just the 
difference between revenues and costs at any time, there is no fixed relationship among 
the estimated regressions’ dependent variables. This approach yields noticeably more 
efficient estimates of the underlying parameters than ordinary least squares. Moreover, 
Zellner generates covariances between coefficient estimates in different equations, 
allowing more accurate comparisons of the revenue and cost adjustments in market 
rate changes.
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The isolation of the effect of each qualitative explanatory variable is accomplished by 
using “dummy” variables which assumed the values of zero or one [Haslem (1968)]. 
Dummy variables have been widely used in econometric research to represent 
attributes such as temporal effects, qualitative variables, and quantitative variables 
where only broad groupings are relevant.
In order to examine the percentage of the total variation in the dependent variable 
explained by all the independent variables, the multiple coefficient of determination, 
R2, is utilised. The R2 is calculated by dividing the Error Sum of Squares (ESS) by the 
Total Sum of Squares (TSS) of the dependent variable.
Finally, the overall significance of the model of the estimation regression line is 
provided through the use of the F-test [Fraser and Rose (1971,1972)]. The F-test based 
on the ratio of the regression mean square to the residual mean square is appropriate 
for testing the hypothesis: H0: bi = b2 = ... = b„ =0. If true, this implies that the 
variation in the response y is simple chance variation. In other words, the F-values 
computed to measure the significance of the ratio differences are partial F variable 
ratios. These partial F-values result from the use of analysis of variance to test the 
significance of the partial regression coefficients for the explanatory effects.
Christos Staikouras 209
Cup UnMm% Hmmw SrJWMil
I»*«.*#*
Determinants o f  Bank Profitability -  Econometric Analysis
8.3. The Process and the Data
The balance sheet and the income statement are obtained from the Fitch - International 
Bank Credit Analysis Ltd. (IBCA) Bankscope database. Accounting information are 
from the full spreadsheet and raw data files. This source provides data for the period 
1992-1999. All of them have been consolidated on the 31“ of December o f each year 
and are calculated in US$. However, since the availability of data for early years (i.e. 
1992, and 1993) and 1999 is short, we work with a balanced sample covering all the 
EU banking industries in the period 1994-1998. The main objective in choosing the 
particular sample period and their respective data is to utilise the most recent year-end 
financial data that are available in the new European economic and monetary 
environment that has been created.
The data was pooled to account for simultaneous consideration o f intermproval 
movements and cross sectional differences. However, in our case with firm level data, 
there are typically large numbers of cross sectional units, but few time series 
observations on each firm. We therefore also approach panel techniques from the 
opposite direction, seeking to exploit the time series dimension of the data in order to 
achieve more powerful tests than are available based on pure cross sectional 
estimations. So, in addition to the pooled time series cross sectional regressions, the 
models also were estimated as a series of five year-by-year cross-sectional regressions, 
If the results are similar, this suggests that the findings are robust with respect to the 
pooling approach, the sample composition, and the period estimated. The analysis is 
extended to cover the different types of financial institutions i.e. commercial banks, 
savings banks, cooperative banks, and mortgage banks. Also we split the whole dataset 
in two parts; one covering large banks (total assets of over USIObn in 1998) and small 
banks that include all the other financial institutions. Regression models, with the TSP- 
43 econometric package, using pooled time-series cross-sectional data for banking 
sectors across Europe will be utilised in our econometric analysis.
The data were reviewed for reporting errors and other inconsistencies. For example, in 
some cases banks reported negative assets. Where possible, in these cases, values were 
imputed by assuming a constant rate of growth between two correct data points. In 
some such cases it seemed obvious that these should in fact be set to zero. In a very
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few cases observations were dropped from the sample. It was finally decided to drop 
from the sample these yearly observations where the absolute value of the return was 
100 percent or larger.
A very particular and careful attention must be paid to the problem of consolidation 
which meaning differs from the concept applied at the United States. While in the 
United States consolidated financial statements mean information covering domestic 
activities and activities carried out abroad as well, in Europe consolidation refers to the 
aggregate activities of subsidiary banks, fund management companies, leasing 
companies, factoring companies, asset management companies, dealers and joint 
venture companies. In this case, the unconsolidated data from the parent company will 
be used. When such a procedure is followed, the only information lost is related with 
non-bank subsidiary companies. Profits from these companies may be considered 
negligible when compared to the core activities of banks. Therefore we assume that the 
current research will not introduce biased results on estimation procedures or 
inconsistency on hypothesis testing in the models that will be developed. Additionally, 
the unconsolidated data are used to make the bank information as country specific as 
possible.
The data in the sample also include accounts for foreign bank subsidiaries. We do not 
omit these data on foreign bank subsidiaries for the following reasons. One of the 
major problems with concentration-profit analyses is defining the extent of the market. 
As there is no sub-market data officially available for different European countries, we 
choose the simplest and broadest market definition -  total banking sector assets in each 
particular country. As we aim to evaluate banking industry performance across 
different European markets, and as our market definition includes the assets of both 
domestic and foreign banks, it seems justifiable to include information on these types 
of banks in our analysis. The majority of individual bank data for Luxembourg and the 
United Kingdom are on foreign bank subsidiaries.
In the previous chapters we show that many different determinants may influence 
profitability. However, it is difficult to tell whether all are significant factors in bank 
performance, and if they are, which their relative importance is. With this limitation in
Christos Staikouras 211
Ofty Uhmm j*ly §k punmm
l j  <i<
Determinants o f  Bank Profitability -  Econometric Analysis
mind the study now moves to exploring these relationships at the individual bank level. 
The underlying assumption of the empirical analysis is that the measure of the 
profitability reflects management efforts to maximise shareholder wealth and not 
engage in expense preference behaviour. The underlying economic structure which 
determines the profitability o f the bank indicates that profit is determined 
simultaneously with overall bank risk and the composition of the bank’s balance sheet; 
the appropriate structural model must provide for this simultaneity. Further, the 
structural model may include variables which capture the influence the risk-return 
preferences of the bank management (ownership), as well as any element of the 
market, regulatory and organisational structures may have on the return and cost 
attributes of the assets and liabilities selected by the bank. The whole process is not an 
easy one. Haslem (1969) managed to explain as much as 77 per cent o f the total 
variation in profitability for each of his examined years by using fourteen explanatory 
variables (two qualitative and twelve ratios) to do it.
In banking, output and productivity are difficult to be estimated due to definitional 
problems, joint products, and conceptual issues about which services a bank actually 
provides. To avoid this problem, researchers interested in the performance of the 
banking industry have often looked at profitability. Using accounting data has some 
appeal. First, market data are typically available only for the largest firms in an 
industry, so they clearly are more limited than accounting data. In addition, regulators 
rely heavily on accounting figures in their evaluation of a firm’s financial condition. 
The earnings quality of European banks will be examined through the use of the return 
on assets (ROA). Similar are the results if we use the return on equity (ROE). In both 
cases the profits are taking before tax to cover the different taxation systems that are 
implemented across Europe. For example the tax figure reported on a firm’s annual 
statements may include tax credits or carry-forwards that do not pertain to the current 
year’s performance.
As reported earlier, the literature review on bank performance studies suggests that 
bank profitability is determined by factors both internal and external to the bank. Since 
the performance measure is not risk-adjusted, we employ four variables to account for 
firm-specific risk. The loan-to-assets ratio (LA) provides a measure of risk since loans
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are riskier and have a greater expected return than other bank assets, like government 
securities. Thus, one would expect a positive relationship between this variable and the 
performance measure. It could be the case, however, that banks that are rapidly 
increasing their loan books have to pay a higher cost for their funding requirements 
and this could reduce the positive impact on profitability.
The equity-to-assets ratio (EA) is also included as a measure of the overall capital 
strength. The ratio is a measure of capital adequacy, and should capture the general 
average safety and soundness of the financial institutions. A deterioration of the equity- 
to-assets ratio indicates either an increase in debt financing of banks’ total assets (while 
holding total assets constant), or a decline in banks’ total assets (while holding total 
equity constant), or both over time and space. Irrespectively, this is an increase in 
banks’ risk, and potentially, in banks’ cost-to-capital. The theory o f capital structure 
states that a higher use of debt (equity) financing within a certain range, called the 
target capital structure, might actually reduce (increase) firms’ cost of capital. Thus a 
positive (negative) coefficient estimate for equity-to-assets indicates an efficient 
(inefficient) management of banks’ capital structure.
According to some authors the equity (capital)-to-assets ratio is negatively related to 
the total revenue dependent variable, since lower capital ratios should lead to higher 
bank revenues58. Accounting to conventional wisdom in banking, a higher capital-to- 
assets ratio is associated with lower profitability. A higher capital-to-assets ratio tends 
to reduce the risk of equity and therefore lowers the equilibrium expected return on 
equity required by investors. In addition, a higher equity-to-assets ratio lowers after tax 
earnings by reducing the tax shield provided by the deductibility of interest payments. 
Moreover, the reduced risk from a higher capital ratio may depress earnings by 
lowering the value of access to federal deposit insurance (as is the case in the United 
States) that at best imperfectly prices risk. Despite these arguments, the data on banks 
in 1990s tell a very different story. Book values of capital-to-assets ratio and
58 Molyneux (1993) states that: “As lower [equity-to-assets] ratios suggest a relatively risky 
position, one would expect a negative coefficient on this variable, although it could be the case 
that high levels o f equity suggest that the cost o f capital is relatively cheap and therefore this 
variable may have a positive impact on profitability”.
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profitability are positively related, and this relationship is both statistically and 
economically significant. According to Berger (1995) there are a number of potential 
explanations for the positive capital-earnings relationship. An increase in capital may 
raise expected earnings by reducing the expected costs of financial distress including 
bankruptcy. Also, an increase in earnings may raise the capital ratio, provided that 
marginal earnings are not fully paid out in dividends. Higher capital-to-assets ratio may 
also cause higher profitability if the higher capital reduces risk-related barriers to entry 
or expansion into some profitable product lines. Banks that increase capital and reduce 
their risks may be better able to avoid issuing off-balance-sheet guarantess, such as 
loan commitments and standby letters of credit. Safer banks may also be able to 
borrow uninsured funds more easily to pursue high revenue on-balance-sheet 
investment opportunities as they arise.
The provisions fo r  loan losses-to-total loans (PLL/TL) ratio provides a measure of the 
capital risk. In our analysis we have the problem that the dataset does not provide 
figures for that ratio in Germany. So, the sample is much smaller (especially for 
savings and cooperative banks) compared with the case that we do not include the 
measure of capital risk. However, we prefer to present initially the results with the 
participation of that variable in order to cover the whole set of possible risks that a 
bank can face. Unfortunately we do not have enough data to include other credit risk 
measures, as are the net charge offs or the non-performing loans to total loans. Finally, 
as a measure of interest rate risk we include the gap-to-assets ratio (Gap) which is 
defined as the difference between interest rate sensitive assets and interest rate 
sensitive liabilities divided by total assets of each financial institution.
The concentration ratio and the bank market share variables are calculated on the basis 
of the size of the national markets, i.e. total banking sector assets. Concentration is 
measured country by country in terms of assets, either by the 3-firm concentration 
ratio (cone) or the Herfindahl index (H) 59. The 3-firm concentration ratio for each 
country is defined as the sum of the market shares of the 3 firms with the largest
59 This index is calculated as the sum of the squares of the market shares of the several banks in 
a country.
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market shares, where market share is measured in terms of the book value of assets. 
Table 36 presents this Herfindahl index for the several EU countries. Firm-specific 
market share (MSB'), defined as the bank’s assets divided by total value of assets of all 
banks in a given country and in Fitch’s Bankscope. These measures are used to capture 
for both the traditional concentration-performance relationship and the efficient 
hypothesis.
Empirical industrial organisation literature has shown that the distribution of firm sizes 
within many industries and countries can often be approximated by various skewed 
distributions of which the most widely used is the lognormal. The size effect is 
captured by the natural logarithm o f the total assets fo r  each financial institution 
(Inassets). The log of assets is used instead of assets in order to reduce the scale effect. 
This variable controls for cost differences related to bank size and for the greater 
ability of larger banks to diversify. The first factor would lead to positive coefficient 
for profitability if there are significant economies of scale and the second to negative 
coefficients if increased diversification leads to lower risk and thus lower required 
returns.
Quite sophisticated meaures of both scale efficiency and X-efficiency are discussed in 
the literature (Berger and Hannan, 1998). In general, these require estimating a cost 
function for banks, which is feasible only for a sufficiently long time series. For the 
purpose of the analysis here, we have decided to follow a simpler approach and 
measure inefficiency as the ratio of overheads, which is available as a cost item in the 
income statement to total assets (OA) in each year and for each bank. We expect an 
inverse relationship with profitability.
A last group hypotheses concerns macroeconomic conditions. The evidence suggests 
that bank performance is sensitive to macroeconomic conditions despite the trend in 
the industry towards greater geographic diversification and greater use o f financial 
engineering techniques to manage risk. We also introduce the level o f  interest rates 
(IR) and their variability (VAR). We use the three months interbank rate for each 
European country from Datastream (we do not have data only for Luxembourg). 
Drawing data for all countries from the same source ensures comparability across the
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measures. The variability is measured as the standard deviation of weekly rates around 
their annual average60.
Finally we include the growth rate o f the GDP (dGDP) and of the gross personal 
income (dGPI) for each EU country (Table 37). Both of them affect numerous factors 
related to the supply and demand for loans and deposits. One might expect bank 
profitability to be driven by real GDP for a number of reasons. First, bank asset quality 
will depend on the position in the cycle. Loan loss provisions will be related to default 
risks. These will be greater in downturns than in upturns, so that bank profitability will 
be positively correlated with GDP growth. One can also view GDP as measuring the 
size of the market in which banks operate. In upturns, there will be higher demand for 
bank credit than in downturns. If the number of banks operating across the cycle is 
constant, one would, under conditions of imperfect competition, expect bank 
profitability to be positively related to market size as measured by GDP. However, the 
coefficient may also be negative because countries with higher GDP or GPI are 
assumed to have a banking system that operates in a mature environment resulting in 
more competitive interest and profit margins (see also Goldberg and Rai, 1995). These 
data have been taken from national statistics published in the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics and the OECD. These factors could well be important for the 
experience of EU banks, which since 1994 have operated under conditions of relative 
high GDP growth and falling interest rates. Ireland shows the highest growth rates of 
real GDP, which has had an average growth rate of more than three times the average. 
Greece and Portugal are followed.
60 The level of interest rates Is used instead of the rate of inflation in order to avoid 
multicollinearity problems. The rate of inflation is an important factor and is related to the 
endowment effect from interest free deposits. Higher inflation means a higher opportunity cost 
of leaving funds in interest free deposits. This opportunity cost accrues to the bank, as it lends 
out funds at a nominal rate, which reflects the rate of inflation. This would lead one to expect a 
positive relationship between inflation and bank profitability. One could also hypothesise, 
however, that there are positive wealth effects for banks associated with unanticipated decreases 
in inflation (one can also see Chapter 7).
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Table 36: llcrlliidalil Index i
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Austria 1729.9270 980.0316 896.7714 1083.725 1188.844
Belgium 1118.844 1126.925 1136.7100 1072.614 1577.4100
Denmark 1635.887 1574.126 1585.333 1668.864 1658.684
Finland 2686.742 3637.543 2619.994 2375.813 2467.619
France 470.3594 442.3404 506.4851 484.6482 505.8327
Germany 249.2857 268.3548 295.3182 336.9897 388.2777
Greece 2614.607 2458.620 2274.645 1872.306 1893.5400
Ireland 2668.041 2252.634 1787.994 1710.970 1381.825
Italy 458.8573 430.4616 491.0702 470.5402 600.2837
Netherlands 2243.365 2147.712 1994.9500 2339.049 2399.371
Portugal 980.5929 985.0205 907.1316 872.1221 989.9542
Spain 810.4091 798.7463 764.5571 808.7134 849.4669
Sweden 1244.994 1220.772 1087.534 1276.652 1360.512
UK 706.6012 646.2008 545.6745 657.7967 641.3557
Source: Own calculations based on Fltch-IBCA Bankscope database
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T a b l e  3 7 :  K c a l  G D P  G r o w t h  o f  L U  c o u n t r i e s  ( 1 9 9 4 - 1 9 9 8 )
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Austria na na 0.0324 0.0286 0.0349
Belgium 0.0491 0.0440 0.0216 0.0492 0.0431
D enmark 0.0728 0.0456 0.0506 0.0481 0.0466
Finland 0.0603 0.0809 0.0377 0.0848 0.0876
France 0.0362 0.0359 0.0253 0.0315 0.0403
Germany 0.0497 0.0385 0.0181 0.0237 0.0298
Greece 0.1338 0.1202 0.1059 0.1052 0.0749
Ireland 0.0798 0.0757 0.1247 0.1019 0.1508
Italy 0.0576 0.0812 0.0643 0.0428 0.0423
Netherlands 0.0322 0.0226 0.0304 0.0379 0.0366
Portugal 0.0869 0.0813 0.0635 0.0624 0.0777
Spain 0.0545 0.0581 0.0586 0.0605 0.0634
Sweden 0.0412 0.0369 0.0108 0.0198 0.0295
UK 0.0443 0.0277 0.0255 0.0351 0.0264
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics and OECD
The sample includes 685 European banks (138 large banks and 547 small banks) 
(Table 38). If we do not include the loan loss provisions ratio the sample comprises of 
2,162 European banks because, as we hane already mentioned above, we include the 
German banks that do not provide the above mentioned ratio.
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Tubli- 38: Number uf banks in the sample
7
Country Large banks Small banks Total number o f  banks
Austria 8 39 47
Belgium 7 18 25
Denmark 5 44 49
Greece 4 4 8
France 34 176 210
UK 15 51 66
Ireland 3 5 8
Sweden 4 3 7
Italy 22 149 171
Germany 1 0 1
Portugal 7 13 20
Spain 19 42 61
Finland 4 2 6
Netherlands 5 12 17
Totals 138 547 685
Source: Own calculations from Fitch-IBCA Bankscope database
Table 39 provides summary statistics for the variables that are used in the analysis. The 
profit rates have a mean of 0.9297% of total assets and a standard deviation of 
1.2726%. The mean value of the loans-to-assets ratio is 54% but with the standard 
deviation approaching 20%. Equity is, on average, 7.7% of total assets but with a 
significant variation (3.92%). The overheads are 3% of total assets. The dG D P  and the 
dG P I have similar levels for their mean values, but the dGDP  has much higher 
variability. Worth mentioning is the high variability of the loan loss provisions to total 
loans and the market share variable (2.64% and 11.08% respectively). Also, the return 
on assets has a negative skewness, while OA significant positive kurtosis.
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T a b l e  3 9 :  D e s c r i p t i v e  S t a t i s t i c s
mean st. dev. min max var. Skew. kurt.
ROA 0.9297 1.2746 -22.6530 14.6611 1.6245 -4.7911 75.2807
Lnassets 14.5790 1.8978 9.3393 20.3752 3.6019 0.3907 0.0901
LA 54.0069 19.2529 0.3110 99.5503 370.6758 0.0861 -0.1490
Gap 0.0603 0.0485 -0.1831 0.3796 0.0024 0.1074 1.3588
EA 7.7217 3.9219 -11.2884 38.4245 15.3816 0.9458 1.6346
OA 2.9963 1.4034 0.0398 15.295 1.9696 0.8463 4.1734
LLP/TL 1.1386 2.6440 -37.0154 77.7832 6.9922 9.7118 271.7168
MSH 2.4319 11.0807 0.0015 179.0446 122.7822 9.4619 110.2415
H 786.6545 512.9612 249.2857 3637.543 263129.2 1.9231 3.3595
1NT 6.1488 2.4173 3.0754 27.2734 5.8432 2.0506 12.9465
DEV 0.5234 1.1030 0.0484 22.2561 1.2388 17.5549 337.8466
dGDP 4.8098 16.3800 -37.2823 106.4748 268.3048 3.9170 24.3683
dGPI 4.6992 1.9183 -7.3847 14.0852 3.6800 1.3091 2.4003
Table 40 presents the correlation matrix for the several variables. W e will select 
initially independent variables in the order o f  highest correlation with the dependent 
variable, and the lowest correlation with any independent variable previously selected. 
We find a significant positive correlation o f  ROA with the Gap and EA variables and 
negative with the LLP/TL variable. Also there is a strong negative correlation o f  assets 
with EA and OA and positive with M SH, as well as a positive one o f  gap with EA, o f  
EA with OA, and a negative one o f  LA with EA, and o f  IR with DEV and dGPI (all o f  
them expected).
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T a b l e  4 0 :  C o r r e l a t i o n  M a t r i x
ROA Lnas LA Gap EA OA LLP MSH H 1R DEV dGD dGPl
ROA 1.00
Lnas -0.12 1.00
LA 0.09 -0.03 1.00
Gap 0.32 -0.23 0.06 1.00
EA 0.39 -0.51 -0.39 0.69 1.00
OA 0.11 -0.41 0.06 0.10 0.37 1.00
LLP •0.43 -0.09 -0.10 -0.01 -0.01 0.12 1.00
MSH 0.01 0.43 -0.01 •0.03 -0.16 -0.14 -0.04 1.00
H 0.08 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.12 -0.03 0.11 1.00
IR 0.08 -0.02 -0.18 0.07 0.16 0.14 0.02 0.04 -0.07 1.00
DEV 0.02 0.01 -0.07 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.16 0.55 1.00
dGDP -0.08 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.016 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.19 0.04 1.00
tlGPI 0.14 -0.08 0.00 0.07 0.20 0.08 -0.02 0.05 0.22 0.41 0.28 0.23 1.00
8.4. Empirical Results
In order to test for the empirical relevance of the hypotheses regarding the causes of 
bank profitability, we adopt a multiple regression framework to analyse the panel data 
set that has been constructed. The basic equation we have worked with is:
DF.P,,=f (Inassets,,, LA,„ OA„, Gap,,, F.A„, LL.P/TL,,, MSH,„ H„, INT„, DI V,,, DGDP,,, DGPI„) + u„ 
where i refers to an individual bank, t refers to time, and j refers to the country in 
which bank i operates. DEP„ is the dependent variable and is the observation of a 
particular bank in a particular year.
At each stage o f model building and for each group of regression results, we perform 
the regression with all variables included and we examine the results. We start by 
running OLS estimates and fixed effects estimates with the Gap, EA and LLP/TA 
variables as the only independent variables (Table 41). However, in the main text we 
will present only the fixed effects’ results since they present the best estimates. The 
sample is comprised of 685 European banks for the period 1994-1998, or 3425 
observations. The explanatory power of the model, the R-squared, is at the satisfactory
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level of 0.68. The standard error of the regression is 0.8069. It also seems that we do 
not have heteroscedasticity problems, since we conduct the Lagrange multiplier (LM)61 
test for heteroscedasticity. Since the Durbin-Watson statistic is 1.85, one may assume 
that there is no first-order autocorrelation, either positive or negative. All the variables 
are significant at the 5% level in the regression with the expected sign (the results are 
the same if we run the plain OLS estimates, Annex 19). The t-statistics for the Gap, 
EA, and LLP/TL variables are 5.0938, 8.8783, and -27.5798 respectively. Based on a 
Hausman test we can conclude that of the two alternatives (fixed versus random 
effects), the fixed effects estimator is the appropriate choice.
i
I
I
Table 41: Within (fixed effects) estimates (independent variables: Gap, EA,
1
8
Dependent variable: return on assets
Sum of squared residuals = 1782.21 R-squared = 0.6796
Variance of residuals = 0.6512 Adjusted R-squared = 0.5992
Std. error of regression = 0.8069 LM het. Test = 362.697 [.000]
Durbin-Watson = 1.8560 [.000, .000]
Variance Estimated
Coefficient
Standard
error
t-statistic p-value
Gap 4.3817 0.8602 5.0938 [.000]
EA 0.1192 0.0134 8.8783 [.000]
LLP/TL -0.1926 0.0070 -27.5798 [.000]
F (684, 2737) = 4.0960, p-value = [.0000]
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(3) = 12.380, p-value = [.0062]
41 The assumptions of homoscedastic residual variance is often violated by the use o f cross- 
sectional data. To investigate whether there is evidence of heteroscedasticity in the residual 
variance we use the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test. The LM test is performed by regressing the 
residuals into the predicted values from which they were obtained. Calculating nR2, where n is 
the sample size and R2 obtained from this regression gives the test statistic. Its distribution will 
be chi-squared with S  degrees of freedom, where S  is the number o f restrictions in the model. 
The critical chi-square values are 3.84146 (at the 55 level) and 6.63490 (at the 10% level). 
Values below this would reject the null hypothesis of heteroscedastic residual variance.
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We then introduce in the model the two variables, the market share (MSH) and the 
Herfindahl index (H), to examine whether the structure-conduct-performance or the 
efficient hypothesis is validate (Table 42). The results for the significance and the sign 
o f the variables Gap, EA, and LLP/TL do not change, while both the MSH and the H 
are not significant at the 5% level (the t-statistics for MSH and H are 0.2383 and - 
1.7804 respectively, while the p-values are 0.812 and 0.075 respectively). The plain 
(OLS) estimates differ on the significance of the structure variables; both the MSH and 
the H variables are significant and positive with t-value 3.0723 and 3.4366 respectively 
(Annex 20). The statistical figures for the regression remain almost the same. If we 
introduce only the MSH variable the results for the significance and the sign do not 
change (the same if we introduce only the H variable).
¡- Table 42: \ \  it bin (fixed effects) estimates (Independent sariablcs: Gap, EA, j
LLP/TL, MSII, II)
Dependent variable: return on assets
Sum of squared residuals = 1780.14 R-squared = 0.6800
Variance of residuals = 0.6509 Adjusted R-squared = 0.5993
Std. error of regression = 0.8068 LM het. Test = 363.775 [.000]
Durbin-Watson = 1.8543 [.000, .000]
Variance Estimated
Coefficient
Standard error t-statistic p-value
Gap 4.4710 0.8616 5.1893 [.000]
EA 0.1202 0.0135 8.9303 [.000]
LLP/TL -0.1924 0.0070 -27.5650 [.000]
MSH 0.0027 0.0113 0.2383 [.812]
H -0.0003 0.0002 -1.7804 [.075]
F  (684, 2735) =4.0457,p-value = [0000]
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(5) = 17.623, p-value = [0035]
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We then introduce the bassets, LA, and OA variables in the model (Table 43). The R- 
square is improved (it is now 0.70) while the variance and the standard error of the 
regression are smaller (0.6138 and 0.7835 respectively). LA has a negative and 
significant sign (the t-statistic is -4.8493 and the coefficient -0.0144). Although 
conflicting results appear in the case of testing for this relationship, Molyneux and 
Thornton (1992) and Abdula (1994) find also a negative relationship between bank 
profitability and the level of liquid assets being in the balance structure of the banks. 
Also the lnassets and OA have positive and negative significant values respectively, as 
expected (the t-statistics are 9.0297 and -4.7869 respectively). The signs and 
significance of the other variables remain the same.
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Table 43: Within (fixed effects) estimates (independent variables: Inussets, LA, ; 
OA, Gap, KA, I.LIVTL, MSII, II)
Dependent variable: return on assets
Sum of squared residuals = 1676.89 R-squared = 0.6985
Variance of residuals = 0.6138 Adjusted R-squared = 0.6222
Std. error of regression =0.7835 LM het. Test = 463.142 [.000]
Durbin-Watson = 1.8061 [.000, .000]
Variance Estimated
Coefficient
Standard error t-statistic p-value
Lnassets 0.7347 0.0814 9.0297 [.000]
LA -0.0144 0.0030 -4.8493 [.000]
OA -0.1593 0.0333 -4.7869 [.000]
Gap 2.2922 0.8592 2.6677 [.008]
EA 0.2076 0.0148 14.0502 [.000]
LLP/TL -0.1812 0.0069 -26.2436 [.000]
MSH -0.0099 0.0111 -0.8970 [.370]
H -0.0003 0.0001 -1.8459 [.065]
F  (684, 2732) =4.4489, p-value = [.0000]
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(8) = 199.36, p-value = [0035]
If we exclude LLP/TL, the size of the sample increases significantly (German banks 
are also included), the explanatory power of the model is at satisfactory levels but 
lower than the respective one if we include this ratio (the R-squared is now 0.6054) 
(Table 44). In this case LA has positive but insigificant effect on profitability, while 
the concentration index has negative and significant values (the t-statistic is -7.7488 
and the coefficient is -0.0006).
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, Tal>lc 44: Within (fixed effects) estimates (.independent variables: Inassets, LA, .
j OA, Gap, EA, MSII, II)
i .___________________________ ,_______________________________________ - __ ä
Dependent variable: return on assets
Sum of squared residuals = 3355.08 R-squared = 0.6054
Variance of residuals = 0.3883 Adjusted R-squared = 0.5064
Std. error of regression =0.6231 LM het. Test = 405.142 [.000]
Durbin-Watson = 1.7521 [.000, .000]
Variance Estimated
Coefficient
Standard error t-statistic p-value
Lnassets 0.3898 0.0432 9.0142 [.000]
LA 0.0026 0.0016 1.6295 [.000]
OA -0.3361 0.0198 -16.9455 [.000]
Gap 2.2339 0.4952 4.5113 [.000]
EA 0.1887 0.0082 21.8926 [.000]
MSH -0.0052 0.0083 -0.6199 [.195]
H -0.0006 0.0001 -7.7488 [.000]
F (2161, 8641) =4.9924, p-value = [0000]
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(7) = 574.41, p-value = [0000]
We then introduce the macroeconomic variables in the model. In this case all the 
values have the expected sign (Table 45). The sum of the squared residuals is further 
reduced, as do the variance of the residuals and the standard error of the regression 
(with values 1630.40, 0.5977, and 0.7731 respectively). The market structure variables 
do not have any influence, while the change of the GDP and the level o f interest rates 
have significant negative and positive effects respectively (their t-statistics are -8.4756 
and 4.5202 respectively). The OLS estimates show similar results, with the MSH, LA, 
and H being significantly positive (only the OA has not the expected sign) (Annex 21). 
If we exclude LLP/TL the results are similar with Table 44 (the level of interest rates
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has positive and significant effect on ROA, while H continues to have significantly 
negative impact).
V ..................... ...............  ■ . ......................................................  ■ ■ i .  ... ......................................................................... I ,
! Table 45: Within (fixed effects) estimates (independent variables: Inassets, LA, 
s OA, (¿up, l-'.A, L1.17TL, .MS11, II, and the macroecunuiiiie \urlablcs)
Dependent variable: return on assets
Sum of squared residuals = 1630.40 R-squared = 0.7069
Variance of residuals = 0.5977 Adjusted R-squared = 0.6321
Std. Error of regression = 0.7731 LM het. Test = 444.384 [.000]
Durbin-Watson =1.7816 [.000, .000]
Variance Estimated
Coefficient
Standard error t-statistic p-value
Lnassets 0.7022 0.0820 8.5659 [.000]
LA -0.0119 0.0031 -3.8547 [.000]
OA -0.1860 0.0335 -5.5549 [.000]
Gap 2.1827 0.8495 2.5695 [.010]
EA 0.1968 0.0147 13.3499 [.000]
LLP/TL -0.1806 0.0068 -26.4952 [.000]
MSH -0.0104 0.0109 -0.9488 [.343]
H 0.0000 0.0002 -0.2379 [.812]
INT 0.0537 0.0118 4.5202 [.000]
DEV -0.0313 0.0171 -1.8377 [.066]
DGDP -0.0076 0.0009 -8.4756 [.000]
DGPI 0.0142 0.0091 1.5652 [.118]
F  (684, 2728) =4.5111, p-value = [0000]
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(12) = 202.35, p-value = [0000]
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8.4.1. S iz e  effects
We split the banks according to the cut-off point we have defined for the size of the 
financial institutions i.e. the large banks have total assets of over US$ 10,000bn in 
1998. In this case the two sub-samples comprise from 138 large banks (or 690 
observations) and 547 small banks (or 2735 observations) respectively. Table 46 
provides summary statistics for the variables that are used in the analysis. Small banks 
have larger mean value for the profit rates in the examined period compared with the 
large banks (profits before tax have a mean value of 0.9596% and 0.8110% of total 
assets respectively), but also almost double values of ROA’s standard deviation. Worth 
mentioning is the high variability of the loan loss provisions to total loans, for both size 
types. The mean values of LA, Gap, and EA are larger for small banks, but these banks 
have also larger values for OA, and LLP/TL. For large banks the equity-to-assets ratio 
is 5.3% (compared with 8.3% for small banks), and the proportion of overheads to total 
assets is 2.14% (compared with the 3.2% for the smaller banks).
-------------  ------- ■— ■----------------------------------------------------------]
Table 46: Descriptive Statistics for Large and Small Hanks
Large mean st. dev. min max var. skew. kurt.
ROA 0.8110 0.6345 -1.8991 3.0788 0.4025 0.2616 1.7023
Lnassets 17.3478 1.1644 13.5466 20.3752 1.3560 0.5390 -0.4948
LA 50.9770 18.9619 0.3110 97.0450 359.553 0.2729 0.5049
Gap 0.0480 0.0411 -0.0798 0.3796 0.0017 1.6480 8.5514
EA 5.2859 2.3928 0.9182 38.4245 5.7255 4.1684 52.4865
OA 2.1423 0.9531 0.0398 6.9137 0.9084 0.0450 1.0085
LLP/TL 0.7597 1.7693 -37.0154 15.0251 3.1304 -12.9840 309.1122
MSH 11.3737 22.5636 0.0821 179.0446 509.1184 4.3312 22.0652
H 895.4995 589.028 249.285 3637.543 346954.4 1.8710 2.9092
INT 6.2900 2.8180 3.0754 27.2734 7.9408 2.8950 17.0322
DEV 0.6127 1.7157 0.0484 22.2561 2.9435 11.7816 145.5572
DGDP 4.6188 12.1018 -37.2833 106.4748 146.4542 4.0037 35.2252
DGPI 4.7322 2.0484 -7.3847 14.0852 4.1958 0.9763 3.8788
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Sm all mean st. dev. min max var. skew. kurt.
ROA 0.9596 1.3887 -22.6530 14.6611 1.9286 -4.6967 66.9395
Lnassets 13.8804 1.3215 9.3393 16.2905 1.7462 -0.4624 -0.4539
LA 54.7713 19.2539 1.7728 99.5503 370.7129 0.0395 -0.2683
Gap 0.0635 0.0497 -0.1831 0.2352 0.0025 -0.1659 0.7780
EA 8.3362 3.9932 -11.2884 24.3390 15.9455 0.6543 0.3789
OA 3.2117 1.4168 0.1328 15.2950 2.0073 0.8285 4.5287
LLP/TL 1.2342 2.8147 -30.9892 77.7832 7.9226 10.8358 250.9740
MSH 0.1761 0.4430 0.0015 5.9298 0.1962 6.7401 57.6223
H 759.1945 488.2174 430.4616 3637.542 238356 1.9282 3.1720
1NT 6.1132 2.3044 3.0754 27.2734 5.3104 1.6125 9.7318
DEV 0.5009 0.8984 0.0484 22.2561 0.8071 20.9772 502.1211
DGDP 4.8580 17.2945 -37.2822 106.4748 299.0992 3.8192 22.2696
DGPI 4.6909 1.8844 1.7948 14.0852 3.5511 1.4122 1.8601
Table 47 presents the correlation matrix for the several variables in the two size 
categories. We find a significant positive correlation in both categories for ROA with 
with Gap and EA, Gap with EA (especially for small banks), EA with OA, and IR with 
DEV and dGPI. Also there is a negative correlation of Lnassets with EA for both large 
and small banks. Moreover, for large banks there exist a significant positive correlation 
of LA with the Gap and the EA, ROA with LA, OA with IR, and the deviation of the 
interest rates with dGPI. Finally, for small banks there is a strong negative correlation 
of ROA with the LLP/TL, and Lnassets with EA, and a positive one of Lnassets with 
the market share of the financial institutions. There does not seem to exist any 
collinearity problem.
Christos Staikouras 229
f n T T T " j n  c«»un«nt Determinants o f  Bank Profitability -  Econometric Analysis
IkWinp*»
« ■"" ■ ■ .. . ..... 1,1 1 1
i 1'iililu 47: Correlation Matrix or Large anil Small Hanks
Large ROA Lnas LA Gap EA OA LLP MSH H 1R DEV dGD dGPI
ROA 1.00
Lnas -0.16 1.00
LA 0 5 0 -0.09 1.00
Gap 0.26 -0.08 0.25 1.00
EA 0.51 -0.34 050 0.40 1.00
OA 0.25 -0.14 0.01 -0.17 052 1.00
LLP -0.08 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 0.01 0.17 1.00
MSH 0.14 0.52 0.06 0.07 -0.12 -0.04 -0.04 1.00
H 0.01 -0.01 0.08 0.02 -0.01 -0.14 -0.02 0.11 1.00
IR 0.12 -0.15 -0.03 -0.12 0.14 0.29 0.06 0.04 0.10 1.00
DEV 0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.23 0.66 1.00
dGDP -0.07 -0.01 0.04 -0.05 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.12 0.24 0.05 1.00
dGPI 0.20 -0.09 0.05 -0.08 0.14 0.17 -0.02 0.09 0.22 0.54 0.38 0.24 1.00
S m all ROA Lnas LA Gap EA OA LLP MSH H 1R DEV dGD dGPI
ROA 1.00
Lnas -0.13 1.00
LA 0.08 0.07 1.00
Gap 0 5 4 -0.24 0.01 1.00
EA 0.40 -0.46 -0.12 0.74 1.00
OA 0.10 •052 0.05 0.10 051 1.00
LLP -0.47 -0.07 -0.12 -0.01 -0.04 0.09 1.00
MSH 0.01 053 -0.01 -0.14 •0.16 -0.14 -0.03 1.00
H 0.10 -0.18 0.02 0.03 0.10 -0.09 -0.03 0.37 1.00
1R 0.08 -0.04 -0.23 0.13 0.20 0.13 0.01 0.11 -0.15 1.00
DEV 0.02 0.01 -0.08 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.12 0.12 0.51 1.00
dGDP -0.08 -0.08 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.13 0.19 0.05 1.00
dGPI 0.15 -0.13 -0.01 0.11 0.23 0.07 -0.02 0.13 0.22 057 0.24 0.23 1.00
We begin the econometric analysis by running the fixed effects estimates for the two 
size categories, with the Gap, EA and LLP/TL variables as the only independent
Christos Staikouras 230
Determinants o f  Bank Profitability -  Econometric Analysis
□naa?“ -
variables (Table 48). All the variables are significant with the expected sign (the results 
are the same if we run the plain OLS estimates, Annex 22). The t-statistics are much 
more significant in the case of small banks. However, the R-squared is much higher for 
large banks (R-squared equal to 0.8097 for large banks compared with 0.6879 for small 
banks), and the sum of the squared residuals and their variance smaller.
Table 48: Within (fixed cll'ccts) estimâtes fur large and small banks (independent
variables: Gap, EA, LLP/TL)
Dependent variable: return on assets
Sum of squared residuals 
52.7678 (1645.39)
R-squared 
0.8097 (0.6879)
Variance of residuals 
0.0961 (0.7530)
Adjusted R-squared 
0.7612 (0.6095)
Standard error of regression 
0.3100 (0.8678)
LM heteroscedasticity test 
2.5359 [.111] (277.478[000])
Durbin-Watson test 
1.4857 [.000] (1.8250 [000])
Variance Estimated
Coefficient
Standard
error
t-statistic p-value
Gap 2.4470 (5.4342) 0.6960
(1.0540)
3.5156
(5.1557)
[.000]
([.000])
EA 0.0282 (0.1336) 0.0117
(0.0161)
2.4041
(8.3013)
[.017]
([.000])
LLP/TL -0.019 (-0.2198) 0.0071
(0.0057;
-2.7016
(-27.0082)
[.007]
([.000])
F (137, 549) = 11.439, p-value = [.0000]
F  (546, 2185) = 4.0568, p-value = [.0000]
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(3) = 34.340, P-value = [.0000] 
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(3) = 13.953, P-value = [.0030]
Note: Fonds with italics refer to small banks: otherwise, large banks,
We then introduce in the model the two variables, MSH and H (Table 49). The results 
for the significance and the sign of the variables Gap, EA, and LLP/TL do not change, 
while both the MSH and the H are not significant for large banks (the t-statistics for 
MSH and H are -1.6813 and -0.8997 respectively). In the case of small banks, it seems
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that the MSH is significant and positive (the t-statistic for the market share variable is 
5.4666 and the coefficient is 0.8736) (the latter case gives support to the efficient 
hypothesis).
Table 49: Within (fixed effects) estimates fur large and small bunks (independent' 
variables: (jap, EA, LI.IYI I., M.MI, und II)
Dependent variable: return on assets
Sum of squared residuals 
52.3734 (1622.30)
R-squared 
0.8112 (0.6923)
Variance of residuals 
0.0957 (0.7432)
Adjusted R-squared 
0.7621 (0.6147)
Standard error of regression 
0.3094 (0.8621)
LM heteroscedasticity test 
2.8111 [.094] (281.445 [000])
Durbin-Watson test 
1.4837 [.000] (1.8436 [000])
Variance Estimated
Coefficient
Standard
error
t-statistic p-value
Gap 2.5111 (5.1309) 0.6956
(1.0509)
3.6096
(4.8823)
[.000]
([.000])
EA 0.0278 (0.1469) 0.0120
(0.0162)
2.3221
(9.0755)
[.021]
([.000])
LLP/TL -0.0191 (-0.2224) 0.0070
(0.0081)
-2.7161
(-27.4640)
[.007]
([.000])
MSH -0.0074 (0.8736) 0.0044
(0.1598)
-1.6813
(5.4666)
[.093]
([.000])
H 0.0001 (-0.0004) 0.0001
(0.0002)
-0.8997
(-1.9305)
[.369]
([.054])
F (137, 547) = 10.702, p-value = [.0000]
F  (546, 2183) = 4.1048, p-value = [0000]
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(5) = 46.614, P-value = [.0000] 
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(5) = 35.777, P-value = [.0000]
Note: Fonds with italics refer to small banks: otherwise, large banks.
We also introduce the lnassets, LA, and OA in the model (Table 50). The results we 
find for small banks are similar with those for the total sample of banks. However, the 
MSH continues to be positive and significant (the t-statistic is 2.7914 and the
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coefficient 0.4574). In the case of large banks, the LA has a positive and significant 
sign (the t-statistic is 3.0475 and the coefficient 0.0095), supporting the view that a 
positive relationship exists between this variable and the performance measure.
|Table 50: Within (fixed effects) estimates fur large and small banks (independent; 
variables: Inassets, LA, li, MSII, OA, Gap, l-'.A, l.LP/TL)
Dependent variable: return on assets
Sum of squared residuals 
50.8351 (1519.70)
R-squared 
0.8167 (0.7118)
Variance of residuals 
0.0934 (0.6971)
Adjusted R-squared 
0.7679 (0.6385)
Standard error of regression 
0.3057 (0.8349)
LM heteroscedasticity test 
2.4304 [.119] (365.006 [000])
Durbin-Watson test 
1.5280 [.000] (1.7828 [000])
Variance Estimated
Coefficient
Standard
error
t-statistic p-value
Lnassets -0M 37 (0.8144) 0.0750
(0.1027)
-1.5156
(7.9277)
[.130]
([.000])
LA 0.0095 (-0.1758) 0.0031
(0.0034)
3.0475
(-5.1285)
[.002]
([000])
Gap 2.2896 (3.2988) 0.7388
(1.0366)
3.0991
(3.1824)
[.002]
([001])
EA 0.0191 (0.2328) 0.0146
(0.0173)
1.3101
(13.4630)
[.191]
([000])
OA -0.1484 (-0.1645) 0.0489
(0.0374)
-3.0324
(-4.3942)
[.003]
([000])
LLP/TL -0.0174 (-0.2089) 0.0070
(0.0080)
-2.4845
(-26.0541)
[.013]
([000])
MSH -0.0086 (0.4574) 0.0044
(0.1639)
-1.9313
(2.7914)
[.054]
([005])
H 0.0000 (-0.0003) 0.0001
(0.0002)
-0.5968
(-1.4392)
[.551]
([■150])
F (137, 544) = 10.092, p-value = [.0000]
F  (546, 2180) = 4.5737,p-value = [0000]
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(8) = 60.292, P-value = [.0000] 
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(8) = 196.59, P-value = [0000]
Note: Fonds with italics refer to small banks: otherwise, laree banks.
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We then introduce the macroeconomic variables in the model (Table 51). The 
interesting points are that the size variable has negative impact on large banks, while a 
significant positive one on small banks, and the level of interest rates has a negative 
impact on large banks and positive on small banks. This result gives support to the 
recent papers that mention the diseconomies of scale that exist from a level of size 
upwards. Growing banks may face diminishing marginal returns so average profits 
would decline with size. Information advantage and the enforcement power gain from 
size is significant for small banks.
| Table 51: Within (fixed effects) estimates (independent vuriubles: Inassets, I .A, 
OA, Gup, EA, LLl’/TL, MSII, II, INT, DEV, dCDl», dG’I'I)
Dependent variable: return on assets
Sum of squared residuals 
46.7127 (1473.74)
R-squared 
0.8316 (0.7205)
Variance of residuals 
0.0865 (0.6773)
Adjusted R-squared 
0.7851 (0.6488)
Standard error of regression 
0.2941 (0.8230)
LM heteroscedasticity test 
2.8639 [.091] (352.007 [.000])
Durbin-Watson test 
1.5901 [.000] (1.7532 [.000])
Variance Estimated
Coefficient
Standard
error
t-statistic p-value
Lnassets -0.1777 (0.7688) 0.0743
(0.1041)
-2.3914
(7.3857)
[.017]
([.000])
LA 0.0069 (-0.0147) 0.0031
(0.0036)
2.2368
(-4.1084)
[.026]
([.000])
Gap 2.0573 (3.2008) 0.7203
(1.0234)
2.8563
(3.1276)
[.004]
([.002])
EA 0.0172 (0.2213) 0.0141
(0.0173)
1.2205
(12.7822)
[.223]
([.000])
OA -0.0850 (-0.1991) 0.0483
(0.0376)
-1.7585
(-5.2955)
[.079]
([.000])
LLP/TL -0.0154 (-0.2083) 0.0067
(0.0079)
-2.2793
(-26.3182)
[.023]
([000])
MSH -0.0056 (0.4480) 0.0043
(0.1661)
-1.3013
(2.6971)
[•194]
(007])
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H -0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0001
(0.0002)
-1.0532
(0.4261)
[.293]
([670])
1NT -0.0276 (0.0663) 0.0102
(0.0147)
-2.7231
(4.5001)
[.007]
([.000])
DEV 0.0273 (-0.0448) 0.0104
(0.0249)
2.6304
(-1.7979)
[.009]
([.072])
DGDP -0.0044 (-0.0079) 0.0010
(0.0010)
-4.0787
(-7.8128)
[.000]
([.000])
DGPI 0.0320 (0.0136) 0.0078
(0.0109)
4.0957
(1.2478)
[.000]
([.212])
F (137,540) = 10.598, p-value = [.0000]
F  (546, 2176) = 4.6695, p-value = [0000]
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(12) = 51.058, P-value = [.0000] 
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(12) = 204.49, P-value = [0000]
Note: Fonds with italics refer to small banks: otherwise, large banks.
8.4.2. Type effects
Finally, we split the banks according to their type. The four categories are those of 
commercial, co-operative, savings and mortgage banks. We conclude with 356 
commercial banks, 135 savings banks and 151 co-operative banks. We do not include 
the mortgage banks since the number of institutions in that category is small (only 43 
financial institutions are mortgage banks). We should repeat at this point that the 
number of savings and co-operative banks has been reduced since we do not have 
available data for the loan loss provisions of the German banks (where most of the 
savings and cooperative banks are established) and our sample is balanced.
Table 52 provides summary statistics for the variables that are used in the analysis. All 
variables vary widely among the different types of financial institutions. The mean 
value of the ROA is the largest for the savings banks (1.10%), and the smallest for 
commercial banks (0.79%); the latter category of financial institutions also have the 
largest variability on their profits (1.82%). The proportion of loans to total assets is the 
largest for cooperative and commercial banks (almost 54% in both cases) and 7% 
smaller for the savings banks. The equity to assets ratio is almost 9% for cooperative 
and savings banks, and about 7% for commercial banks. Finally, all types of 
institutions have almost similar levels of overheads to total assets.
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.Table 52: Descriptive Statistics Tor Commercial, Co-operative anil Savings Hanks
Com m ercial
banks
mean st. dev. min max var. skew. kurt.
ROA 0.7930 1.8158 -22.6530 14.6611 3.2973 -5.0261 52.4382
Lnassets 14.7058 2.0581 10.5180 20.3752 4.2356 0.4530 -0.3067
LA 53.5723 19.3345 0.8423 99.5503 373.8225 0.1827 -0.0597
Gap 0.0538 0.0513 -0.2787 0.2163 0.0026 -0.4218 2.5846
EA 7.2241 3.9956 -36.3921 24.3389 15.9653 -0.4293 11.5249
OA 3.1837 1.6577 0.0398 16.7623 2.7481 1.5356 7.1034
LLP/TL 1.3781 3.1275 -30.9892 77.7832 9.7813 10.1395 232.3713
MSH 2.0932 5.6343 0.0014 54.0289 31.7448 4.1826 21.0995
H 885.002 583.569 249.285 3637.543 340553.3 1.5057 1.5883
1NT 5.9560 2.6543 3.0754 27.2734 7.0452 2.9507 18.1691
DEV 0.5619 1.5183 0.0485 22.2561 2.3051 13.2416 185.4120
DGDP 5.1354 18.4871 -37.2822 106.4748 341.7717 3.5716 19.1182
DGP1 4.7489 2.0108 -7.3847 14.0852 4.0434 1.3222 3.1368
Cwo, banks mean st. dev. min max var. skew. kurt.
ROA 1.0378 0.7318 -2.7363 4.1115 0.5356 0.1505 3.2343
Lnassets 14.2726 1.6523 10.4679 19.9843 2.7299 0.4913 0.8730
LA 54.3152 16.3485 4.7219 90.2399 267.2746 -0.1844 0.1025
Gap 0.0650 0.0433 -0.0798 0.2622 0.0019 0.4588 0.4359
EA 8.7115 4.1825 -0.9289 26.5105 17.4935 0.7959 0.3648
OA 3.1703 0.8278 0.0773 6.2382 0.6852 -0.4651 1.5448
LLP/TL 0.9426 0.8635 -0.1926 9.5714 0.7456 4.0506 25.5219
MSH 0.4209 2.0046 0.0018 21.1895 4.0183 7.8202 67.6215
H 509.4587 172.3246 430.4616 2399.371 29695.7 7.8179 70.9744
INT 6.3407 2.2886 3.2283 10.2825 5.2374 0.2324 -1.1871
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DEV 0.5023 0.3151 0.0484 1.0384 0.0993 0.1917 •1.2164
DGDP 3.2634 7.0572 -9.5517 18.4549 49.8044 -0.0986 -0.5674
DGPI 4.3138 1.6865 1.7948 8.7928 2.8442 1.7795 2.2882
Savinas banks mean st. dev. min max vor. skew. hurt.
ROA 1.1003 0.8558 -3.8062 5.6328 0.7324 0.4647 4.7470
Lnassets 14.3440 1.7443 9.3393 19.2779 3.0427 -0.2409 0.3725
LA 47.1624 14.3969 9.0526 96.8180 207.2700 0.0923 0.1976
Gap 0.0672 0.0504 -0.0766 0.2172 0.0025 0.1326 -0.8969
EA 8.6997 3.9362 1.7134 21.7069 15.4934 0.5219 -0.4028
OA 3.1479 1.1525 0.5304 7.7744 1.3282 0.0071 -0.5351
LLP/TL 0.9496 1.0106 -2.1659 9.7336 1.0214 3.4355 21.4075
MSH 0.6597 2.3892 0.0026 21.7841 5.7084 6.2477 41.6039
H 823.3682 460.6764 430.4616 2668.041 212222.7 1.2379 0.5578
INT 6.4653 2.1429 3.2283 10.2825 4.5919 0.1979 -1.1568
DEV 0.5019 0.2584 0.0484 1.3877 0.0668 0.2495 -0.8499
DGDP 5.0855 20.6660 -37.2822 106.4748 427.0844 3.3902 15.7935
DGPI 4.9303 2.0744 1.7948 10.3204 4.3033 0.9686 0.0836
Table 53 presents the correlation matrix for the several variables. We find a significant 
positive correlation of ROA with Gap and EA (especially for cooperative banks) and 
negative with LLP/TL (especially for commercial banks and insignificant for savings 
banks). Also there is a strong negative correlation of assets with EA and OA and 
positive with MSH, and a positive one for Gap with EA, for all different types of 
financial institutions. Finally, savings banks seem to have a positive correlation of OA 
with EA and Gap.
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Tabic S3: Correlation Matrix of Commercial, Cooperala e and Savings llanks
ROA Lnas LA Gap EA OA LLP MSH H IR DEV dGD dGPI
ROA 1.00
Lnas -0.02 1.00
LA 0.10 -0.11 1.00
Gap 0.32 -0.14 0.13 1.00
EA 0.38 -0.43 0.05 0.66 1.00
OA -0.05 -0.39 0.24 0.02 0.25 1.00
LLP •0.53 -0.13 -0.05 -0.04 -0.07 0.18 1.00
MSH 0.00 0.57 -0.10 -0.09 -0.22 -0.20 -0.06 1.00
H 0.10 -0.01 -0.07 0.06 0.10 -0.15 -0.06 0.37 1.00
IR 0.06 0.09 -0.17 -0.04 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.06 1.00
DEV 0.02 0.02 -0.08 •0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.13 0.21 0.65 1.00
dGDP -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.12 0.17 0.03 1.00
dGPI 0.13 -0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.18 0.02 -0.04 0.11 0.29 0.46 0.35 0.23 1.00
Note: commercial banks
ROA Lnas LA Gap EA OA LLP MSH H 1R DEV dGD dGPI
ROA 1.00
Lnas -0.34 1.00
LA -0.10 0.19 1.00
Gap 0.64 -0.38 -0.19 1.00
EA 0.65 -0.56 -0.25 0.86 1.00
OA 0.17 •0.50 0.08 0.03 0.23 1.00
LLP -0.39 -0.09 -0.11 -0.04 -0.01 0.12 1.00
MSH -0.12 0.51 -0.08 -0.01 -0.16 -0.32 -0.04 1.00
H -0.06 0.24 0.01 0.16 0.01 -0.30 -0.05 0.72 1.00
1R 0.32 -0.38 -0.47 0.29 0.43 0.38 017 -0.13 -0.25 1.00
DEV 0.19 -0.16 -0.23 0.16 0.19 0.12 012 -0.06 -0.05 0.54 1.00
dGDP 0.07 -0.01 -0.08 -0.04 0.00 0.09 0.07 0.00 -0.06 0.51 0.73 1.00
dGPI 0.23 -0.17 -0.15 0.14 0.20 0.16 0.08 -0 07 -0.14 0.48 0.34 0.28 1.00
Note: cooperative hanks
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ROA Lnas LA Gap EA OA LLP MSH H 1R DEV dGD dGPl
ROA 1.00
Lnas -0.30 1.00
LA 0.26 -0.19 1.00
Gap 0 3 8 -0.43 0.16 1.00
EA 0.51 -0.60 0.15 0.81 1.00
OA 0.19 -0.57 0.25 0.54 0.64 1.00
LLP -0.05 •0.18 -0.02 0.21 0.25 0.34 1.00
MSH -0.05 0.44 0.08 -0.17 -0.23 ■0.26 -0.08 1.00
H 0.30 -0.45 0.30 0.04 0.23 -0.05 -0.04 0.11 1.00
1R -0.01 0.06 0.03 0.23 0.14 0.39 0.30 -0.03 -0.47 1.00
DEV 0.14 0.06 0.05 0.17 0.06 0.14 0.16 -0.04 -0.26 0.47 1.00
dGDP -0.22 -0.13 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.04 -0.01 0.15 0.15 0.01 1.00
dGPl 0.23 -0.19 0.26 0.15 0.29 0.26 0.09 -0.03 0.17 0.21 0.10 0.22 1.00
Note: savings banks
We start by running fixed effects estimates with the Gap, EA and LLP/TL variables as 
the only independent variables (Table 54). The reported R-squared is higher for 
cooperative banks (0.82), while it is 0.72 for commercial banks and 0.65 for savings 
banks. However, the standard error of the regression is the highest one for commercial 
banks. All the variables are significant with the expected sign (the results are the same 
if we run the plain OLS estimates, Annex 23). The Gap variable is more significant for 
savings banks (the t-statistic is 7.0490), while the EA variable is more significant for 
commercial banks (the t-statistic is 9.5187). For savings banks, the sign for EA is 
negative but insignificant. The LLPfTL is more significant with negative effect on 
profitability for commercial and cooperative banks (the t-statistics equal -24.1567 and - 
12.2459 respectively). From the Hausman test, it seems that the random effects may 
give better estimates in the case of co-operative banks. However the results, even with 
the implementation of the random effects model, are the same (Annex 24)
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Table 54: Within (fixed effects) estimates for the tjpes of institutions 
(independent \ariuhles: Gap, EA, LI.P/TL)
Dependent variable: return on assets
Sum o f squared residuals 
1667.23 
71.11 
173.677
R-squared
0.7158
0.8239
0.6482
Variance o f residuals 
1.1733 
0.1183 
0.3234
Adjusted R-squared 
0.6442 
0.7791 
0.5584
Standard error o f  regression 
1.0832 
0.3440 
0.5687
LM heteroscedasticity test 
303.123[.000] 
30.975i[.000] 
56.6363[.000]
Durbin-Watson test 
1.9366[.073,.096] 
1.4389[.000,.000] 
1.6720[.000,.000]
Variance Estimated
Coefficient
Standard
error
t-statistic p-value
Gap 5.1963
5.0041
12.5828
1.3972
1.1042
1.7851
3.7190
4.5319
7.0490
[.000]
[.000]
[.000]
EA 0.1769
0.0557
-0.0070
0.0186
0.0177
0.0298
9.5187
3.1476
-0.2340
[.000]
[002]
[.815]
LLP/TL -0.2441
-0.2969
-0.0967
0.0101
0.0242
0.0316
-24.1567
-12.2459
-3.0591
[.000]
[000]
[.002]
F (355, 1421) = 4.3452, p-value = [.0000]
F  (ISO, 601) = 5.3093, p-value = [MOO]
F (134,537) = 3.9819, p-value = [.0000]
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(3) = 34.340, P-value = [.0000] 
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(3) = 1.6122, P-value = [.6566] 
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(3) = 55.347, P-value = [.0030]
Note: nomal letters -  commercial banks, italics -  cooperative banks, bold ■ savings banks
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We then introduce in the model the two variables (MSH and H) to examine whether 
the structure-conduct-performance or the efficient hypothesis are validate for each type 
of financial institution (Table 55). The R-squared do not seem to have been improved 
in any type of financial institution. Also, the results for the significance and the signs 
of the variables Gap, EA, and LLP/TL do not change. MSH is not a significant 
variable, while H is significant only for cooperative banks (the t-statistics is 2.0547 and 
the coefficient is 0.0005). This gives support to the traditional structure-conduct- 
performance hypothesis. If we introduce only MSH the results for the significance and 
the sign do not change (the same if we introduce only the H variable).
; Table 55: \ \  ¡thin (fixed effects) estimates (independent xariubles: Gap, LA, 
I I.LIVI L, MSII, II)
Dependent variable: return on assets
Sum o f squared residuals R-squared
1666.50 0.7159
70.2725 0.8260
173.668 0.6482
Variance o f residuals Adjusted R-squared
1.1744 0.6438
0.1173 0.7809
0.3246 0.5568
Standard error o f  regression LM heteroscedasticity test
1.0837 303.308 [.000]
0.3425 27.0000 [.000]
0.5697 56.6234 [.000]
Durbin-Watson test 
1.9359 [.064,. 102] 
1.4628 [000, .000] 
1.6708 [.000, .000]
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Variance Estimated
Coefficient
Standard
error
t-statistic p-value
Gap 5.2157 1.3989 3.7283 [.000]
5.7336 1.1356 5.0590 [000]
12.5966 1.7940 7.0213 [.000]
EA 0.1769 0.0186 9.5036 [.000]
0.0510 0.0180 2.8274 [005]
-0.0071 0.0299 -0.2382 [.812]
LLP/TL -0.2441 0.0101 -24.1371 [.000]
-0.3007 0.0242 -12.4271 [000]
-0.0970 0.0319 -3.0386 [.002]
MSH 0.0077 0.0263 0.2929 [.770]
-0.0999 0.0859 -1.1625 1245]
-0.0136 0.1135 -0.1196 [.905]
H -0.0002 0.0003 -0.7878 [.431]
0.0005 0.0003 2.0547 [040]
0.0000 0.0003 -0.0844 [.933]
F (355,1419) = 4.3110, p-value = [.0000]
F  (150, 599) = 4.9661, p-value = [0000]
F (134,535) = 3.6577, p-value = [.0000]
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(5) = 28.533, P-value = [.0000]
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(5) = 3.2844, P-value = [.6566]
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(5) = 48.074, P-value = [.0000]
Naleuiomal letters -  commercial banks, italics -  cooperative banks, bold -  savings banks
We also introduce the lnassets, LA, and OA variables in the model. LA has a negative 
and significant sign for commercial and savings banks, while it is insignificant for 
cooperative banks (Table 56). The results for the significance of Gap, EA and LLP/TL 
remain robust (significantly positive for Gap and EA, and negative for LLP/TL) for all 
types of financial institutions. The size variable is positive and significant for all types 
of banks (the t-statistics are 7.3854, 2.9768, and 3.0245 for commercial, cooperative, 
and savings banks respectively). The difference with the previous table is on the sign 
of OA for cooperative banks. It can be argued that this result occurs because more 
profitable co-operative banks may employ better paid but more productive staff. This 
finding would indicate that more profitable cooperative banks direct a large proportion 
of their resources towards staff expenses. Also, the H is not any more significant for 
the cooperative banks, but MSH is significant with negative sign (the t-statistic of
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MSH is -2.4437 and the coefficient is -0.2335). However, for cooperative banks the 
random effects model gives good estimates for the cooperative banks (Annex 25). In 
this case H is again significant (while MSH not) but with negative coefficient (the t- 
statistic is -2.9047 and the coefficient -0.006).
I
L
Table 56: Within (fixed effects) estimates (independent variables: Gap, EA, 
I.LP/TL, MSH, II, lnussets, LA, OA)
Dependent variable: return on assets
Sum o f squared residuals R-squared
1555.87 0.7348
69.0122 0.8291
156.864 0.6822
Variance o f residuals Adjusted R-squared
1.0988 0.6668
0.1158 0.7838
0.2949 0.5974
Standard error o f  regression LM heteroscedasticity test
1.0482 367.314 [.000]
0.3403 27.1379 [.000]
0.5430 47.7512 [.000]
Durbin-Watson test
1.9048 [.O il,.030]
1.4331 [000, .000]
1.6530 [.000, .000
Variance Estimated Standard t-statistic p-value
Coefficient error
Lnassets 0.9441 0.1278 7.3854 [.000]
0.3808 0.1279 2.9768 [003]
0.6339 0.2096 3.0245 [.003]
LA -0.0193 0.0046 -4.1694 [.000]
-0.0044 0.0038 -1.1796 [239]
-0.0129 0.0060 -2.1496 [.032]
Gap 3.3717 1.3681 2.4645 [.014]
5.9283 1.2201 4.8591 [000]
9.9892 1.7819 5.6059 [.000]
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EA 0.2416 0.0192 12.5986 [.000]
0.0557 0.0190 2.9242 [004]
0.0988 0.0318 3.1075 [.002]
OA -0.0865 0.0494 -1.7506 [.080]
0.1071 0.0483 2.2158 [027]
-0.3593 0.0712 -5.0457 [.000]
LLP/TL -0.2353 0.0100 -23.5415 [.000]
-0.3079 0.0245 -12.5835 [000]
-0.0784 0.0308 -2.5502 [.Oil]
MSH -0.0242 0.0258 -0.9367 [.349]
-0.2335 0.0956 -2.4437 [015]
0.0013 0.1084 0.0117 [.991]
H 0.0000 0.0003 -0.1388 [.890]
-0.0005 0.0003 -1.8849 [060]
-0.0001 0.0003 -0.7469 [.455]
F (355, 1416) = 4.8235, p-value = [.0000]
F  (150, 596) = 4.8851, p-value == [0000]
F (134,532) = 3.9764, p-value == [.0000]
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CH1SQ(8) = 110.77, P-value = [.0000]
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(8) = 14.409, P-value = [.0717]
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(8) = 79.266, P-value = [.0000]
Note: nomal letters -  commercial banks, italics -  cooperative banks, bold -  savings banks
Finally, we introduce the macroeconomic variables in the model (Table 57). The R- 
squared has improved significantly for savings banks, and considerably for cooperative 
banks. The variance of the residuals is decreased for all types of financial institutions. 
What we observe is a significant positive effect of the level of interest rates on 
profitability, while the variability of interest rates is significant but positive for the 
savings banks (the t-statistic is 6.0219). Finally, the GDP growth is significant and 
negative in the case of commercial and savings banks, and the GPI growth significant 
and positive for co-operative banks.
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Table 57: Within (lived effects) estimates (independent variables: Gup, LA, 
i L L M L , MSI1, II, lnassets, LA, OA, I« , DEV, dGDP, dGIM) |
Dependent variable: return on assets
Sum o f squared residuals R-squared
1532.7500 0.7387
60.4499 0.8503
115.794 0.7654
Variance o f residuals Adjusted R-squared
1.0855 0.6708
0.1021 0.8093
0.2193 0.7006
Standard error o f  regression LM heteroscedasticity test
1.0419 362.459 [.000]
0.3195 11.8097 [.001]
0.4683 51.6042 [.000]
Durbin-Watson test
1.8926 [.004, .021]
1.3540 [000, .000]
1.6120 [.000, .000
Variance Estimated Standard t-statistic p-value
Coefficient error
Lnassets 0.9098 0.1288 7.0633 [.000]
0.3680 0.1421 2.5898 [010]
-0.1228 0.2095 -0.5863 [.558]
LA -0.1838 0.0048 -3.8642 [.000]
0.0011 0.0038 0.0029 [769]
-0.0050 0.0059 -0.8451 [.398]
Gap 3.1965 1.3632 2.3449 [.019]
5.9262 1.1648 5.0879 [000]
7.6268 1.5675 4.8655 [.000]
EA 0.2369 0.0191 12.4000 [.000]
0.0428 0.1851 2.3144 [021]
0.2383 0.0300 0.7951 1.427]
OA -0.1042 0.0494 -2.1096 [035]
0.0328 0.0474 0.6921 [489]
-0.4077 0.0700 -5.9119 [.000]
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LLP/TL -0.2340 0.0100 -23.4980 [.000]
-0.3246 0.0231 -14.0561 [000]
-0.1123 0.0272 -4.1303 [.000]
MSH -0.0231 0.0260 -0.8862 [.376]
-0.3222 0.0995 -3.2377 [ M l]
0.0216 0.0943 0.2290 [.819]
H 0.0001 0.0003 0.2803 [.779]
0.0017 0.0004 3.9094 [000]
0.0005 0.0002 1.9307 [.054]
IR 0.0447 0.0213 2.0983 [.036]
0.1140 0.0226 5.0430 [000]
0.0511 0.0203 2.5157 [.012]
DEV -0.0339 0.0253 -1.3417 [.180]
0.0173 0.0702 0.2462 [806]
0.5405 0.0898 6.0219 [.000]
DGDP -0.0067 0.0015 -4.5156 [.000]
-0.0074 0.0038 -1.9402 [053]
-0.0121 0.0010 -11.5570 [.000]
DGPI 0.0183 0.0172 1.0670 [.286]
0.0309 0.0086 3.6073 [000]
-0.0022 0.0117 -0.1881 [.851]
F (355, 1412) = 4.8050, p-value = [.0000]
F  (150, 592) = 5.5600, p-value = [0000]
F (134,528) = 4.9983, p-value == [.0000]
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(12) = 112.78, P-value = [.0000]
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(12) = 33.066, P-value = [.0005]
Hausman test HO: RE vs. FE: CHISQ(12) = 85.120, P-value =* [.0000]
Note: nomal letters -  commercial banks, italics * cooperative banks, bold -  savings banks
8.4.3. Year-by-year cro ss-sectiona l re gre ss io n s
In this section, we are seeking to exploit the time series dimension of the data in order 
to achieve more powerful tests than are available based on pure cross sectional 
estimations. So, in addition to the pooled time series cross sectional regressions, the 
models also were estimated as a series of five year-by-year cross-sectional regressions, 
If the results are similar, this suggests that the findings are robust with respect to the 
pooling approach, the sample composition, and the period estimated.
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From Table 58 we can conclude that the Gap and EA variables are significant positive 
for all the examined years, while LLP/TL is significantly negative.
r ~ --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -
; I able 58: \  ear-by-year cross-sectional eslimates (independent sariables: Gap, ■ 
I EA, LLP/TL)
Dependent variable: return on assets
Sum o f squared residuals R-squared
496.491 0.3032
475.997 0.4045
1133.66 0.4289
626.715 0.3301
610.746 0.4303
Variance o f residuals Adjusted R-squared
0.7291 0.3001
0.6989 0.4019
1.6647 0.4263
0.9203 0.3272
0.8968 0.4278
Standard error o f  regression
0.8539
0.8360
1.2903
0.9593
0.9470
Variance Estimated Standard t-statistic
Coefficient error
Gap 3.8447 1.0323 3.7242
2.0038 0.9801 2.0444
2.5816 1.3562 1.9036
2.6744 1.0415 2.5678
2.7885 0.9767 2.8549
EA 0.0367 0.0124 2.9497
0.1405 0.0122 11.5292
0.1484 0.0170 8.7068
0.0838 0.0126 6.6553
0.1030 0.0123 8.3691
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LLP/TL -0.2484
-0.1280
-0.3784
-0.1599
-0.2045
0.0183
0.0138
0.0213
0.0116
0.0111
-13.5469
-9.2759
-17.7765
-13.7665
-18.5004
C 0.5354 0.0775 6.9086
0.0062 0.0719 0.0857
0.1028 0.1128 0.9118
0.2642 0.0843 3.1327
0.2488 0.0815 3.0536
Note: results are presented bv ascending order from year 1994 to 1998,
In Table 59 the variables Gap, EA, and LLP/TL continue to have the expected signs for 
all the examined years. Lnassets is significant and positive only for years 1997 and 
1998 (t-statistics are 2.4290 and 2.1322 respectively). The proportion of loans to total 
assets is positive, except year 1996, but is significant only for 1994, 1997, and 1998. 
The OA variable is positive (contrary to what is expected). The MSH is positive but 
insignificant at the 5% level, with the exception of 1995. The sign of the H variable 
tends to be unstable and is found to be negative in some regressions.
Table 59: Year-by-year cross-sectional estimates (independent \ iiriublcs: 
l.uassets, LA, Gap, LA, ÜA, LLI7TL, .MSI1,11)
Dependent variable: return on assets
Sum o f squared residuals R-squared
489.346 0.3123
442.643 0.4462
1121.51 0.4350
603.372 0.3551
596.782 0.4434
Variance o f  residuals Adjusted R-squared
0.7239 0.3051
0.6548 0.4397
1.6590 0.4283
0.8926 0.3475
0.8828 0.4368
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Standard error o f  regression 
0.8509 
0.8092 
1.2880 
0.9448 
0.9396
Variance Estimated
Coefficient
Standard
error
t-statistic
Lnassets 0.0093 0.0227 0.4078
-0.0219 0.0223 -0.9804
-0.0132 0.0357 -0.3705
0.0632 0.0260 2.4290
0.0545 0.0256 2.1322
LA 0.2771 0.0018 1.5445
0.0051 0.0017 2.9736
-0.0021 0.0026 -0.7929
0.0054 0.0019 2.8226
0.0053 0.0020 2.8140
Gap 3.8969 1.1085 3.5155
2.0138 1.0051 2.0037
2.9167 1.4273 2.0436
2.4370 1.0861 2.2439
2.3654 1.0170 2.3258
EA 0.0352 0.0150 2.3435
0.1275 0.0143 8.9009
0.1405 0.0214 6.5700
0.0893 0.0157 5.6920
0.1170 0.0152 7.7244
OA 0.0547 0.0275 1.9899
0.0795 0.0269 2.9579
0.0152 0.0410 0.3698
0.0897 0.0318 2.8227
0.0401 0.0286 1.4053
LLP/TL -0.2486 0.0189 -13.1757
-0.1311 0.0136 -9.6692
-0.3776 0.0220 -17.1551
-0.1559 0.0117 -13.3576
-0.2005 0.0112 -17.8840
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MSH 0.0042
0.0078
0.0065
0.0007
0.0025
0.0030
0.0036
0.0054
0.0034
0.0036
1.3687
2.1558
1.1995
0.2071
0.6891
H -0.0001 0.0001 -0.1762
0.0003 0.0001 4.9000
0.0023 0.0001 2.1330
0.0002 0.0001 2.2512
0.0000 0.0001 -0.0314
C 0.0911 0.4160 0.2189
-0.3165 0.4040 -0.7834
0.2072 0.6515 0.3180
-1.3765 0.4743 -2.9023
-1.0594 0.4678 -2.2644
Note; results are presented bv ascending order from year 1994 to 1998,
If we introduce the macroeconomic variables, the results are the same for the above 
mentioned variables (Table 60). The level of interest rates has mixed effects on 
profitability, although in the last two years it seems to be positive but insignificant at 
the 5% level. The same mixed picture is observed for the variability o f the interest 
rates. The growth of the GDP rates is negative in all the examined years, while the 
growth of GPI is positive but insignificant.
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Table 60: Year-by-jear eruss-sectiunal estimates (imlejieiideiu variables: 
Lnasu'ts, LA, Gap, LA, OA, LL1VTL, MSII, II, INT, d G » l\ dGPI)
Dependent variable: return on assets
Sum o f squared residuals R-squared
475.076 0.3333
412.688 0.4837
1113.13 0.4392
588.876 0.3706
593.955 0.4460
Variance o f residuals Adjusted R-squared
0.7070 0.3214
0.6141 0.4745
1.6564 0.4293
0.8763 0.3593
0.8839 0.4361
Standard error o f  regression
0.8408
0.7836
1.2870
0.9361
0.9401
Variance Estimated Standard t-statistic
Coefficient error
Lnassets 0.0004 0.0233 0.0151
0.0069 0.0223 0.3097
-0.0188 0.0365 -0.5145
0.0479 0.0264 1.8171
0.0591 0.0258 2.2921
LA 0.0012 0.0019 0.6026
0.0055 0.0017 3.1920
-0.0028 0.0028 -1.0016
0.0049 0.0020 2.4874
0.0051 0.0019 2.6315
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Gap 4.0875
0.9923
3.1918
3.8410
2.4568
1.1067
0.9917
1.4757
1.1523
1.0436
3.6934
1.0006
2.1630
3.3334
2.3542
EA 0.0394 0.0155 2.5365
0.1205 0.0145 8.2994
0.1357 0.0218 6.2280
0.0715 0.0166 4.3145
0.1129 0.0164 6.8881
OA 0.0787 0.0286 2.7531
0.0699 0.0279 2.5039
0.0201 0.0416 0.4842
0.0934 0.0327 2.8596
0.0379 0.0290 1.3049
LLP/TL -0.2490 0.0188 -13.2554
-0.1318 0.0132 -10.0068
-0.3761 0.0212 -16.9590
-0.1565 0.0116 -13.5264
-0.2004 0.0112 -17.8562
MSH 0.0026 0.0031 0.8537
0.0039 0.0036 1.0728
0.0050 0.0056 0.8990
0.0006 0.0035 0.1848
0.0017 0.0038 0.4481
H 0.0000 0.0000 -0.3515
0.0001 0.0001 1.7390
0.0002 0.0001 1.3421
-0.0001 0.0001 -0.6323
0.0000 0.0001 -0.5521
INT -0.1052 0.0375 -2.8046
0.1075 0.0367 2.9300
-0.0046 0.0521 -0.0878
0.0219 0.0383 0.5707
0.0610 0.0491 1.2372
DEV 0.0713 0.0309 2.3094
-0.4655 0.1530 -3.0418
0.5459 0.3503 1.5585
0.0175 0.1151 0.1517
-0.1868 0.2135 -0.8752
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DGDP -0.0077
-0.0155
-0.2522
-0.0166
-0.0290
0.0023
0.0025
0.0269
0.0098
0.0342
-3.3101
-6.2510
-0.9392
-1.6908
-0.8590
DGPI 0.1318 0.0527 2.5027
-0.1094 0.0401 -2.7250
0.0932 0.0521 1.7897
0.2000 0.0592 3.3788
0.0372 0.0236 1.5770
C 0.4869 0.4364 1.1159
-0.1642 0.4250 -0.3864
-0.1189 0.6747 -0.1763
-1.9164 0.5269 -3.6370
-1.3710 0.5056 -2.7118
Note; results are presented bv ascending order from year 1994 to 1998.
8.5. Concluding Remarks
This chapter quantifying how internal changes (“within effects” changes) due to 
changes in balance composition and external factors (“dynamic reallocation” effects) 
due to market share changes and the macroeconomic environment contribute to the 
performance of the EU banking industry as a whole from 1994 to 1998. The 
decomposition identifies and measures both of these two broad factors that jointly 
determine the performance of the EU banking industry. This distinction is important as 
failure to count for the dynamic reallocation effects can create mistaken impressions 
about the underlying strength of the industry.
We perform cross-sectional time series regressions and year-by-year cross sectional 
regressions. The use of pooled data allows us better to control for the effects of missing 
or omitted variables. Rather than including other bank-varying variables, a comparison 
of the results for the OLS regressions with the fixed-effect models over banks can 
indicate whether the omission of bank-varying variables in the pooled OLS regressions 
produce biased results, and whether these biases arises.
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The estimation results suggest that the profitability of European banks is influenced not 
only by factors related to their management decisions but also to changes in the 
external macroeconomic environment.
Equity to assets ratio has consistently the same sign and level of significance 
suggesting that banks with greater levels of equity are relatively more profitable. The 
loans to assets ratio appears to be inversely related to banks return on assets. This 
implies that banks which have large non-loan earning assets are more profitable than 
those which depend more heavily on assets. The funds gap ratio is significantly 
positive, and the proportion of loan loss provisions to total loans significantly negative. 
Also, the results are in contrast to studies that have examined the structure- 
performance relationship for European banking and find a positive effect of the 
concentration and/or market share variables on bank profitability. In our case, not only 
the traditional structure-conduct-performance hypothesis, but also the efficient 
hypothesis are not supported. The MSH variable is not significantly different from zero 
in either regression. In fact, its sign tends to be unstable and is found to be negative in 
some regressions. However, if we exclude the loan loss reserves’ variable the 
concentration ratio seems to be significant but negative. The level of interest rates have 
a positive effect, while the variability of the interest rates and the growth of GDP rates 
negative.
We have to point out that there are some measurement issues with the MSH variable, 
since it takes the share of the value o f assets of bank over the total market value of the 
banks in each country, which are included in the Bankscope dataset. It therefore is 
influenced by how many banks in each country are reporting balance sheet data to 
Fitch-IBCA. This issue should be addresses in future work.
Concerning the size categories and the different types of financial institutions the 
following conclusions can be drawn:
>  The t-statistics are much higher for small banks
> LA positive for large banks and negative for small banks
Christos Staikouras 254
>  Negative bassets for large and positive for small banks, this has to do with 
diseconomies from a size upwards
> The market share variable is positive and significant for small banks, supporting 
the efficient hypothesis
>  The funds gap ratio is much more significant for savings banks
> The equity to assets ratio is more significant for commercial banks
> The concentration ratio is significant only for co-operative banks.
A limitation of the analysis may be related to the specification of the functional form of 
the estimating equation. Linear functions may mispecify the nature o f the relationship 
between profitability and the several internal and external determinants and bias the 
results.
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The type of explanation for the level of profitability would determine possible policy 
implications and ought to be taken seriously. Since very little empirical work has been 
undertaken investigating the competitive behaviour of European banking systems, an 
empirical investigation like the one conducted above may yield insights that could be 
of interest to academics, bankers, and policy makers.
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“Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications”
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Chapter 9: Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications
In recent years new economic forces have swept through financial markets and have 
caused major changes in the way financial intermediaries operate. While changes have 
occurred virtually everywhere and in all phases of the business, we can trace them in 
three fundamental factors: macroeconomic changes that resulted in more sophisticated 
and demanding customers, financial innovations that broke down barriers to 
competition, and the internationalisation of financial markets. Those economic changes 
had two key effects: they intensified competition among financial intermediaries and 
non-depository institutions, and they undercut the effectiveness of traditional 
regulation. Disintermediation has been favoured by the introduction of new 
technologies, financial liberalisation and European Economic and Monetary Union, 
which allow new market participants to perform tasks previously largely reserved for 
banks.
In general, banks dominate the financial system of the European Union more than that 
of the US. Thus bank assets were worth more than 240% of euro-area GDP in 1998, 
while the comparable figure in the US was only 60%. Moreover, bank assets are rising 
in relation to GDP in Europe, having been worth only 176% of GDP in 1985, while the 
comparable US ratio is declining. Banks are not only adapting a more market-oriented 
financial structure, but are also contributing to the general development of such a 
structure through their trading activities or by initiating securitisation operations. Over 
recent years the value of banks’ trading books has increased in almost all countries.
Structural differences in Europe (asset and liability composition, ownership etc.) are 
not a concern in themselves. They reflect the impact of a range of country-specific 
factors and may be sustainable for some time into the future. But differences in the 
asset size, portfolio allocation, and liability structure will affect how banks respond to 
monetary union and changes in financial markets. An important challenge will be the 
very substantial level of excess capacity in most countries’ banking systems, which 
will come under pressure as cross-border competition increases.
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Banks responses to the changing financial systems have been most clearly visible in 
their financial accounts. Data from the comprehensive OECD publication and the 
Fitch-IBCA database of bank income statements and balance sheets show that there are 
substantial performance variations across countries. The use of two data sets stems 
from the fact that data provided by the national authorities were not sufficient enough 
to capture past years’ trends in income structure and volatility of income sources. 
Second, different approaches may exist across the different countries to accounting 
procedures and supervisory reporting schemes limiting the effectiveness of cross­
country comparisons. Moreover, it should be noted that the reference period (1994- 
1998), for which a more detailed description of the components of non-interest income 
is available, has been characterised by specific market conditions (decrease of interest 
rates and a generally favourable financial climate for high level profits on financial 
operations).
Generally speaking net interest income has declined over time. This has been due 
mainly to the fall in nominal interest rates and the consequent fall in banks 
“endowment” income on non-interest bearing liabilities, and only to a small extent to 
increased competition in lending and deposit markets. From the analysis it seems that 
there is a direct (level and variability) or indirect (through the balance sheet structure) 
influence of nominal interest rates on the net interest margin of the banks. Rising rates 
increase the demand for rate sensitive assets relative to that of rate sensitive liabilities, 
while falling rates have the opposite effect. However, although interest rates are the 
most significant factor determining net interest margin, there are also some other 
variables that have a great influence on that ratio, as are the concentration measure of 
the banking industry in an EU country and the asset size of the financial institution.
Meanwhile there has been substantial rise in non-interest income. The competition 
from non-bank financial institutions and the resulting pressure on intermediation 
margins has led banks to offset the decrease in their interest income by shifting to other 
sources of income, such as fees and commissions. The relative importance of non­
interest income (as a percentage o f total operating income) increased in the EU 
throughout the observation period. This trend has been confirmed by the existing data 
for the entire period 1983-1999, which is long enough to verify a structural change in
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the EU banks’ income composition. The increase in its relative importance could, 
however, signal either the intrinsic dynamism of non-interest income or an ongoing 
reduction in interest income. In fact, both patterns are at work. The increase of non­
interest income seems to be accompanied by a decrease of banks’ profitability in 
recent years, maybe due maybe to increased costs associated with the development of 
non-interest income activities and the reduction of net interest income. However, the 
evolution of non-interest income may indicate that although the growth of that source 
of income did not fully offset the reduction in the interest margin, the growth 
nevertheless helped to consolidate the banks’ overall profitability at the 1995 level and, 
moreover, given the favourable economic conditions, to achieve a remarkable 
improvement in the overall profitability of the EU banking system for the last year of 
the observation period (1999).
Also we try to find the correlation between interest income and non-interest income. If 
the two components of banks’ income demonstrate a different cyclical behaviour, non­
interest income could exert a stabilising influence on banks’ results by offsetting the 
fluctuations in interest income. Compared with a recent report of the European Central 
Bank (April, 2000) which is based on aggregate country data presented on the OECD 
publication, we conduct an empirical search for the correlation between interest and 
non-interest income, both expressed as a percentage o f the average balance sheet total, 
for individual banks in the period 1994-1998. A correlation coefficient significantly 
lower than one would indicate a stabilising influence, while a negative correlation 
would even imply that any decreases in interest income (e.g. due to a reduction in 
interest margins, increased competition etc.) could be expected to be compensated by 
an increase in non-interest income. With regard to the empirical evidence, only in few 
cases the correlation is negative.
Additionally we present the empirical findings with regard to volatility of interest and 
non-interest income for EU countries. If the measure of volatility is the standard 
deviation, the results are heterogeneous but conclude with s significant increase of non­
interest variability in the recent period. However, if the statistical indicator used to 
measure volatility is the coefficient of variation, the results indicate much higher
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variability for non-interest income for most of the EU countries and the examined 
years.
The dramatic changes in the financial services industry have had a profound effect on 
profitability, forcing financial institutions to change their management focus. Increased 
competitive pressures, tightening interest-rate spreads and declining deposit balances 
have made financial goals even more difficult to achieve. This environment creates an 
increased and urgent need for quality information on profitability management. The 
challenge posed by the decline of traditional banking is twofold: we need to maintain 
the soundness of the banking system while restructuring the banking industry to 
achieve long-term financial stability.
Performance measurement is above all a management tool, intended to support and 
assist management in tactical or strategic decision making. It follows that management 
understanding plays an important role in resolving the complex issues surrounding 
performance measurement and the successful use of the information. Performance 
measures are a quantitative assessment of progress toward achieving a particular goal 
or objective. Within the performance measurement system are many profitability 
measures, such as return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA). With 
management’s increased control of the components of return on assets, its use as a 
performance measure is more valid.
European bank profitability could have implications for financial stability. For 
example, high profitability could be the result of more pronounced risk-taking 
behaviour of European banks as they position themselves higher on the expected 
return-risk frontier. High profitability could also be the result of the anticipated bailout 
policy by the lender of last resort. If European banks are perceived to be “too big to 
fail”, this will again induce risk-taking behaviour, but in addition, could lead to high 
credit ratings, reducing the funding costs. On the other hand, high profitability could be 
the result of superior operating efficiency of some European banks when compared 
with their European competitors.
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After reviewing the empirical literature concerning bank performance and the main 
components of income sources, we can determine the several factors that influence 
bank profitability. We believe that testing for the robustness of banks’ performance 
over time and space should shed light on policy debates, and on the assessment of 
banks’ performance. In addition, we believe that our work has some relevance and 
importance for the ongoing wave of consolidation and restructuring in the European 
banking markets as an outcome of the Monetary Union. A linear function of a multiple 
regression equation, on a pooled cross section time series sample, is utilised to test the 
effects of firm and market specific variables on bank profitability. A number of studies 
have examined bank performance in an effort to isolate the factors that account for 
interbank differences in profitability. These factors are either internal or external. 
Individual bank characteristics such as the portfolio composition, and the scale and 
scope o f operations, can affect the costs at which banks produce financial services. 
Market structure, measured by the relative size and number of firms, can influence the 
degree of local competition, and, by extension, the quality, quantity, and pricing of 
financial services ultimately available to bank customers.
Rather than including other bank-varying variables, a comparison of the results for the 
OLS regressions with the fixed-effect models over banks can indicate whether the 
omission of bank-varying variables in the pooled OLS regressions produce biased 
results, and whether these biases arises. The estimation results suggest that the 
profitability of European banks is influenced not only by factors related to their 
management decisions but also to changes in the external macroeconomic 
environment. The financial performance of any financial institution is largely 
determined by the behavior of its balance sheet. The balance sheet is a wonder of 
dynamism and inertia. How assets and liabilities perform individually and in 
combination is critical. Equity to assets ratio has consistently the same sign and level 
of significance suggesting that banks with greater levels of equity are relatively more 
profitable. The loans to assets ratio appears to be inversely related to banks return on 
assets. This implies that banks which have large non-loan earning assets are more 
profitable than those which depend more heavily on assets. The funds gap ratio is 
significantly positive, and the proportion of loan loss provisions to total loans 
significantly negative. Also, the results are in contrast to studies that have examined
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the structure-performance relationship for European banking and find a positive effect 
o f the concentration and/or market share variables on bank profitability. In our case, 
not only the traditional structure-conduct-performance hypothesis, but also the efficient 
hypothesis are not supported. The MSH variable is not significantly different from zero 
in either regression. In fact, its sign tends to be unstable and is found to be negative in 
some regressions. However, if we exclude the loan loss reserves’ variable the 
concentration ratio seems to be significant but negative. The level of interest rates have 
a positive effect, while the variability of the interest rates and the growth of GDP rates 
negative.
The foreseen structural changes require the need for adjustment to be taken seriously 
by all participants in the financial system. This adjustment appears to have intensified 
in recent years, as there has been an increase in merger activity, an establishment of 
alliances and an introduction of new products and services, often based on modem 
information technology. The process of structural change embodies an element of risk, 
but if these risks are identified early and analysed carefully, then they can be duly 
taken into account.
In order for European banks to prosper in rapidly changing markets, the major strategic 
issue that they must address in governance, not consolidation. As we have outlined, 
banks face declining volumes and margins in core corporate and some retail deposit 
markets. At the same time they have considerable opportunities in newer markets and 
can maintain profits by widening some margins and reducing costs. The key to success 
in the European banking industry will therefore be learning, adapting, and exploiting 
new profit opportunities and appropriately reducing costs. Mergers and acquisitions 
will be beneficial only as a means to this end. Ultimately the test of each new initiative 
will be whether it delivers increased shareholder value. The discipline on corporate 
governance provided by a clear commitment to delivering shareholder value is not yet 
fully established in European banking. There are differing patterns of both bank 
governance and of financial reporting across Europe.
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Greater emphasis on delivering profits and shareholder value will coincide with a 
dramatic squeeze on traditional sources of bank income. Assuming that the possibility 
of state support is no longer available, many banks will be forced to take vigorous 
action to reduce costs and avoid losses. However, many banks may try to maintain 
profit levels by diversifying into new activities and by taking greater risks. Some banks 
may take riskier, higher-yielding loans. In particular, they may place a greater 
percentage of their funds in commercial real estate loans, historically a riskier type of 
loans. They may also increase lending to support corporate takeovers and highly 
leveraged buyouts, and expanded their lending to less creditworthy borrowers. They 
may expand off-balance sheet activities and provide a wider array o f nontraditional 
financial products, such as underwriting, securities, and derivatives market services, 
some of which may be quite risky. That strategy has raised questions about what the 
proper activities for banks should be, and about whether nontraditional activities might 
result in banks’ taking excessive risk.
According to the ECB report the development of non-interest income could lead banks 
to bear additional market risks. If this could mitigate the sensitivity of banks to the 
credit cycles linked to downturns in economic activities, it could, at the same time, 
reinforce their sensitivity to market cycles related to fluctuations in interest rates, stock 
exchanges or foreign exchange markets. Operational risks have also several facets. To 
develop complex new products, banks need to upgrade the level of skills of their 
employees. They also have to organise good follow-up o f their new activities, which 
necessitates an adequate internal control mechanism. This is particularly important 
when banks diversify their range of services and enter new geographic areas, such as 
emerging markets, which present political and country risks. Finally, in order to react 
to the changing nature of banking and financial services in an adequate way, banks 
have to take strategic risks. In particular, they have to redefine their objectives in order 
to safeguard a substantial level of profitability in the future. For some banks, this will 
imply a greater specification, based on a correct assessment of their specific strength, 
with the risk of making wrong choices of adopting herding behaviour. Indeed, in some 
products (e.g. private banking and asset management) seem to be a promising area for 
future profits, too many banks could be tempted to focus on the same non-interest 
income related activities.
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Creditors and depositors would almost certainly demand to have more and better 
information about what banks do, about the current values of banks’ assets and 
liabilities, and about the risks that banks are taking. Requiring banks to make public 
disclosures about their operations and financial performance could in principle 
reinforce regulators as monitors of banks. Banks should make available to the public 
market value based risk disclosure statements that provide a reasonably accurate 
picture of the risks to which they are exposed. Such disclosures will enhance economic 
efficiency and may help to deter excessive risk-taking by providing better information 
to regulators, customers, creditors, and stockholders.
The changes in the banks’ income structure deriving from developments in the banking 
business also have implications for the activity of banking supervision in two respects: 
prudential regulation and current supervision. As banks expand into increasingly 
complex and opaque activities, it will become more and more difficult for regulators to 
determine appropriate capital standards and to monitor and police the activities of 
banks. For policy makers, the key goals are to ensure that the benefits of the single 
market in banking are fully realised, and that the ongoing consolidation of the banking 
industry does not result in financial instability or excessive social and fiscal costs.
With regard to prudential regulation, the main reference is to the capital adequacy 
regime. This regime, initially designed to cover credit risks on the basis of the solvency 
ratio, was later extended to cover market risks. As a subsequent step, the development 
of sophisticated risk management techniques by banks was taken into account by 
supervisors through the acceptance of internal risk management models to measure 
market risk for capital requirement purposes. One of the areas in which this process is 
being undertaken is the determination of specific capital requirements for categories of 
risks other than credit and market risk. Requiring banks to hold adequate capital 
promotes financial stability in two ways. First, it provides a greater cushion with which 
banks can absorb losses, lessening the likelihood of failure. Second, with more capital 
at risk, banks have less incentive to take excessive risk. To ensure that banks hold the 
requisite amount of capital and do not engage in either excessively risky or illegal 
activities, supervision and field examinations of banks would continue to be necessary.
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Effective regulatory monitoring and supervision are key elements in a system of risk- 
based capital requirements. Regulators must be willing and able to take early corrective 
action to prevent losses from escalating to levels greater than the capital held by the 
bank. Among other things, effective monitoring requires that the net worth of a bank 
be frequently (if not continually) reassessed and that a bank’s activities be monitored to 
ensure that the bank does not take inappropriate risks. A precondition for successful 
monitoring is that regulators be able to measure accurately both a bank’s capital and its 
potential risk exposure.
In general terms, banking supervisors have to ensure that all risks stemming from the 
changes in the banks’ income structure are properly controlled by banks. To that end, 
banking supervisors have already adapted or are in the process of adapting their 
monitoring process in order to take account of the developments in banking activities. 
Bank supervision has traditionally focused on the assessment of the quality of a bank’s 
balance sheet at a specific point of time -and on whether it complies with capital 
requirements and restrictions on portfolio composition. This approach is no longer 
adequate in a world in which banks are active players in the capital markets and can be 
driven into insolvency extremely rapidly from trading losses. In today’s financial 
environment effective supervision requires shorter monitoring intervals than in the 
past, which substantially increases supervisory costs. For example, derivatives (futures, 
forwards, options, and swaps) can be useful in reducing a bank’s risk but can also be 
used to increase risk exposure quickly and dramatically. A bank can change its risk 
exposure substantially within minutes by simply altering its trading position in 
derivatives. Thus, we are moving toward a financial system where effective monitoring 
will require regulators to reassess the market value o f a bank’s capital as well as the 
bank’s risk exposure on a continuous basis. If banks were to take excessive risks, for 
example, depositors and creditors could demand higher risk premiums or leave the 
bank entirely and thereby provide an incentive for banks to operate more prudently. At 
a minimum, therefore, banks should be required to adopt market-value accounting and 
disclosure principles.
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